By Scott Stewart
As the United States and its allies move closer to direct military action in Syria, Russia and Iran have expressed vocal opposition to any attack against their ally in Damascus. In addition to press statements, more subtle messages have been passed around the region. For example, while Iran is quite unlikely to confront the United States directly and militarily, we have received reports that Iranian diplomats have discussed the possibility of Hezbollah launching a wave of hostage takings in Lebanon in response to any U.S. military strike on the al Assad regime -- discussions apparently intended for U.S. ears. The Daily Star, a Lebanese newspaper, quoted pro-Hezbollah Sheikh Afif Nabulsi on Aug. 27 as saying that "any [U.S.] strike against Syria would be met by harsh responses against U.S. interests in the region."
While there are fewer Americans living in Lebanon than there were in the 1970s and early 1980s -- the wave of kidnappings in Lebanon commenced with the abduction of American University of Beirut President David Dodge in July 1982; the last Western hostage, Terry Anderson, was released in December 1991 -- there are many more American college students, tourists and businessmen in Lebanon at present than there were in the early 1990s in the immediate wake of the Lebanese hostage crisis. With the abduction U.S. Marine Col. William Higgins, the last American taken hostage, having occurred in 1988, the threat is seen as greatly reduced. This sentiment exists despite U.S. State Department warnings of the threat of kidnapping in Lebanon, like the travel warning issued in April. Warnings notwithstanding, many if not most of the Americans living in Lebanon would be easy kidnapping targets for a sophisticated group such as Hezbollah -- especially if they are not looking for surveillance directed against them.
The manner in which these warnings are occurring suggests the Iranians and their Lebanese allies are using this threatening message to the U.S. government as a bluff. Given the history of kidnapping in Lebanon, however, such as the Aug. 9 abduction of two Turkish Airlines pilots, this threat should be taken very seriously by Americans residing in or visiting Lebanon.
The Dog that Barks
If the Iranians were really preparing to unleash Hezbollah for a kidnapping operation, it seems unlikely that they would provide such a well-telegraphed warning in advance. Past covert operations by the Iranians and Hezbollah have been conducted with much more secrecy, and in most cases with a very large degree of plausible deniability. For example, Hezbollah used many different organizational names to hide its hand during the Lebanese hostage crisis, such as Islamic Jihad, Organization for the Defense of Free People and Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, among others. This obfuscation was also intended to hide the Iranian connection to the kidnappings despite the very real involvement of Iranian intelligence. While the first American hostage, David Dodge, was held in an Iranian prison near Tehran, the Iranians took many steps to attempt to keep their involvement in later kidnappings more concealed, arms-for-hostages deals and other indicators aside. The charade was enough to keep the United States from directly attacking Iran and also sufficed to allow the Europeans enough leeway to continue commercial relations with Iran despite U.S. objections and economic sanctions.
As seen in the August 2006 Lebanon war and in its current offensive actions in Syria to assist the al Assad regime, Hezbollah remains a potent militant force with a large number of highly trained and dedicated fighters. Indeed, the urban warfare skills Hezbollah is demonstrating in Syria, such as planning and executing complex ambushes and employing improvised explosive devices, are things that can be directly applied to terrorist attacks. As seen by their apparent involvement in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and other more recent incidents, the group has also not lost its ability to construct and effectively deploy large vehicle bombs.
Hezbollah also operates a very complex intelligence apparatus inside Lebanon that allows it to collect a great deal of intelligence on prospective targets. This includes the ability to tap phone traffic at will. Moreover, Hezbollah has long controlled security and communications at Beirut's Rafik al-Hariri International Airport, a position that lets it note the comings and goings of foreigners or other targets of interest. It is believed that this network was instrumental in the October 2012 assassination of Brig. Gen. Wissam al-Hassan, the intelligence chief for Lebanon's Internal Security Forces.
In addition to assassinations, Hezbollah clearly has retained the capability to locate and kidnap foreigners. The ability was showcased Aug. 9 when two Turkish Airlines pilots were kidnapped shortly after they departed from Rafik al-Hariri International Airport in a van. While the kidnapping was claimed by a previously unknown group calling itself Zuwwar al Imam Ali al Reda, (the Visitors of the Shrine of Imam Ali al Reda), there is little doubt Hezbollah actually carried it out. The kidnappers have demanded the release of a group of nine Lebanese Shia kidnapped by Sunni rebels in Syria. Syrian rebels have claimed the abducted Lebanese were members of Hezbollah, and said they will not be released until Hezbollah stops fighting in Syria. Hezbollah took the Turkish pilots in the hope that Ankara, which is assisting the Syrian rebels, could pressure the Syrian rebels to release the Lebanese prisoners. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has conveniently volunteered to help negotiate the pilots' release.
Intent, not Just Capability
While Hezbollah clearly retains the capability to take American hostages -- and there are numerous vulnerable Americans in Lebanon at this time -- the big question is whether Hezbollah intends to do so.
Hezbollah has long had operatives capable of undertaking missions aimed at U.S. interests in Lebanon and beyond, including in the United States. In fact, Hezbollah's militant operatives are better trained and more numerous than any group the al Qaeda core has ever controlled. Yet despite this capability, Hezbollah has not chosen to use it to strike American interests for several years now. Though there are indications Hezbollah operatives may have assisted the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force in the July 2012 attack against Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, Hezbollah has been very careful not to anger the United States in recent years.
This is due in large part to the way Hezbollah has matured as an organization. It is no longer the new, shadowy organization it was in 1982 or 1983, but rather is now a large global organization with a proverbial return address. Its assets and personnel now can be identified and seized or attacked. Hezbollah understands that a serious terrorist attack or series of attacks against Americans could result in the type of reaction that followed 9/11, and that the organization would likely end up on the receiving end of the type of relentless global campaign that the United States launched against al Qaeda. The ability of the United States to strike targets using special operations forces, drones and other advanced weapons far surpasses its capabilities in the 1980s -- and Lebanon is far easier for the United States to strike than Afghanistan or Pakistan.
As discussed above, in the early days, Hezbollah (and its Iranian patrons) worked hard to sow ambiguity and hide responsibility for terrorist attacks, but as Hezbollah matured as an organization, such subterfuge became more difficult.
There is also international public opinion to consider. Hezbollah is not just a militant group. Today, it is also a political organization seeking legitimacy. It is one thing for it to portray itself as a "victim of Israeli aggression" when standing up to Israeli forces in southern Lebanon or even fighting jihadists in Syria to help Alawites being attacked. It is quite another to be seen kidnapping students or businessmen.
Hezbollah also sees the United States (and the rest of the Western Hemisphere) as a wonderful place to make money through its array of legal and illegal enterprises. If it angered the United States, Washington could launch a persistent and focused campaign against Hezbollah financial networks similar to the one conducted against al Qaeda's finances. If this were to occur, Hezbollah's business interests in the Western Hemisphere would be severely impacted. Such an economic campaign could also extend to Hezbollah's business interests in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. With Iran and Syria facing serious financial issues, Hezbollah needs its financial network more than ever.
Hezbollah's terrorist attacks in Lebanon in the 1980s, such as the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and the two attacks against the U.S. Embassy, were intended to drive U.S. influence out of Lebanon, and the attacks largely succeeded in doing that. An attack by Hezbollah against American interests today could result in the return of U.S. attention to, and perhaps even attacks against, Hezbollah's infrastructure in Lebanon, something that is clearly not in Hezbollah's interests. Therefore, even if the Iranians did ask Hezbollah to undertake a kidnapping campaign, it is not certain Hezbollah would oblige -- especially in the wake of these recent threats, which would make it difficult for Hezbollah and Iran to deny involvement.
Taking all that into account, given Hezbollah's capabilities and the history of kidnapping in Lebanon such as the recent kidnapping of the two Turkish pilots, Americans in Lebanon should not ignore the potential kidnapping threat. They should reassess their personal security, examine their travel habits and patterns, dust off their contingency plans and above all, practice good situational awareness.
Hezbollah may possess advanced operational and intelligence capabilities, but it cannot operate without detection. Even the most professional militant networks are bound by the constraints of the attack planning cycle and their operational activities are vulnerable to detection during certain phases of that cycle -- especially during the surveillance phase.
If the threat of Hezbollah kidnappings is not merely an Iranian bluff, picking up on signs of preoperational surveillance and then acting to avoid a potential abduction could spare one a long and painful hostage ordeal.
Copyright Stratfor.com
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