Please send us a Tropical Storm

It's bad when we're asking for this.....

TROPICAL WEATHER OUTLOOK
NWS NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL
800 PM EDT SUN JUL 31 2011

FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC...CARIBBEAN SEA AND THE GULF OF MEXICO...

AN ELONGATED AREA OF LOW PRESSURE EXTENDING FROM THE LESSER ANTILLES EASTWARD SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES INTO THE TROPICAL ATLANTIC OCEAN IS PRODUCING A LARGE BUT DISORGANIZED AREA OF SHOWERS AND
THUNDERSTORMS. CONDITIONS ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN FAVORABLE FOR A TROPICAL DEPRESSION OR TROPICAL STORM TO FORM...AND THIS SYSTEM HAS A HIGH CHANCE...90 PERCENT...OF BECOMING A TROPICAL CYCLONE DURING THE NEXT 48 HOURS AS IT MOVES WEST-NORTHWESTWARD AT AROUND 15 MPH. IF THE SYSTEM BECOMES A TROPICAL CYCLONE TONIGHT OR MONDAY...

TROPICAL STORM WATCHES OR WARNINGS WOULD BE ISSUED FOR PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN WINDWARD ISLANDS AND THE LEEWARD ISLANDS ON VERY SHORT NOTICE...AND INTERESTS IN THESE AREAS SHOULD CLOSELY MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS SYSTEM. A HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT IS SCHEDULED TO INVESTIGATE THIS SYSTEM MONDAY MORNING. REGARDLESS OF TROPICAL CYCLONE FORMATION...THIS SYSTEM WILL BRING LOCALLY HEAVY RAINFALL AND GUSTY WINDS TO PORTIONS OF THE LESSER ANTILLES TONIGHT AND MONDAY.

Actually, we're begging. Beth and I worked in the yard all weekend and the ground it like rock.

Don was such a disappointment...and we need rain, not snow fall, so ALGORE showing up to talk about Global Warming won't help!

Officer Down

Police Officer Russell Willingham
Winston-Salem North Carolina Police Department
End of Watch: Saturday, July 30, 2011
Age: 28
Tour of Duty: 2 years

Police Officer Russell Willingham was killed in an automobile accident while responding to backup another officers at approximately 3:15 am.

He was traveling on North Vargrave Street when his patrol car left the roadway and struck a tree. He was able to notify dispatch that he was pinned inside and rescue units were dispatched. Moments later he notified dispatchers that his vehicle had caught fire. When the rescue units arrived the vehicle was fully engulfed in flames.



Officer Willingham had served with the Winston-Salem Police Department for two years and had previously served with the Greensboro Police Department.  

Rest in Peace Bro…We’ll Continue The Watch
Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 


Thankfully I was able to hold my breakfast after seeing this crap

I was up this morning ordering some new checks and I saw this on Checks Unlimited....

I remember in the early 90s some idiot made a remake of Johnny Quest and it was fully PC...now the Jetsons, the Flintstones and Tom and Jerry...please, leave some of the better images of my childhood alone!!!!

Checks Unlimited I hope you loose your ass on this crap!

What's going on in the World Today 110730

 HYPERLINKS MAY REQUIRE AN EMAIL:  
 

USA

U.S. Naval Update Map: July 27, 2011 | STRATFOR

Alleged Fort Hood Plotter Thwarted by Operational Mistakes | STRATFOR

EUROPE

Portfolio: Eurozone's Future To Rely Heavily On Germany | STRATFOR

ASIA

China's Technology Showcases Mask Economic Warning Signs | STRATFOR

Agenda: North Korea Resumes Diplomatic Negotiations | STRATFOR

India: Defense Ministry To Upgrade Fighter Aircraft Fleet July 29, 2011

Indian Defense Ministry officials signed a $2.4 billion deal with French companies Thales and Dassault Aviation on July 29 to upgrade its 51-strong Mirage 2000 fighter fleet, company officials said, PTI reported. The aircraft will serve 20-25 more years. The Indian air force inducted Mirages in the mid 1980s.

RUSSIA

Russia and France: New Levels of Cooperation | STRATFOR
 
IRAN

Iran: China Invests In Major Iranian Petrochemical Project July 30, 2011

Chinese investors will provide 85 percent of the funding for construction of the Masjed-Soleyman Petrochemical Complex in Iran, the BBC reported July 30, citing the Mehr news agency. The complex will be the largest urea fertilizer and ammonium production unit in the word, and Iranian private investors, along with the Chinese investors, are set to invest $4 billion. Construction officially started July 30.
 
IRAQ

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT
 
ISRAEL

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT
 
AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan Weekly War Update: Raid on a Haqqani Camp | STRATFOR

MIDDLE EAST

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT

SOUTH OF THE BORDER

Mexico Security Memo: Underground Meth Labs in Sinaloa | STRATFOR

Mexico: Juarez Cartel Leader Captured July 30, 2011

Mexican police arrested alleged Juarez drug cartel leader Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez, known as “El Diego,” Reuters reported July 30. An arrest was made but the identity was not confirmed, according to a spokeswoman for the federal police in Mexico City.
 
MISC

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT
 

 
Except where noted courtesy www.stratfor.com
 

 

A great quote to contemplate as the idiots in Washington fiddle.

Somehow I got on the distro list for The Nooner, a daily email blast from The Hayride: A Commendatory on Louisiana Politics. Part of it is the Quote of the Day and I received this earlier this week. As the idiots in DC are showing why they are not competent to mow a lawn, this seems to be appropriate.

"It is not by the intermeddling of [English poet laureate] Mr. Southey's idol, the omniscient and omnipotent State, but by the prudence and energy of the people, that England has hitherto been carried forward in civilization; and it is to the same prudence and the same energy that we now look with comfort and good hope. Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the nation by strictly confining themselves to their own legitimate duties, by leaving capital to find its most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their natural reward, idleness and folly their natural punishment, by maintaining peace, by defending property, by diminishing the price of law, and by observing strict economy in every department of the state. Let the Government do this: the People will assuredly do the rest."

- Thomas Babington Macaulay, Southey's Colloquies on Society, 1830

The idiots on Capital Hill get corrupted on what they are sent to do. To borrow the phrase from another great philosopher, "Politicians are like diapers. They must be changed regularly, and for the same reason."

UPDATE: Another great quote of the day, inspired by the former Republican nominee.

“I’d rather be a hobbit than a troll.”
- Rand Paul, on John McCain.

Officer Down

Police Officer Daniel Ackerman
Buena Park California Police Department
End of Watch: Saturday, July 30, 2011
Age: 31
Tour of Duty: 10 years, 3 months
Date of Incident: Friday, July 29, 2011

Police Officer Daniel Ackerman passed away after collapsing during a SWAT training exercise.

He was participating in the training when he collapsed at about 8:00 am. He was transported to St. Jude Medical Center where he remained until passing away early the following morning.

Officer Ackerman had served as a full-time officer with the Buena Park Police Department for six years and had previously served as a reserve officer for four years. He is survived by his daughter, mother, and sister.

Rest in Peace Bro…We’ll Continue The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh.

Update on CPL Scott

I recently posted on CPL Breck Scott (Thank you Pat at And So it Goes in Shreveport).

Beth and I visited CPL Scott this afternoon at his hospital room.  He and his family were pleasantly surprised to see strangers checking up on them.   His father said he is really impressed that the area is supportive of an injured out of town officer, how fellow cops and strangers were coming by.  Mr Scott mentioned how a packed restaurant, after finding out why CPL Scott was there, immediately cleared a table for them.

The good news is the infection is gone and barring any other problems the worse is behind him...he has a long recovery and physical terrorism in front of him but he is headed in the right direction.

UPDATE: Thanks Darren (Right on the Left Coast) for the link

Security Weekly: Norway: Lessons from a Successful Lone Wolf Attacker, July 28, 2011

By Scott Stewart

On the afternoon of July 22, a powerful explosion ripped through the streets of Oslo, Norway, as a large improvised explosive device (IED) in a rented van detonated between the government building housing the prime minister’s office and Norway’s Oil and Energy Department building. According to the diary of Anders Breivik, the man arrested in the case who has confessed to fabricating and placing the device, the van had been filled with 950 kilograms (about 2,100 pounds) of homemade ammonium nitrate-based explosives.

After lighting the fuse on his IED, Breivik left the scene in a rented car and traveled to the island of Utoya, located about 32 kilometers (20 miles) outside of Oslo. The island was the site of a youth campout organized by Norway’s ruling Labor Party. Before taking a boat to the island, Breivik donned body armor and tactical gear bearing police insignia (intended to afford him the element of tactical surprise). Once on the island he opened fire on the attendees at the youth camp with his firearms, a semiautomatic 5.56 mm Ruger Mini-14 rifle and a 9 mm Glock pistol. Due to the location of the camp on a remote island, Breivik had time to kill 68 people and wound another 60 before police responded to the scene.

(click here to enlarge image)
Shortly before the attack, Breivik posted a manifesto on the Internet that includes his lengthy operational diary. He wrote the diary in English under the Anglicized pen name Andrew Berwick, though a careful reading shows he also posted his true identity in the document. The document also shows that he was a lone wolf attacker who conducted his assault specifically against the Labor Party’s current and future leadership. Breivik targeted the Labor Party because of his belief that the party is Marxist-oriented and is responsible for encouraging multiculturalism, Muslim immigration into Norway and, acting with other similar European governments, the coming destruction of European culture. Although the Labor Party members are members of his own race, he considers them traitors and holds them in more contempt than he does Muslims. In fact, in the manifesto, Breivik urged others not to target Muslims because it would elicit sympathy for them.

Breivik put most of his time and effort into the creation of the vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) that he used to attack his primary target, the current government, which is housed in the government building. It appears that he believed the device would be sufficient to destroy that building. It was indeed a powerful device, but the explosion killed only eight people. This was because the device did not bring down the building as Breivik had planned and many of the government employees who normally work in the area were on summer break. In the end, the government building was damaged but not destroyed in the attack, and no senior government officials were killed. Most of the deaths occurred at the youth camp, which Breivik described as his secondary target.

While Breivik’s manifesto indicated he planned and executed the attack as a lone wolf, it also suggests that he is part of a larger organization that he calls the “Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici (PCCTS, also known as the Knights Templar), which seeks to encourage other lone wolves (whom Brevik refers to as “Justiciar Knights”) and small cells in other parts of Europe to carry out a plan to “save” Europe and European culture from destruction.

Because of the possibility that there are other self-appointed Justiciar Knights in Norway or in other parts of Europe and that Breivik’s actions, ideology and manifesto could spawn copycats, we thought it useful to examine the Justiciar Knights concept as Breivik explains it to see how it fits into lone wolf theory and how similar actors might be detected in the future.

An Opening Salvo?

From reading his manifesto, it is clear that Breivik, much like Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, believes that his attack is the opening salvo in a wider campaign, in this case to liberate Europeans from what Breivik views as malevolent, Marxist-oriented governments. These beliefs are what drove Breivik to attack the Norwegian Labor Party. As noted above, it is also clear that Breivik planned and executed his attack alone.

However, he also discusses how he was radicalized and influenced by a Serbian living in Liberia whom he visited there. And Breivik claims to have attended a meeting in London in 2002 to “re-found the Knights Templar.” This organization, PCCTS, which was founded in 2002, is not related to the much older official and public chivalric order also known as the Knights Templar. According to Breivik, the PCCTS was formed with the stated purpose of fighting back against “European Jihad” and to defend the “free indigenous peoples of Europe.” To achieve this goal, the PCCTS would implement a three-phase plan designed to seize political and military power in Europe. In his manifesto Breivik outlines the plan as follows:

Phase 1 (1999-2030): Cell-based shock attacks, sabotage attacks, etc.
Phase 2 (2030-2070): Same as above but bigger cells/networks, armed militias.
Phase 3 (2070-2100): Pan-European coup d’etats, deportation of Muslims and execution of traitors.
As outlined in Breivik’s manifesto, the 2002 meeting was attended by seven other individuals, two from England and one each from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Russia. He also asserts that the organization has members from Serbia (his contact living in Liberia), Sweden, Belgium and the United States who were unable to attend the meeting. Brevik states that all the members of the PCCTS were given code names for security, that his code name was “Sigurd,” and that he was mentored by a member with the code name “Richard the Lionhearted” (presumably a Briton). Breivik claims that after meeting these individuals via the Internet he was carefully vetted before being allowed to join the group.

The diary section of Breivik’s manifesto reveals that during the planning process for the attack Breivik traveled to Prague to obtain firearms and grenades from Balkan organized-crime groups there (he had hoped to obtain a fully automatic AK-47). Breivik was not able to procure weapons in Prague and instead was forced to use weapons he was able to obtain in Norway by legal means. It is interesting that he did not contact the Serbian member of the PCCTS for assistance in making contact with Balkan arms dealers. Breivik’s lawyer told the media July 26 that although Breivik acted alone in conducting his attack, he had been in contact with two terror cells in Norway and other cells abroad. Certainly, Norway and its partners in EUROPOL and the United States will try to identify these other individuals, if they do in fact exist.

In phase one of the PCCTS plan, shock attacks were to be carried out by individuals operating as lone wolves or small cells of Breivik’s so-called Justiciar Knights, who are self-appointed guardians who decide to follow the PCCTS code outlined in Breivik’s manifesto and who are granted the authority to act as “a judge, jury and executioner until the free, indigenous peoples of Europe are no longer threatened by cultural genocide, subject to cultural Marxist/Islamic tyranny or territorial or existential threats through Islamic demographic warfare.”

Breivik’s manifesto notes that he does not know how many Justiciar Knights there are in Western Europe but estimates their number to be from 15 to 80. It is unclear if this is a delusion on his part and there are no other Justiciar Knights or if Breivik has some factual basis for his belief that there are more individuals like him planning attacks.

While some observers have noted that the idea of Justiciar Knights operating as lone wolves and in small cells is similar to the calls in recent years for grassroots jihadists to adopt lone wolf tactics, it is important to understand that leaderless resistance has been a central theme of white supremacist groups in the United States since the early 1990s. While Breivik did not express any anti-Semitism in his manifesto (something he has been heavily criticized for on U.S. anti-Semitic websites), clearly the anti-immigration and anti-Marxist ideology of the PCCTS has been influenced more by white hate groups than by al Qaeda.

Moreover, the concept of a self-identified Justiciar Knight is quite similar to the idea of a “Phineas Priest” in the leaderless resistance model propagated by some white supremacists in the United States who adhere to “Christian Identity” ideology. In this model, Phineas Priests see themselves as lone wolf militants chosen by God and set apart to be his “agents of vengeance” upon the earth. Phineas Priests also believe that their attacks will serve to ignite a wider “racial holy war” that will ultimately lead to the salvation of the white race.

Leaderless resistance has also been advocated by militant anarchists as well as animal rights and environmentalist activists who belong to such groups as the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. So it is not correct to think of leaderless resistance merely as a jihadist construct — it has long been used by a variety of militant actors.

Lone Wolf Challenges

One of the great strengths of our enemies, the Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist regimes is their vast resources and their advanced investigation/forensic capabilities. There are thousands of video cameras all over European major cities and you will always risk leaving behind dna, finger prints, witnesses or other evidence that will eventually lead to your arrest. They are overwhelmingly superior in almost every aspect. But every 7 headed monster has an Achilles heel. This Achilles heel is their vulnerability against single/duo martyr cells. — Anders Breivik

As STRATFOR has long discussed, the lone wolf operational model presents a number of challenges for law enforcement, intelligence and security officers. The primary challenge is that, by definition, lone wolves are solitary actors, and it can be very difficult to determine their intentions before they act because they do not work with anyone else. When militants are operating in a cell consisting of more than one person, there is a larger chance that one of them will get cold feet and reveal the plot to authorities, that law enforcement and intelligence personnel will intercept a communication between conspirators, or that the authorities will be able to insert an informant into the group.

This ability to fly solo and under the radar of law enforcement has meant that some lone wolf militants such as Joseph Paul Franklin, Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph were able to operate for years before being identified and captured. Indeed, from Breivik’s diary, we know he took several years to plan and execute his attack without detection.

As the Breivik case illustrates, lone wolves also pose problems because they can come from a variety of backgrounds with a wide range of motivations. While some lone wolves are politically motivated, others are religiously motivated and some are mentally unstable.

In addition to the wide spectrum of ideologies and motivations among lone wolves, there is also the issue of geographic dispersal. As we’ve seen from past cases, their plots and attacks have occurred in many different locations and are not confined just to Manhattan, London or Washington. Lone wolf attacks can occur anywhere.

Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between those extremists who intend to commit attacks and those who simply preach hate or hold radical beliefs (things that are not in themselves illegal in many countries). Therefore, to single out likely lone wolves before they strike, authorities must spend a great deal of time and resources looking at individuals who might be moving from radical beliefs to radical actions. This is a daunting task given the large universe of potential suspects.

Vulnerabilities

In spite of the challenges presented by lone wolf operatives, they are vulnerable to detection at several different stages of their attack cycle. One of these vulnerabilities comes during the planning stage when weapons are acquired. From reading Breivik’s diary, it is clear that he felt exposed as he tried to purchase the chemicals he needed to build his IED. Because of this vulnerability, Breivik created an extensive cover story that included renting a farm in order to explain his purchase of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The farm also provided a private, spacious place for him to construct his IED.

Breivik also exposed himself to potential detection when he traveled to Prague to attempt to purchase weapons. One of the criminals he contacted could have turned him in to authorities. (In June 2011 we saw a jihadist cell in Seattle detected and arrested while attempting to buy guns from a criminal acquaintance. Another small cell was arrested in New York in May 2011, also while attempting to obtain weapons.) Even if Breivik had succeeded in purchasing weapons in Prague, he would still have been vulnerable as he smuggled the weapons back into Norway in his car (though it is important to remember that EU countries have open borders so security checks would not have been too stringent).

Breivik also exposed himself to detection as he conducted surveillance on his targets. Interestingly, in his diary, Breivik goes into excruciating detail discussing how he manufactured his device based on information he was able to obtain from the Internet, but he mentions very little about how he selected specific targets or how he conducted surveillance on them. He mentions only that he visited the sites and programmed the locations into his GPS. He also discusses using a video camera to record his attack but does not mention if he used still or video cameras in his target surveillance. How Breivik specifically chose his targets and how he conducted surveillance on them will be important for the Norwegian authorities to examine.

Finally, Breivik mentions several times in his diary that the steps he was taking would be far more difficult if he were a foreign-born Muslim instead of a Caucasian Norwegian. This underscores a problem we have discussed with profiling suspects based on their ethnicity or nationality. In an environment where potential threats are hard to identify, it is doubly important to profile individuals based on their behavior rather than their ethnicity or nationality — what we refer to as focusing on the “how” rather than the “who.”

Not All Lone Wolves are Equal

Finally, in the Breivik case we need to recognize that Norwegian authorities were dealing with a very capable lone wolf operator. While lone wolf theory has been propagated for many years now, there have been relatively few successful lone wolf attacks. This is because it takes a special individual to be a successful lone wolf assailant. Unlike many lone wolves, Breivik demonstrated that he possessed the intelligence and discipline to plan and carry out an attack that spanned several years of preparation. For example, he joined a pistol club in 2005 just in case he ever needed to buy a gun through legal means in Norway, and was able to rely on that alternate plan when his efforts to purchase firearms in Prague failed. Breivik was also driven, detail-oriented and meticulous in his planning. His diary documents that he was also extremely patient and careful during the dangerous trial-and-error process of manufacturing explosives.

It is rare to find a lone wolf militant who possesses all those traits, and Breivik stands in stark contrast to other European grassroots operatives like Nick Reilly or Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed, who made amateurish attempts at attacks. Breivik appears to have been a hard worker who claims to have amassed some 500,000 euros by working a variety of jobs and selling a communications company. After some unsuccessful speculation on the stock market he still had enough money and credit to rent the farm and the vehicles he used in the attack and to buy the required bomb components, weapons and body armor. In his diary he says that he began his two tasks — writing the manifesto and conducting the attack — with a war chest of 250,000 euros and several credit cards.

Breivik also is somewhat unique in that he did not attempt to escape after his attacks or become a martyr by his own hand or that of the authorities. Instead, as outlined in his manifesto, he sought to be tried so that he could turn his trial into a grandstand for promoting his ideology beyond what he did with his manifesto and video. He was willing to risk a long prison sentence in order to communicate his principles to the public. This means that the authorities have to be concerned not only about other existing Justiciar Knights but also anyone who may be influenced by Breivik’s message and follow his example.

There is also the possibility that individuals who do not adhere to Breivik’s ideology will seek to exploit the loopholes and security lapses highlighted by this incident to conduct their own attacks. Breivik’s diary provides a detailed step-by-step guide to manufacturing a successful VBIED, and the authorities will be scrutinizing it carefully to address the vulnerabilities Breivik exposed before those instructions can be used again.


Norway: Lessons from a Successful Lone Wolf Attacker is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

I got a few things to add George Lopez

Take Barbara Streisand, Alec Baldwin, et all with you

George Lopez: I’ll move to Canada if Palin becomes president

“The Smurfs” star George Lopez is threatening to flee the country should former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin win the presidential election.

In a recent interview with CNN’s Piers Morgan, Lopez said he would retreat to Canada if Palin takes over the Oval Office. (Bristol Palin on her family: ‘I think we have some of the thickest skin’)

“If Sarah Palin becomes president at any point, I would say ‘allegedly,’ I will move to Canada,” Lopez told the British talk show host. “I will go further north. I’ve been south but I will go further north. I will leave the United States of America.

Now here is the best part...his rational for this.

“I like my politicians to actually have a political background, to know politics,” Lopez said of the former vice presidential candidate and governor...

...“Is it that maverickness? Is it that homespun kind of Andy Griffith, wink-your-eye, shake-the-imaginary-gun thing. Maybe?” Lopez said. “Is it just that we’ve become a culture of personality? Do we elect somebody by their smile? Instead of by their content? It’s a little bit of all of that.”

You know George I don't like politicians. I like leaders who occupy political office and have a proven ability to accomplish the limited things government should do.

I wonder George, who did you vote for president back in 08? Or should I ask? You sound like the typical Hollywood leftist who voted for B Hussein Obama for the image his handlers presented.

If only more people would have voted because of accomplishment and not a poorly crafted image.

Final days of Blue Knights

Ok I'm finally back...what a vacation.

4072 miles and 12 states over 13 days!

Wednesday July 20th, rode out to the USS Wisconsin and saw a beautiful ship....

Thursday July 21st, saw the Yorktown battlefield and Jamestown settlement.

Friday, outta here....get to Gettysburg and stayed at the B&B and took a tour at the graveyard where Lincoln gave The Speech.

Saturday heading home...

Home Tuesday.

Sorry for a quick note with a lot of pics but my days off are not really off....

Have a great week

What's going on in the World Today 110727

 HYPERLINKS MAY REQUIRE AN EMAIL:  

USA

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT

EUROPE

Lithuania and Austria's Feud Highlights Europe's Split Over Russia | STRATFOR

Consequences of a Moderated Far Right In Europe | STRATFOR

Dispatch: Europe's Far-Right Parties and the Norway Attacks | STRATFOR

ASIA

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT

RUSSIA

Dispatch: Energy Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union | STRATFOR

Russia: Military Spending To Increase By 50 Percent In 2011 July 26, 2011

Russia will increase military spending by 50 percent in 2011 compared to 2010 to modernize and rearm its military, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said July 26, Reuters reported. In 2011, about 750 billion rubles (27.3 billion) will be used to buy arms and research defense and development.

IRAN

Iran: Guards Kill 50 Kurdish Anti-Revolutionaries July 27, 2011

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) killed at least 50 anti-revolutionaries from Kurdistan’s Free Life Party (PJAK), wounded 100 and imprisoned an unspecified number in recent operations, an IRGC commander in northwestern Iran said, AFP reported July 27. He added that the IRGC will continue its attacks on PJAK’s American anti-revolutionaries along the northern part of Iran’s border with Iraq until the Kurdish and Iraqi governments send police and military personnel to the region

Iran: Scientist Shot Dead in Tehran July 23, 2011

An Iranian scientist was shot dead June 23 in Tehran, Reuters reported, adding that Iran’s student news agency ISNA quoted a police officer as saying the physicist was a nuclear scientist. The scientist is named by ISNA as Darioush Rezaie, 35, a university teacher. Deputy Interior Minister Safarali Baratlou told Iran’s Labor News Agency that it is not known whether Rezaie was one of Iran’s nuclear scientists.

IRAQ

Iraq: Military Needs U.S. Training Past 2011 - FM July 27, 2011

Iraq needs U.S. troops to train its military after 2011 ends, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said July 27, AP reported. Zebari said Iraq has not asked U.S. forces to stay, and no agreement has been reached yet. He did not offer further details.

Iraq: Iran May Attempt To Inflict Mass Casualties To Expel U.S. Troops July 26, 2011

Iran’s increased arming of Shiite militant groups in southern Iraq is meant to create a “Beirut-like moment” by inflicting mass casualties on U.S. forces and send the message that they have expelled the United States from Iraq, U.S. Army Gen. Martin Dempsey said to Congress on July 26, citing his Iraqi contacts and other intelligence sources, AP reported. When asked what Iran should know about the plan, Dempsey said it would be a mistake on Iran’s part to proceed without considering the U.S. response to Iran’s aggression. Dempsey is the Obama administration’s nominee to chair the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


ISRAEL

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT

AFGHANISTAN

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT

MIDDLE EAST

Dispatch: Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and Indian Oil Imports | STRATFOR

SOUTH OF THE BORDER

Mexico: Public Protest and Meth-Precursor Shipments in Michoacan | STRATFOR

MISC

Above the Tearline: Tactical Assessment of the Oslo Bombing | STRATFOR

Except where noted courtesy www.stratfor.com

Officer Down

Agent Luis E. Gomez-Crespo
Puerto Rico Police Department, Puerto Rico
End of Watch: Friday, July 15, 2011
Age: 24
Tour of Duty: 4 years

Agent Luis Gomez-Crespo was shot and killed when he attempted to take action during a robbery while off duty.

Agent Gomez-Crespo, his father, and another officer were in a restaurant while off duty when a man entered and announced a robbery.

When the three identified themselves as officers the man opened fire, striking Agent Gomez-Crespo five times. His father, who also serves with the Puerto Rico Police Department, and the other off duty officer were also shot and wounded.



The suspect turned himself in at a local police station and was charged with one count of murder of a law enforcement officer and two counts of attempted murder.

Agent Luis Gomez-Crespo had served with the Puerto Rico Police Department for four years and was assigned to the South Trujillo Alto Precinct. He is survived by his wife, daughter, and parents.  

Rest in Peace Bro…We’ll Continue The Watch
Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 


Officer Down




Deputy Sheriff Richard "Rick" Joseph Daly
Clayton County Georgia Sheriff's Office
End of Watch: Wednesday, July 20, 2011
Age: 55
Tour of Duty: 25 years

Deputy Rick Daly was shot and killed while conducting a traffic stop near the intersection of East Fayetteville and Walker roads. A fugitive squad in an unmarked car identified a teenage suspect wanted on armed robbery charges and called on Deputy Daly in his marked cruiser to execute the traffic stop around 3:00 pm.



As Deputy Daly approached the passenger side of the vehicle where the suspect was, the suspect exited the vehicle and fired multiple shots that struck him in locations not protected by his body armor. He was transported to the hospital where he succumbed to his wounds.



The suspect fled the scene and remained at large for several hours before he was captured by a tactical team with the aid of a canine.



Deputy Daly had served in law enforcement for 25 years.  

Rest in Peace Bro…We’ll Continue The Watch
Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

 

A great comment on the President's speech

As Beth and I sit in a Waffle House outside of Baton Rouge this morning she directs me to a comment thread on Hotair. I really loved this one.

Hehe, an oldie but goodie, adapted to the situation, and posted over at TH (borrowed for the enjoyment of those here)…

Barack Obama was in a hot air balloon realized he was lost. He reduced altitude and spotted John Boehner below. He descended a bit more and shouted, “Excuse me, can you help me? I promised Michelle I would meet her an hour ago, but I don’t know where I am.”

John Boehner replied, “You’re in a hot air balloon hovering approximately 30 feet above the ground. You’re between 40 and 41 degrees north latitude and between 59 and 60 degrees west longitude.”

“You must be a Conservative,” said Barack Obama.

“I am,” replied John Boehner, “How did you know?”

“Well,” answered Barack Obama, “everything you told me is, technically correct, but I’ve no idea what to make of your information, and the fact is I’m still lost. Frankly, you’ve not been much help at all. If anything, you’ve delayed my trip.”

John Boehner responded, “You must be a Marxist.”

“I am,” replied Barack Obama, “but how did you know?”

“Well,” said John Boehner, “you don’t know where you are or where you’re going. You have risen to where you are due to a large quantity of hot air. You made a promise which you’ve no idea how to keep, and you expect people beneath you to solve your problems. The fact is you are in exactly the same position you were in before we met, but now, somehow, it’s my fault.”

Midas on July 25, 2011 at 11:44 PM

Geopolitical Weekly: Germany's Choice: Part 2, July 26, 2011

By Peter Zeihan and Marko Papic

Seventeen months ago, STRATFOR described how the future of Europe was bound to the decision-making processes in Germany. Throughout the post-World War II era, other European countries treated Germany as a feeding trough, bleeding the country for resources (primarily financial) in order to smooth over the rougher portions of their systems. Considering the carnage wrought in World War II, most Europeans — and even many Germans — considered this perfectly reasonable right up to the current decade. Germany dutifully followed the orders of the others, most notably the French, and wrote check after check to underwrite European solidarity.

However, with the end of the Cold War and German reunification, the Germans began to stand up for themselves once again. Europe’s contemporary financial crisis can be as complicated as one wants to make it, but strip away all the talk of bonds, defaults and credit-default swaps and the core of the matter consists of these three points:

Europe cannot function as a unified entity unless someone is in control.

At present, Germany is the only country with a large enough economy and population to achieve that control.

Being in control comes with a cost: It requires deep and ongoing financial support for the European Union’s weaker members.

What happened since STRATFOR published Germany’s Choice was a debate within Germany about how central the European Union was to German interests and how much the Germans were willing to pay to keep it intact. With their July 22 approval of a new bailout mechanism — from which the Greeks immediately received another 109 billion euros — the Germans made clear their answers to those questions, and with that decision, Europe enters a new era.

The Origins of the Eurozone

The foundations of the European Union were laid in the early post-World War II years, but the critical event happened in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on Monetary Union. In that treaty, the Europeans committed themselves to a common currency and monetary system while scrupulously maintaining national control of fiscal policy, finance and banking. They would share capital but not banks, interest rates but not tax policy. They would also share a currency but none of the political mechanisms required to manage an economy. One of the many inevitable consequences of this was that governments and investors alike assumed that Germany’s support for the new common currency was total, that the Germans would back any government that participated fully in Maastricht. As a result, the ability of weaker eurozone members to borrow was drastically improved. In Greece in particular, the rate on government bonds dropped from an 18 percentage-point premium over German bonds to less than 1 percentage point in less than a decade. To put that into context, borrowers of $200,000 mortgages would see their monthly payments drop by $2,500.

Faced with unprecedentedly low capital costs, parts of Europe that had not been economically dynamic in centuries — in some cases, millennia — sprang to life. Ireland, Greece, Iberia and southern Italy all experienced the strongest growth they had known in generations. But they were not borrowing money generated locally — they were not even borrowing against their own income potential. Such borrowing was not simply a government affair. Local banks that normally faced steep financing costs could now access capital as if they were headquartered in Frankfurt and servicing Germans. The cheap credit flooded every corner of the eurozone. It was a subprime mortgage frenzy on a multinational scale, and the party couldn’t last forever. The 2008 global financial crisis forced a reckoning all over the world, and in the traditionally poorer parts of Europe the process unearthed the political-financial disconnects of Maastricht.

The investment community has been driving the issue ever since. Once investors perceived that there was no direct link between the German government and Greek debt, they started to again think of Greece on its own merits. The rate charged for Greece to borrow started creeping up again, breaking 16 percent at its height. To extend the mortgage comparison, the Greek “house” now cost an extra $2,000 a month to maintain compared to the mid-2000s. A default was not just inevitable but imminent, and all eyes turned to the Germans.

A Temporary Solution

It is easy to see why the Germans did not simply immediately write a check. Doing that for the Greeks (and others) would have merely sent more money into the same system that generated the crisis in the first place. That said, the Germans couldn’t simply let the Greeks sink. Despite its flaws, the system that currently manages Europe has granted Germany economic wealth of global reach without costing a single German life. Given the horrors of World War II, this was not something to be breezily discarded. No country in Europe has benefited more from the eurozone than Germany. For the German elite, the eurozone was an easy means of making Germany matter on a global stage without the sort of military revitalization that would have spawned panic across Europe and the former Soviet Union. And it also made the Germans rich.

But this was not obvious to the average German voter. From this voter’s point of view, Germany had already picked up the tab for Europe three times: first in paying for European institutions throughout the history of the union, second in paying for all of the costs of German reunification and third in accepting a mismatched deutschemark-euro conversion rate when the euro was launched while most other EU states hardwired in a currency advantage. To compensate for those sacrifices, the Germans have been forced to partially dismantle their much-loved welfare state while the Greeks (and others) have taken advantage of German credit to expand theirs.

Germany’s choice was not a pleasant one: Either let the structures of the past two generations fall apart and write off the possibility of Europe becoming a great power or salvage the eurozone by underwriting two trillion euros of debt issued by eurozone governments every year.

Beset with such a weighty decision, the Germans dealt with the immediate Greek problem of early 2010 by dithering. Even the bailout fund known as the European Financial Security Facility (EFSF) — was at best a temporary patch. The German leadership had to balance messages and plans while they decided what they really wanted. That meant reassuring the other eurozone states that Berlin still cared while assuaging investor fears and pandering to a large and angry anti-bailout constituency at home. With so many audiences to speak to, it is not at all surprising that Berlin chose a solution that was sub-optimal throughout the crisis.

That sub-optimal solution is the EFSF, a bailout mechanism whose bonds enjoyed full government guarantees from the healthy eurozone states, most notably Germany. Because of those guarantees, the EFSF was able to raise funds on the bond market and then funnel that capital to the distressed states in exchange for austerity programs. Unlike previous EU institutions (which the Germans strongly influence), the EFSF takes its orders from the Germans. The mechanism is not enshrined in EU treaties; it is instead a private bank, the director of which is German. The EFSF worked as a patch but eventually proved insufficient. All the EFSF bailouts did was buy a little time until investors could do the math and realize that even with bailouts the distressed states would never be able to grow out of their mountains of debt. These states had engorged themselves on cheap credit so much during the euro’s first decade that even 273 billion euros of bailouts was insufficient. This issue came to a boil over the past few weeks in Greece. Faced with the futility of yet another stopgap solution to the eurozone’s financial woes, the Germans finally made a tough decision.

The New EFSF

The result was an EFSF redesign. Under the new system the distressed states can now access — with German permission — all the capital they need from the fund without having to go back repeatedly to the EU Council of Ministers. The maturity on all such EFSF credit has been increased from 7.5 years to as much as 40 years, while the cost of that credit has been slashed to whatever the market charges the EFSF itself to raise it (right now that’s about 3.5 percent, far lower than what the peripheral — and even some not-so-peripheral — countries could access on the international bond markets). All outstanding debts, including the previous EFSF programs, can be reworked under the new rules. The EFSF has been granted the ability to participate directly in the bond market by buying the government debt of states that cannot find anyone else interested, or even act pre-emptively should future crises threaten, without needing to first negotiate a bailout program. The EFSF can even extend credit to states that were considering internal bailouts of their banking systems. It is a massive debt consolidation program for both private and public sectors. In order to get the money, distressed states merely have to do whatever Germany — the manager of the fund — wants. The decision-making occurs within the fund, not at the EU institutional level.

In practical terms, these changes cause two major things to happen. First, they essentially remove any potential cap on the amount of money that the EFSF can raise, eliminating concerns that the fund is insufficiently stocked. Technically, the fund is still operating with a 440 billion-euro ceiling, but now that the Germans have fully committed themselves, that number is a mere technicality (it was German reticence before that kept the EFSF’s funding limit so “low”).

Second, all of the distressed states’ outstanding bonds will be refinanced at lower rates over longer maturities, so there will no longer be very many “Greek” or “Portuguese” bonds. Under the EFSF all of this debt will in essence be a sort of “eurobond,” a new class of bond in Europe upon which the weak states utterly depend and which the Germans utterly control. For states that experience problems, almost all of their financial existence will now be wrapped up in the EFSF structure. Accepting EFSF assistance means accepting a surrender of financial autonomy to the German commanders of the EFSF. For now, that means accepting German-designed austerity programs, but there is nothing that forces the Germans to limit their conditions to the purely financial/fiscal.

For all practical purposes, the next chapter of history has now opened in Europe. Regardless of intentions, Germany has just experienced an important development in its ability to influence fellow EU member states — particularly those experiencing financial troubles. It can now easily usurp huge amounts of national sovereignty. Rather than constraining Germany’s geopolitical potential, the European Union now enhances it; Germany is on the verge of once again becoming a great power. This hardly means that a regeneration of the Wehrmacht is imminent, but Germany’s re-emergence does force a radical rethinking of the European and Eurasian architectures.

Reactions to the New Europe

Every state will react to this new world differently. The French are both thrilled and terrified — thrilled that the Germans have finally agreed to commit the resources required to make the European Union work and terrified that Berlin has found a way to do it that preserves German control of those resources. The French realize that they are losing control of Europe, and fast. France designed the European Union to explicitly contain German power so it could never be harmed again while harnessing that power to fuel a French rise to greatness. The French nightmare scenario of an unrestrained Germany is now possible.

The British are feeling extremely thoughtful. They have always been the outsiders in the European Union, joining primarily so that they can put up obstacles from time to time. With the Germans now asserting financial control outside of EU structures, the all-important U.K. veto is now largely useless. Just as the Germans are in need of a national debate about their role in the world, the British are in need of a national debate about their role in Europe. The Europe that was a cage for Germany is no more, which means that the United Kingdom is now a member of different sort of organization that may or may not serve its purposes.

The Russians are feeling opportunistic. They have always been distrustful of the European Union, since it — like NATO — is an organization formed in part to keep them out. In recent years the union has farmed out its foreign policy to whatever state was most impacted by the issue in question, and in many cases these states has been former Soviet satellites in Central Europe, all of which have an axe to grind. With Germany rising to leadership, the Russians have just one decision-maker to deal with. Between Germany’s need for natural gas and Russia’s ample export capacity, a German-Russian partnership is blooming. It is not that the Russians are unconcerned about the possibilities of strong German power — the memories of the Great Patriotic War burn far too hot and bright for that — but now there is a belt of 12 countries between the two powers. The Russian-German bilateral relationship will not be perfect, but there is another chapter of history to be written before the Germans and Russians need to worry seriously about each other.

Those 12 countries are trapped between rising German and consolidating Russian power. For all practical purposes, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova have already been reintegrated into the Russian sphere. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are finding themselves under ever-stronger German influence but are fighting to retain their independence. As much as the nine distrust the Russians and Germans, however, they have no alternative at present.

The obvious solution for these “Intermarium” states — as well as for the French — is sponsorship by the United States. But the Americans are distracted and contemplating a new period of isolationism, forcing the nine to consider other, less palatable, options. These include everything from a local Intermarium alliance that would be questionable at best to picking either the Russians or Germans and suing for terms. France’s nightmare scenario is on the horizon, but for these nine states — which labored under the Soviet lash only 22 years ago — it is front and center.

Germany's Choice: Part 2 is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

Thank God she is no longer Speaker of the House

Good to know House Minority Leader (God I love that title...it took her only four years to get the American people to throw her ass out) has her priorities right as we are deep a budget crisis.

EAST HAVEN – Taking a “time out” from attacking the debt ceiling crisis, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi flew to Connecticut Sunday for a private political fundraiser for friend and fellow Democratic congresswoman Rosa DeLauro.

The elite fundraising event, which drew top state and local Democrats including Gov. Dannel P. Malloy and U.S. Sen. Richard Blumenthal, took place a day after Pelosi, D-Calif., met with Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner, R-OH, and other congressional leaders to try to hash out an 11th-hour deal to raise the debt ceiling and cut the deficit...

..Asked about the negotiations, Pelosi said there needs to be discussion about reducing the deficit, but that conversation should not be tied to raising the debt ceiling. She said previous presidents “never had any conditions placed on it or requirements that there be trillions of dollars in deficit reduction in order to lift the debt ceiling.”...

...Pelosi said she met for most of Saturday with congressional leaders and that she planned on “engaging in some conversations” upon her return to Washington D.C. Sunday. Regarding her decision to fly to Connecticut amidst debt limit talks, Pelosi said “Sunday morning is sort of a time out.”...

Yo Ms Pelosi a "time out" is time off from you business, not begging for money for your friends.

...The two congresswomen go back more than 20 years and DeLauro said Pelosi encouraged her to run for the office she now holds. Both leaders had kind words for each other.

“Rosa DeLauro is a great leader in the Congress and a force of nature in our country,” Pelosi said.

DeLauro had similar praise for the House minority leader.

“She has the intellect, the strategic thinking ability and a moral compass which is the kind of leadership we need today. She understands the plight of middle class America,” DeLauro said...

Rosa, this woman is a moron who in largely responsible for destroying the US economy and bankrupting this country.  And talking about a moral compass...from a woman who demanded a AF 747 to take her and her family around the world which they ran up a 100k bill for booze and food.  We don't need that type of abuse....

Officer Down

Deputy Sheriff Roger Rice
Laurens County South Carolina Sheriff's Office
End of Watch: Thursday, July 14, 2011
Age: 29
Tour of Duty: 1 year, 7 months
Date of Incident: Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Deputy Sheriff Roger Rice was shot and killed as he and other deputies searched for a murder suspect at approximately 11:55 pm.

Officers from the Fountain Inn Police Department had requested assistance from the sheriff's office to locate the man, who had just murdered his girlfriend. Deputies and officers located the man near his home on Barrel Stave Road in Clinton. As they attempted to take him into custody, he opened fire, fatally wounding Deputy Rice. Other officers on the scene returned fire and wounded the subject before taking him into custody.

Deputy Rice had served with the Laurens County Sheriff's Office for 18 months. He is survived by his wife and two children.

Rest in Peace Bro…We’ll Continue The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh.

Vacation initial report

Sorry I've been off the net the last couple of days but the conference was crazy...now the trip back home. At a B&B in Gettysburg PA and will leave early tomorrow. But I wanted to get these up quick.

Steve and Stacy finishing up the night with Don't Stop Believing



Jason with Stacy from Steve and Stacy doing Fire and Rain.



Beth with her new best friend



More to come

PS: OK, late as usual. I'm publishing this from a fleabag motel in Portsmith OH...I am not happy being here or leaving the bikes outside...and I have a gun!

Hopefully will be home Monday and update more.

Fundraiser for an injured officer

I was looking over some favorite blogs and over at And So it Goes in Shreveport: Corporal Breck Scott to Undergo Four Surgeries she has the story of CPL Breck Scott, Shreveport PD who was severly injured in April 2011.

What was supposed to be a full recovery has turned into complications and CPL Scott will undergo four operations to try to save his leg in the next few weeks. A trust fund has been set up at Capital One Bank in Shreveport and you can donate to the CPL Breck Scott fund with Capital One Bank.

Make the check out to Breck Scott, put "For Deposit Only" and  account number 5732676084 on the back and mail it to Capital One Bank, 333 Travis Street, Shreveport, LA 71101.
If you can please forward this info on the fundraiser. Injured cops in larger areas like Houston and New York have more support than smaller places like Shreveport and facing the loss of a leg, this man and his family needs help.

Thanks for any help you can give.

Blue Knights Vacation...Day Six

Up early again, breakfast served by the hotel (thank God that's part of the fee) and depart for the outer banks. Get set up and kick stands up at 0800. Out in time but our ride leader is a little disoriented.....really fun was the turn around in a cul-de-sac of houses being built.

After arriving at Kitty Hawk we drop out of the group, take a break and tour the Wright Brothers national monument. Drove up to the booth and handed the man twenty bucks for two riders. As he's working I make the joke "AAA discount?... AARP?...Disables vet?"

"You're a disabled vet? I"ll do a refund."

He gives me my twenty bank and a lifetime pass to all national parks....ain't life grand.





























Beth and Jason argue over the first flight and we get to laugh at the two OP types.

Ride all the way to the light house we wanted to see and the road it blocked...resurfacing the road...in the middle of tourist season. What geniuses are running the transportation departments in these states.

Rode around the island then back to the hotel. An hour in the pool with some great people from Illinois followed by a couple of hours in the hospitality suite. Karaoke night....some the guys can really sing...then there are some can be used for torture at Gitmo.







A couple of more drinks and cigars with members from New York. We toast our hero Archie Bunker and call it a night.

Gotta go...at least can sleep in a bit on Wednesday....won't be in the parade in the morning and the ship tour is not until 130
.

Geopolitical Weekly:The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics July 19, 2011

By Reva Bhalla

Something extraordinary, albeit not unexpected, is happening in the Persian Gulf region. The United States, lacking a coherent strategy to deal with Iran and too distracted to develop one, is struggling to navigate Iraq’s fractious political landscape in search of a deal that would allow Washington to keep a meaningful military presence in the country beyond the end-of-2011 deadline stipulated by the current Status of Forces Agreement. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, dubious of U.S. capabilities and intentions toward Iran, appears to be inching reluctantly toward an accommodation with its Persian adversary.

Iran clearly stands to gain from this dynamic in the short term as it seeks to reshape the balance of power in the world’s most active energy arteries. But Iranian power is neither deep nor absolute. Instead, Tehran finds itself racing against a timetable that hinges not only on the U.S. ability to shift its attention from its ongoing wars in the Middle East but also on Turkey’s ability to grow into its historic regional role.

The Iranian Position

Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said something last week that caught our attention. Speaking at Iran’s first Strategic Naval Conference in Tehran on July 13, Vahidi said the United States is “making endeavors to drive a wedge between regional countries with the aim of preventing the establishment of an indigenized security arrangement in the region, but those attempts are rooted in misanalyses and will not succeed.” The effect Vahidi spoke of refers to the Iranian redefinition of Persian Gulf power dynamics, one that in Iran’s ideal world ultimately would transform the local political, business, military and religious affairs of the Gulf states to favor the Shia and their patrons in Iran.

From Iran’s point of view, this is a natural evolution, and one worth waiting centuries for. It would see power concentrated among the Shia in Mesopotamia, eastern Arabia and the Levant at the expense of the Sunnis who have dominated this land since the 16th century, when the Safavid Empire lost Iraq to the Ottomans. Ironically, Iran owes its thanks for this historic opportunity to its two main adversaries — the Wahhabi Sunnis of al Qaeda who carried out the 9/11 attacks and the “Great Satan” that brought down Saddam Hussein. Should Iran succeed in filling a major power void in Iraq, a country that touches six Middle Eastern powers and demographically favors the Shia, Iran would theoretically have its western flank secured as well as an oil-rich outlet with which to further project its influence.

So far, Iran’s plan is on track. Unless the United States permanently can station substantial military forces in the region, Iran replaces the United States as the most powerful military force in the Persian Gulf region. In particular, Iran has the military ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz and has a clandestine network of operatives spread across the region. Through its deep penetration of the Iraqi government, Iran is also in the best position to influence Iraqi decision-making. Washington’s obvious struggle in trying to negotiate an extension of the U.S. deployment in Iraq is perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of Iranian resolve to secure its western flank. The Iranian nuclear issue, as we have long argued, is largely a sideshow; a nuclear deterrent, if actually achieved, would certainly enhance Iranian security, but the most immediate imperative for Iran is to consolidate its position in Iraq. And as this weekend’s Iranian incursion into northern Iraq — ostensibly to fight Kurdish militants — shows, Iran is willing to make measured, periodic shows of force to convey that message.

While Iran already is well on its way to accomplishing its goals in Iraq, it needs two other key pieces to complete Tehran’s picture of a regional “indigenized security arrangement” that Vahidi spoke of. The first is an understanding with its main military challenger in the region, the United States. Such an understanding would entail everything from ensuring Iraqi Sunni military impotence to expanding Iranian energy rights beyond its borders to placing limits on U.S. military activity in the region, all in return for the guaranteed flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and an Iranian pledge to stay clear of Saudi oil fields.

The second piece is an understanding with its main regional adversary, Saudi Arabia. Iran’s reshaping of Persian Gulf politics entails convincing its Sunni neighbors that resisting Iran is not worth the cost, especially when the United States does not seem to have the time or the resources to come to their aid at present. No matter how much money the Saudis throw at Western defense contractors, any military threat by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council states against Iran will be hollow without an active U.S. military commitment. Iran’s goal, therefore, is to coerce the major Sunni powers into recognizing an expanded Iranian sphere of influence at a time when U.S. security guarantees in the region are starting to erode.

Of course, there is always a gap between intent and capability, especially in the Iranian case. Both negotiating tracks are charged with distrust, and meaningful progress is by no means guaranteed. That said, a number of signals have surfaced in recent weeks leading us to examine the potential for a Saudi-Iranian accommodation, however brief that may be.

The Saudi Position

Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia is greatly unnerved by the political evolution in Iraq. The Saudis increasingly will rely on regional powers such as Turkey in trying to maintain a Sunni bulwark against Iran in Iraq, but Riyadh has largely resigned itself to the idea that Iraq, for now, is in Tehran’s hands. This is an uncomfortable reality for the Saudi royals to cope with, but what is amplifying Saudi Arabia’s concerns in the region right now — and apparently nudging Riyadh toward the negotiating table with Tehran — is the current situation in Bahrain.

When Shiite-led protests erupted in Bahrain in the spring, we did not view the demonstrations simply as a natural outgrowth of the so-called Arab Spring. There were certainly overlapping factors, but there was little hiding the fact that Iran had seized an opportunity to pose a nightmare scenario for the Saudi royals: an Iranian-backed Shiite uprising spreading from the isles of Bahrain to the Shiite-concentrated, oil-rich Eastern Province of the Saudi kingdom.

This explains Saudi Arabia’s hasty response to the Bahraini unrest, during which it led a rare military intervention of GCC forces in Bahrain at the invitation of Manama to stymie a broader Iranian destabilization campaign. The demonstrations in Bahrain are far calmer now than they were in mid-March at the peak of the crisis, but the concerns of the GCC states have not subsided, and for good reason. Halfhearted attempts at national dialogues aside, Shiite dissent in this part of the region is likely to endure, and this is a reality that Iran can exploit in the long term through its developing covert capabilities.

When we saw in late June that Saudi Arabia was willingly drawing down its military presence in Bahrain at the same time the Iranians were putting out feelers in the local press on an almost daily basis regarding negotiations with Riyadh, we discovered through our sources that the pieces were beginning to fall into place for Saudi-Iranian negotiations. To understand why, we have to examine the Saudi perception of the current U.S. position in the region.

The Saudis cannot fully trust U.S. intentions at this point. The U.S. position in Iraq is tenuous at best, and Riyadh cannot rule out the possibility of Washington entering its own accommodation with Iran and thus leaving Saudi Arabia in the lurch. The United States has three basic interests: to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, to reduce drastically the number of forces it has devoted to fighting wars with Sunni Islamist militants (who are also by definition at war with Iran), and to try to reconstruct a balance of power in the region that ultimately prevents any one state — whether Arab or Persian — from controlling all the oil in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. position in this regard is flexible, and while developing an understanding with Iran is a trying process, nothing fundamentally binds the United States to Saudi Arabia. If the United States comes to the conclusion that it does not have any good options in the near term for dealing with Iran, a U.S.-Iranian accommodation — however jarring on the surface — is not out of the question.

More immediately, the main point of negotiation between the United States and Iran is the status of U.S. forces in Iraq. Iran would prefer to see U.S. troops completely removed from its western flank, but it has already seen dramatic reductions. The question for both sides moving forward concerns not only the size but also the disposition and orientation of those remaining forces and the question of how rapidly they can be reoriented from a more vulnerable residual advisory and assistance role to a blocking force against Iran. It also must take into account how inherently vulnerable a U.S. military presence in Iraq (not to mention the remaining diplomatic presence) is to Iranian conventional and unconventional means.

The United States may be willing to recognize Iranian demands when it comes to Iran’s designs for the Iraqi government or oil concessions in the Shiite south, but it also wants to ensure that Iran does not try to overstep its bounds and threaten Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth. To reinforce a potential accommodation with Iran, the United States needs to maintain a blocking force against Iran, and this is where the U.S.-Iranian negotiation appears to be deadlocked.

The threat of a double-cross is a real one for all sides to this conflict. Iran cannot trust that the United States, once freed up, will not engage in military action against Iran down the line. The Americans cannot trust that the Iranians will not make a bid for Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth (though the military logistics required for such a move are likely beyond Iran’s capabilities at this point). Finally, the Saudis can’t trust that the United States will defend it in a time of need, especially if the United States is preoccupied with other matters and/or has developed a relationship with Iran that it feels the need to maintain.

When all this is taken together — the threat illustrated by Shiite unrest in Bahrain, the tenuous U.S. position in Iraq and the potential for Washington to strike its own deal with Tehran — Riyadh may be seeing little choice but to search out a truce with Iran, at least until it can get a clearer sense of U.S. intentions. This does not mean that the Saudis would place more trust in a relationship with their historical rivals, the Persians, than they would in a relationship with the United States. Saudi-Iranian animosity is embedded in a deep history of political, religious and economic competition between the two main powerhouses of the Persian Gulf, and it is not going to vanish with the scratch of a pen and a handshake. Instead, this would be a truce driven by short-term, tactical constraints. Such a truce would primarily aim to arrest Iranian covert activity linked to Shiite dissidents in the GCC states, giving the Sunni monarchist regimes a temporary sense of relief while they continue their efforts in trying to build up an Arab resistance to Iran.

But Iran would view such a preliminary understanding as the path toward a broader accommodation, one that would bestow recognition on Iran as the pre-eminent power of the Persian Gulf. Iran can thus be expected to make a variety of demands, all revolving around the idea of Sunni recognition of an expanded Iranian sphere of influence — a very difficult idea for Saudi Arabia to swallow.

This is where things get especially complicated. The United States theoretically might strike an accommodation with Iran, but it would do so only with the knowledge that it could rely on the traditional Sunni heavyweights in the region eventually to rebuild a relative balance of power. If the major Sunni powers reach their own accommodation with Iran, independent of the United States, the U.S. position in the region becomes all the more questionable. What would be the limits of a Saudi-Iranian negotiation? Could the United States ensure, for example, that Saudi Arabia would not bargain away U.S. military installations in a negotiation with Iran?

The Iranian defense minister broached this very idea during his speech last week when he said, “the United States has failed to establish a sustainable security system in the Persian Gulf region, and it is not possible that many vessels will maintain a permanent presence in the region.” Vahidi was seeking to convey to fellow Iranians and trying to convince the Sunni Arab powers that a U.S. security guarantee in the region does not hold as much weight as it used to, and that with Iran now filling the void, the United States may well face a much more difficult time trying to maintain its existing military installations.

The question that naturally arises from Vahidi’s statement is the future status of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet in Bahrain, and whether Iran can instill just the right amount of fear in the minds of its Arab neighbors to shake the foundations of the U.S. military presence in the region. For now, Iran does not appear to have the military clout to threaten the GCC states to the point of forcing them to negotiate away their U.S. security guarantees in exchange for Iranian restraint. This is a threat, however, that Iran will continue to let slip and even one that Saudi Arabia quietly could use to capture Washington’s attention in the hopes of reinforcing U.S. support for the Sunni Arabs against Iran.

The Long-Term Scenario

The current dynamic places Iran in a prime position. Its political investment is paying off in Iraq, and it is positioning itself for negotiation with both the Saudis and the Americans that it hopes will fill out the contours of Iran’s regional sphere of influence. But Iranian power is not that durable in the long term.

Iran is well endowed with energy resources, but it is populous and mountainous. The cost of internal development means that while Iran can get by economically, it cannot prosper like many of its Arab competitors. Add to that a troubling demographic profile in which ethnic Persians constitute only a little more than half of the country’s population and developing challenges to the clerical establishment, and Iran clearly has a great deal going on internally distracting it from opportunities abroad.

The long-term regional picture also is not in Iran’s favor. Unlike Iran, Turkey is an ascendant country with the deep military, economic and political power to influence events in the Middle East — all under a Sunni banner that fits more naturally with the region’s religious landscape. Turkey also is the historical, indigenous check on Persian power. Though it will take time for Turkey to return to this role, strong hints of this dynamic already are coming to light.

In Iraq, Turkish influence can be felt across the political, business, security and cultural spheres as Ankara is working quietly and fastidiously to maintain a Sunni bulwark in the country and steep Turkish influence in the Arab world. And in Syria, though the Alawite regime led by the al Assads is not at a breakpoint, there is no doubt a confrontation building between Iran and Turkey over the future of the Syrian state. Turkey has an interest in building up a viable Sunni political force in Syria that can eventually displace the Alawites, while Iran has every interest in preserving the current regime so as to maintain a strategic foothold in the Levant.

For now, the Turks are not looking for a confrontation with Iran, nor are they necessarily ready for one. Regional forces are accelerating Turkey’s rise, but it will take experience and additional pressures for Turkey to translate rhetoric into action when it comes to meaningful power projection. This is yet another factor that is likely driving the Saudis to enter their own dialogue with Iran at this time.

The Iranians are thus in a race against time. It may be a matter of a few short years before the United States frees up its attention span and is able to re-examine the power dynamics in the Persian Gulf with fresh vigor. Within that time, we would also expect Turkey to come into its own and assume its role as the region’s natural counterbalance to Iran. By then, the Iranians hope to have the structures and agreements in place to hold their ground against the prevailing regional forces, but that level of long-term security depends on Tehran’s ability to cut its way through two very thorny sets of negotiations with the Saudis and the Americans while it still has the upper hand.

The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics is republished with permission of STRATFOR.