Last month I posted on an updated Battle Damage Assessment of the attacks on the Iranian nuclear program. Now one of my fellow authors from the American Free News Network has an interesting take on the Chines-Iranian relationship.

Iran: China Bet on the Wrong Horse; Communist Chinese investments in Iran are at risk
Communist China was one of the few nations to side with Iran by publicly condemning strikes on Iranian nuclear capabilities and military targets as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and urging immediate de-escalation of the conflict. As the outrages of Iranian proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis have captured the attention of the world in recent years, China has become increasingly isolated in its many years of overt support for Iran, which has included jump-starting Iranian nuclear research capabilities in the early 1980s.
The reality is that China is protecting its significant investments in the Islamic Republican of Iran (IRI), both on the economic and diplomatic fronts. By some estimates, communist China has invested at least $40 billion in Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, with emphasis on building Iran’s energy infrastructure that facilitates the exportation of Iranian oil and gas to energy-poor China.
China’s significant investments in Iran could be at risk or at least be problematic for the communists on the diplomatic front. Let us examine the issue.
CHINA AND IRAN SINCE 1979
The previously nonexistent relations between Iran and China began to blossom after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It is no coincidence that pariah nations seem to find each other and do business together, in one way or another, although Islamists and communists make strange ideological bedfellows. An alignment of the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism (for 39 years in a row according to the US State Dept) with a country that has practiced cultural genocide and forced organ harvesting for decades could be construed to be a match made in Hell.
Be that as it may, the relationship started slowly and followed an upward trajectory that paralleled China’s economic and military expansion and outreach that has been greatly accelerated by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Some of the highlights:
China recognized the IRI in February 1979. Relations improved after China shifted away from supporting global communist revolutions in pursuit of “diplomatic pragmatism” and economic modernization in the 1980s. In Iran’s case, this meant withdrawing support from the communist Tudeh Party in favor of state-to-state diplomatic relations.
China provided approximately $2 billion worth of military hardware to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), including 107mm rockets, aircraft, main battle tanks, and surface-to-air missile systems.
In 1984, the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center was opened with Chinese assistance, which included technical support for the installation of a 30-kilowatt Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), a Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR), a Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR), a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) for producing experimental nuclear fuel, and a Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) for manufacturing alloys used in nuclear reactors, all of which were vital for Iranian nuclear research.
Formalized in 1990, China signed a covert nuclear agreement to provide Iran with technical assistance and expertise needed to expand the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, including for uranium mining, enrichment, and nuclear research.
After having been one of Iran’s main arms suppliers through the 1990s, China ceased signing new arms export agreements with Iran in 2005 to align with international sanctions and various UN Security Council resolutions on Iran. However, past arms sales agreements were honored through 2015 while Iran shifted to domestic production of various Chinese weapons systems such as the HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile with Chinese assistance.
On the bilateral trade front, in 2004, Iran signed a 25-year agreement with China’s oil giant Sinopec Group worth a projected $70 billion for the development of its oil and gas industry.
By 2005, China had become the second-largest exporter to Iran by supplying 8.3% of its imports. By 2009, the Tehran Times stated that “China became Iran’s premier trading partner, with bilateral trade worth 21.2 billion dollars.”
As part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), China agreed to assist in modernizing Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor in support of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear enrichment under IAEA provisions.
In 2016, China and Iran signed the roadmap for a 25-year “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” that focused on improving energy, infrastructure, regional security cooperation, and overall trade relations between the two countries. This was concluded during Xi Jinping’s trip to Tehran in January 2016.
In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement that focused on international trade in goods, Iranian oil exports to China, and Chinese investments in Iran. China’s goals in Iran aligned with its Belt and Road Initiative: to develop overseas markets for finished Chinese goods while obtaining direct access to raw materials (oil and gas in particular) needed by Chinese industries. Alignment with Iran served China’s geostrategic intentions by positioning Beijing as an alternative to the US in the evolving global order and in the Middle East in particular.
In 2023, China gained significant prestige in the Middle East by brokering a dealto restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which enabled the reopening of embassies in Riyadh and Tehran.
On 14 June 2025, in a show of China’s continuing strong diplomatic support for Iran, Reuters reported that China’s UN Ambassador Fu Cong “condemn[ed] Israel’s violations of Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and urge[d] Israel to immediately stop all risky military actions.”
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
China has much to lose depending on the outcome of the Israel-Iran war. As the largest buyer of Iranian oil, China imports over 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports. Any disruption of flow of those exports through the Strait of Hormuz, whether through blockage or severe damage to Iran’s oil infrastructure, would be a significant blow to China’s economy.
Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure reminds the world of the important Chinese assistance in support of Iran’s nuclear research and development capabilities. While ostensibly developed for “peaceful use of nuclear energy,” the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center has long been suspected of contributing to Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program, and China was the main player in jump-starting Isfahan when France ended its technical support after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Were any of the 1000+ Chinese who have left Iran since the 14 June attacks began involved in Iran’s nuclear programs in any way?
Finally, in pursuit of its goal to displace the US in the Middle East, China would lose significant diplomatic leverage with Gulf Cooperation Council states if it China sides with Iran in a major way (diplomatically or material support).
The end.
This article originally appeared in Stu Cvrk’s Substack. Reprinted here with permission
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