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Sunday, January 18, 2015

Geopolitical Weekly: A War Between Two Worlds, January 13, 2015

By George Friedman

The murders of cartoonists who made fun of Islam and of Jews shopping for their Sabbath meals by Islamists in Paris last week have galvanized the world. A galvanized world is always dangerous. Galvanized people can do careless things. It is in the extreme and emotion-laden moments that distance and coolness are most required. I am tempted to howl in rage. It is not my place to do so. My job is to try to dissect the event, place it in context and try to understand what has happened and why. From that, after the rage cools, plans for action can be made. Rage has its place, but actions must be taken with discipline and thought.

I have found that in thinking about things geopolitically, I can cool my own rage and find, if not meaning, at least explanation for events such as these. As it happens, my new book will be published on Jan. 27. Titled Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, it is about the unfolding failure of the great European experiment, the European Union, and the resurgence of European nationalism. It discusses the re-emerging borderlands and flashpoints of Europe and raises the possibility that Europe's attempt to abolish conflict will fail. I mention this book because one chapter is on the Mediterranean borderland and the very old conflict between Islam and Christianity. Obviously this is a matter I have given some thought to, and I will draw on Flashpoints to begin making sense of the murderers and murdered, when I think of things in this way.

Let me begin by quoting from that chapter:

We've spoken of borderlands, and how they are both linked and divided. Here is a border sea, differing in many ways but sharing the basic characteristic of the borderland. Proximity separates as much as it divides. It facilitates trade, but also war. For Europe this is another frontier both familiar and profoundly alien.

Islam invaded Europe twice from the Mediterranean — first in Iberia, the second time in southeastern Europe, as well as nibbling at Sicily and elsewhere. Christianity invaded Islam multiple times, the first time in the Crusades and in the battle to expel the Muslims from Iberia. Then it forced the Turks back from central Europe. The Christians finally crossed the Mediterranean in the 19th century, taking control of large parts of North Africa. Each of these two religions wanted to dominate the other. Each seemed close to its goal. Neither was successful. What remains true is that Islam and Christianity were obsessed with each other from the first encounter. Like Rome and Egypt they traded with each other and made war on each other.

Christians and Muslims have been bitter enemies, battling for control of Iberia. Yet, lest we forget, they also have been allies: In the 16th century, Ottoman Turkey and Venice allied to control the Mediterranean. No single phrase can summarize the relationship between the two save perhaps this: It is rare that two religions might be so obsessed with each other and at the same time so ambivalent. This is an explosive mixture.

Migration, Multiculturalism and Ghettoization

The current crisis has its origins in the collapse of European hegemony over North Africa after World War II and the Europeans' need for cheap labor. As a result of the way in which they ended their imperial relations, they were bound to allow the migration of Muslims into Europe, and the permeable borders of the European Union enabled them to settle where they chose. The Muslims, for their part, did not come to join in a cultural transformation. They came for work, and money, and for the simplest reasons. The Europeans' appetite for cheap labor and the Muslims' appetite for work combined to generate a massive movement of populations.

The matter was complicated by the fact that Europe was no longer simply Christian. Christianity had lost its hegemonic control over European culture over the previous centuries and had been joined, if not replaced, by a new doctrine of secularism. Secularism drew a radical distinction between public and private life, in which religion, in any traditional sense, was relegated to the private sphere with no hold over public life. There are many charms in secularism, in particular the freedom to believe what you will in private. But secularism also poses a public problem. There are those whose beliefs are so different from others' beliefs that finding common ground in the public space is impossible. And then there are those for whom the very distinction between private and public is either meaningless or unacceptable. The complex contrivances of secularism have their charm, but not everyone is charmed.

Europe solved the problem with the weakening of Christianity that made the ancient battles between Christian factions meaningless. But they had invited in people who not only did not share the core doctrines of secularism, they rejected them. What Christianity had come to see as progress away from sectarian conflict, Muslims (and some Christians) may see as simply decadence, a weakening of faith and the loss of conviction.

There is here a question of what we mean when we speak of things like Christianity, Islam and secularism. There are more than a billion Christians and more than a billion Muslims and uncountable secularists who mix all things. It is difficult to decide what you mean when you say any of these words and easy to claim that anyone else's meaning is (or is not) the right one. There is a built-in indeterminacy in our use of language that allows us to shift responsibility for actions in Paris away from a religion to a minor strand in a religion, or to the actions of only those who pulled the trigger. This is the universal problem of secularism, which eschews stereotyping. It leaves unclear who is to be held responsible for what. By devolving all responsibility on the individual, secularism tends to absolve nations and religions from responsibility.

This is not necessarily wrong, but it creates a tremendous practical problem. If no one but the gunmen and their immediate supporters are responsible for the action, and all others who share their faith are guiltless, you have made a defensible moral judgment. But as a practical matter, you have paralyzed your ability to defend yourselves. It is impossible to defend against random violence and impermissible to impose collective responsibility. As Europe has been for so long, its moral complexity has posed for it a problem it cannot easily solve. Not all Muslims — not even most Muslims — are responsible for this. But all who committed these acts were Muslims claiming to speak for Muslims. One might say this is a Muslim problem and then hold the Muslims responsible for solving it. But what happens if they don't? And so the moral debate spins endlessly.

This dilemma is compounded by Europe's hidden secret: The Europeans do not see Muslims from North Africa or Turkey as Europeans, nor do they intend to allow them to be Europeans. The European solution to their isolation is the concept of multiculturalism — on the surface a most liberal notion, and in practice, a movement for both cultural fragmentation and ghettoization. But behind this there is another problem, and it is also geopolitical. I say in Flashpoints that:

Multiculturalism and the entire immigrant enterprise faced another challenge. Europe was crowded. Unlike the United States, it didn't have the room to incorporate millions of immigrants — certainly not on a permanent basis. Even with population numbers slowly declining, the increase in population, particularly in the more populous countries, was difficult to manage. The doctrine of multiculturalism naturally encouraged a degree of separatism. Culture implies a desire to live with your own people. Given the economic status of immigrants the world over, the inevitable exclusion that is perhaps unintentionally incorporated in multiculturalism and the desire of like to live with like, the Muslims found themselves living in extraordinarily crowded and squalid conditions. All around Paris there are high-rise apartment buildings housing and separating Muslims from the French, who live elsewhere.

These killings have nothing to do with poverty, of course. Newly arrived immigrants are always poor. That's why they immigrate. And until they learn the language and customs of their new homes, they are always ghettoized and alien. It is the next generation that flows into the dominant culture. But the dirty secret of multiculturalism was that its consequence was to perpetuate Muslim isolation. And it was not the intention of Muslims to become Europeans, even if they could. They came to make money, not become French. The shallowness of the European postwar values system thereby becomes the horror show that occurred in Paris last week.

The Role of Ideology

But while the Europeans have particular issues with Islam, and have had them for more than 1,000 years, there is a more generalizable problem. Christianity has been sapped of its evangelical zeal and no longer uses the sword to kill and convert its enemies. At least parts of Islam retain that zeal. And saying that not all Muslims share this vision does not solve the problem. Enough Muslims share that fervency to endanger the lives of those they despise, and this tendency toward violence cannot be tolerated by either their Western targets or by Muslims who refuse to subscribe to a jihadist ideology. And there is no way to distinguish those who might kill from those who won't. The Muslim community might be able to make this distinction, but a 25-year-old European or American policeman cannot. And the Muslims either can't or won't police themselves. Therefore, we are left in a state of war. French Prime Minister Manuel Valls has called this a war on radical Islam. If only they wore uniforms or bore distinctive birthmarks, then fighting only the radical Islamists would not be a problem. But Valls' distinctions notwithstanding, the world can either accept periodic attacks, or see the entire Muslim community as a potential threat until proven otherwise. These are terrible choices, but history is filled with them. Calling for a war on radical Islamists is like calling for war on the followers of Jean-Paul Sartre. Exactly what do they look like?

The European inability to come to terms with the reality it has created for itself in this and other matters does not preclude the realization that wars involving troops are occurring in many Muslim countries. The situation is complex, and morality is merely another weapon for proving the other guilty and oneself guiltless. The geopolitical dimensions of Islam's relationship with Europe, or India, or Thailand, or the United States, do not yield to moralizing.

Something must be done. I don't know what needs to be done, but I suspect I know what is coming. First, if it is true that Islam is merely responding to crimes against it, those crimes are not new and certainly didn't originate in the creation of Israel, the invasion of Iraq or recent events. This has been going on far longer than that. For instance, the Assassins were a secret Islamic order to make war on individuals they saw as Muslim heretics. There is nothing new in what is going on, and it will not end if peace comes to Iraq, Muslims occupy Kashmir or Israel is destroyed. Nor is secularism about to sweep the Islamic world. The Arab Spring was a Western fantasy that the collapse of communism in 1989 was repeating itself in the Islamic world with the same results. There are certainly Muslim liberals and secularists. However, they do not control events — no single group does — and it is the events, not the theory, that shape our lives.

Europe's sense of nation is rooted in shared history, language, ethnicity and yes, in Christianity or its heir, secularism. Europe has no concept of the nation except for these things, and Muslims share in none of them. It is difficult to imagine another outcome save for another round of ghettoization and deportation. This is repulsive to the European sensibility now, but certainly not alien to European history. Unable to distinguish radical Muslims from other Muslims, Europe will increasingly and unintentionally move in this direction.

Paradoxically, this will be exactly what the radical Muslims want because it will strengthen their position in the Islamic world in general, and North Africa and Turkey in particular. But the alternative to not strengthening the radical Islamists is living with the threat of death if they are offended. And that is not going to be endured in Europe.

Perhaps a magic device will be found that will enable us to read the minds of people to determine what their ideology actually is. But given the offense many in the West have taken to governments reading emails, I doubt that they would allow this, particularly a few months from now when the murders and murderers are forgotten, and Europeans will convince themselves that the security apparatus is simply trying to oppress everyone. And of course, never minimize the oppressive potential of security forces.

The United States is different in this sense. It is an artificial regime, not a natural one. It was invented by our founders on certain principles and is open to anyone who embraces those principles. Europe's nationalism is romantic, naturalistic. It depends on bonds that stretch back through time and cannot be easily broken. But the idea of shared principles other than their own is offensive to the religious everywhere, and at this moment in history, this aversion is most commonly present among Muslims. This is a truth that must be faced.

The Mediterranean borderland was a place of conflict well before Christianity and Islam existed. It will remain a place of conflict even if both lose their vigorous love of their own beliefs. It is an illusion to believe that conflicts rooted in geography can be abolished. It is also a mistake to be so philosophical as to disengage from the human fear of being killed at your desk for your ideas. We are entering a place that has no solutions. Such a place does have decisions, and all of the choices will be bad. What has to be done will be done, and those who refused to make choices will see themselves as more moral than those who did. There is a war, and like all wars, this one is very different from the last in the way it is prosecuted. But it is war nonetheless, and denying that is denying the obvious.

A War Between Two Worlds is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

Another example of "This is so stupid it has to be true"


I've gotten into debates with teachers and others on the wisdom of arming educators in case of an active shooter. Putting that aside for the moment, this is beyond the limit of sanity.
Middle School Asks Kids To Bring In Cans To Fight School Shooters

In a letter to parents obtained by WHNT, W.F. Burns Middle School principal Priscella Holley and assistant principal Donna Bell asked each student to bring in a canned food item to throw at an intruder.

“We realize at first this may seem odd, however it is a practice that would catch an intruder off-guard,” the letter said. “The canned food item could stun the intruder or even knock him out until the police arrive. The canned food item will give the students a sense of empowerment to protect themselves and will make them feel secure in case an intruder enters their classroom.”

Bell told BuzzFeed News that the administration decided to ask parents to send the items after receiving training from the ALICE Training Institute.

The private company offers training courses to prepare schools, churches and other institutions for an active shooter.

Nick Feyerchak, a representative from the company, told BuzzFeed News their courses have been offered at more than 30,000 schools and give school staff better tools than a lockdown to ensure their students’ safety.

One of those tactics, he said, is throwing heavy objects at the shooter if all else fails.

“It’s a distraction (to the shooter),” he said.

Feyerchak dismissed criticism that the children would just agitate or anger the shooter, possibly making the situation worse.

“How does it get any worse?” he asked, adding, “How is just simply hiding under your desk when a gunman is shooting at you going to help?

Feyerchak said the program does not specifically say you must throw cans, but he has heard of schools recommending cans be used in defense.

“You want to go out fighting,” he said...

...The police department in the city of Valley, Alabama, where the school is located, did not respond to BuzzFeed News’ request for comment about the plan.

Where to start on this. One, one study after another shows there is only one thing that stops a bad guy with a gun. A good guy with a gun. Two, if there is an active shooter the one thing you are going to want to do is run off as fast as possible, not stand and fight while you are unarmed. And if you don't know it, a can is not a match to a gun. Three, if you are unarmed and can't get out, the last thing you want to do is draw attention to yourself. Throwing a can at someone will make you a greater target. Finally, I wonder if this school system, or the company offering the training realize what kind of liability they have opened themselves open to if there is an active shooter here.

Sorry guys, pay off duty cops or hire rent-a-cops for this.

Good news from Georgia. A cop killer is put down

This is a painful video to watch and for some reason I'm drawn to it. I've watched it dozens of times and it keeps telling me things. I try to not criticize a fallen officer, but I want to know what he did wrong and insure I don't do it myself. As Otto von Bismarck said, “Only a fool learns from his own mistakes. The wise man learns from the mistakes of others.” And in this profession we must learn from the experiences of others.

The circle is now complete. This animal, Andrew Howard Brannan, was put down like a rabid dog. I guess that is appropriate, but I would still rather him be hanged in a public square. But a needle does the job.

If you question my belief in capital punishment, watch this video.

Ga. man executed for killing of deputy during traffic stop

A man who fatally shot a sheriff's deputy who stopped him for speeding on a Georgia interstate was put to death Tuesday for the 1998 killing

JACKSON, Ga. — A man who fatally shot a sheriff's deputy who stopped him for speeding on a Georgia interstate was put to death Tuesday for the 1998 killing, which was captured on the patrol car's video camera.

Andrew Howard Brannan, 66, was pronounced dead at 8:33 p.m. Tuesday after a single-drug injection at the state prison in Jackson. He was convicted of the January 1998 shooting death of Kyle Dinkheller, a 22-year-old sheriff's deputy in Laurens County, central Georgia.

"I extend my condolences to the Dinkheller family, especially Kyle's parents and his wife and his two children," Brannan said in a statement moments before the injection was administered.

Lawyers for Brannan, a Vietnam veteran, had unsuccessfully argued to authorities to spare the inmate's life, saying the shooting was tied to mental illness directly traced to Brannan's military service.

Dinkheller had stopped Brannan for driving 98 mph and demanded he take his hands from his pockets during a traffic stop, officials said Brannan then began cursing, dancing in the street and saying "shoot me" before he rushed the deputy. After a scuffle, Brannan pulled a high-powered rifle from his car and shot Dinkheller at least nine times, authorities said.

The confrontation was captured by a video camera in Dinkheller's patrol car and a microphone he wore. Parts including the scuffle between the two happened off camera, according to court documents. But Dinkheller can be heard yelling orders at Brannan, who responded with expletives, authorities said. Brannan can also be seen crouching by his car and firing at the deputy as Dinkheller yelled at him to stop. Brannan walked toward the patrol car, still firing, exhausted one magazine, reloaded and continued firing, authorities said.

Police found Brannan the next day hiding under a camouflage tarp near his home. He had been shot in the stomach, apparently by Dinkheller...

...The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles held a hearing Monday on a petition for clemency from Brannan's lawyers and denied the request to commute the sentence to life without parole.

"Is it right to execute a mentally-ill veteran whose sole incidence of violent behavior is traceable directly and inexorably to mental illness resulting from his combat service?" Brannan's lawyers had written in that clemency petition...

Mr. Brannon, I have several friends who served in Vietnam and many will tell you they question the wisdom of many of their actions. However, none of them will say it justifies murdering another man. So your explaination rings hollow with this vet. I'll will give you this, you were man enough to apologize to the family of the man your murdered. Hopefully that helps with the Judge you met last night.

To the Dinkheller family, I know this won't remove the pain of your loss, but at least we know he will never do this again. And hopefully your loved one rest easier now.

RIP Deputy Dinkheller. We Got The Watch.

Security Weekly: Jihadism in 2014: Assessing the Islamic State, January 6, 2014

Jihadism in 2014: Assessing the Islamic State

By Scott Stewart

Editor's Note: The following is the third installment of a series examining how the global jihadist movement evolved in 2014.

As noted in part one of this series, the largest change in the jihadist movement in 2014 was the split between al Qaeda and the Islamic State. In part 4 of the 2013 Gauging the Jihadist Movement series, we discussed the tensions between al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, as the organization was referred to then. We also noted that the group was the most powerful of the regional jihadist franchises, that it was growing in power and that it had the potential to be the next jihadist group to establish an emirate. Finally, we noted our belief that this growing power was going to draw the attention of the Unites States and its allies, who do not want to permit the emergence of a jihadist emirate in the heart of the Middle East.

However, while we correctly outlined the general trends that were going to transpire, the actual scope of how those trends played out caught us by surprise. We simply did not foresee the organization being able to conquer as much land in Iraq as it did, with the speed that it did. Also, while Stratfor has long been concerned about the capabilities of the Iraqi security services after the U.S. withdrawal, we were surprised by how quickly the U.S.-trained and -equipped Iraqi army broke and fled in the face of attacks by a far smaller and lesser-equipped force. We were also caught off guard at the way the generally well-regarded Kurdish peshmerga was initially driven back during the Islamic State's offensive into Iraq.

In that context, we will examine the Islamic State in terms of its goals and by comparing its stated aims to insurgent and terrorist theory.

Goals

Despite its current ideological squabbling with al Qaeda, and the pointed criticism of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri that was discussed in part two of this series, the Islamic State nevertheless continues to pursue the broad strategy al-Zawahiri outlined in a 2005 letter he sent to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of the group that has become the Islamic State.

In that letter, al-Zawahiri wrote: "It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world." He also noted that the first step in such a plan was to expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage was to establish an emirate and expand it into a larger caliphate. The third stage was then to attack the secular countries surrounding Iraq (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and Jordan) and bring them into the caliphate. The fourth step was to use the power of the combined caliphate to attack Israel.

Inspired by al-Zawahiri's letter, and emboldened by successes on the battlefield despite the death of al-Zarqawi in a U.S. airstrike, al-Zarqawi's group renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006, thereby declaring the establishment of a jihadist polity in Iraq. While the group was severely weakened as a result of the U.S. surge of forces into Iraq and the corresponding Anbar Awakening in the Sunni areas of the country that began in 2007, the organization never let go of its goals. It rebuilt after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and took advantage of the civil war in Syria. Following a successful military campaign to seize large portions of the Sunni areas in Iraq, on June 29, 2014, the Islamic State organization announced not only the re-establishment of an emirate but also of a caliphate and demanded that all Muslims pay homage to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is now known as Caliph Ibrahim.

The Islamic State currently controls large sections of Syria and Iraq, including significant portions of Syria's energy production apparatus. It also controls Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, having assembled the largest and best-equipped jihadist armed force ever. It has therefore accomplished a great deal over the past year. However, jihadist emirates have been relatively short-lived, including the previously declared Islamic State in Iraq and the emirate declared by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Mali in 2012. They have also been destroyed by foreign intervention, and it is very likely that the Islamic State will find it extremely difficult to hold onto its gains in the face of the concerted international campaign against it.

Insurgency and Terrorism

The militants of the Islamic State have been fighting an insurgent war in Iraq for more than a decade now. They have also been heavily involved in the Syrian civil war since 2011. Through numerous battles in Iraq and Syria, the military leadership of the Islamic State learned hard lessons from attempting to stand toe-to-toe with the U.S. military in Fallujah (twice) and Ramadi. There have also been brutal conflicts with Syrian and Iraqi armed forces and an assortment of militant groups such as Hezbollah and Jabhat al-Nusra — the al Qaeda franchise group in Syria that split from the Islamic State. As seen from its dramatic gains on the battlefield in 2014, the Islamic State has grown quite competent at guerrilla and mobile, light infantry warfare.

Much of the Islamic State's battlefield success came from the fact that it has accepted many former Sunni Iraqi military officers into its ranks, leaders who lost their positions after Saddam Hussein fell. These former soldiers have shown the ability to plan operations, handle logistics, and even operate and maintain heavy weapons systems captured from the Syrian and Iraqi militaries. Experienced militants from Libya, Chechnya and elsewhere have also bolstered the Iraqi contingent. The Islamic State's ability to employ heavy weapons like tanks and artillery greatly assisted its offensive operations in 2014.

While the Iraqi soldiers brought a good deal of military experience to the group, they have not been able to provide much in the way of terrorist tradecraft. Indeed, the Iraqi government was fairly successful in its military campaigns against its own minorities and other regional powers, such as the Kuwaitis and Iranians. However, Iraq struggled to project power transnationally through terrorism.

Hussein's government supported numerous terrorist groups with logistics and training facilities, but others carried out much of the terrorist tradecraft training conducted in those camps. Saddam's military and intelligence personnel were masters at instilling terror in their native population, but they never really mastered transnational terrorism tradecraft themselves.

The Iraqi government's lack of transnational terrorist tradecraft was plainly evident in January 1991 when it launched a string of botched and thwarted attacks across Asia, to include Manila, Jakarta, Bangkok and Beijing. Despite having the luxury of being able to send terrorist materials to intelligence officers assigned to its embassies, for passage to their terrorist teams via the diplomatic pouch, these would-be terrorists committed egregious technical and operational security mistakes. First, because of faulty timers, their bombs either failed to go off or killed their own operatives. Second, their operatives were traveling on sequentially numbered Iraqi tourist passports, and once that sequence was discovered, their terrorist teams were quickly rounded up in a number of countries.

The Hussein government's transnational terrorism incompetence was again displayed in April 1993 when the Iraqi intelligence service attempted to assassinate former U.S. President George HW Bush in Kuwait City. The Iraqis used the same type of explosives used in the 1991 Asia attacks, PE-4A, and the explosives were even from the same manufacturer's lot number the Iraqi intelligence service had sent to Asia and elsewhere via the diplomatic pouch in 1991.

As we have previously discussed, the Islamic State and its predecessor organizations have never conducted terrorist attacks outside their region of operations, and even their efforts to launch attacks in neighboring Jordan have not been successful compared with their terrorist operations in Iraq and Syria. This lack of success stems from the challenges associated with operating remotely in hostile territory, a far more difficult task than operating locally and using internal communication lines. Indeed, projection of terrorist capabilities at the transnational level requires different elements of terrorist tradecraft than attacking locally. For example, in bombmaking it is far more challenging to construct a viable explosive device from improvised components than it is to assemble one using military-grade explosives and other ordnance.

This lack of capability to project terrorist power was evidenced by the Islamic State's call to grassroots jihadists in the West to embrace the leaderless resistance model of terrorism and conduct attacks where they live.

If the Islamic State begins working to develop the tradecraft capabilities required for transnational terrorist operations, we would expect to first see it display a greater ability to project force within its region before we would see it attempt to project force half a world away. We have recently seen reports of the Islamic State attempting to infiltrate personnel into Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but those efforts have been amateurish, as have the group's terrorist attacks to date in Lebanon.


Outlook

The Islamic State has surpassed al Qaeda's accomplishments on the battlefield, declaring a caliphate in an attempt to assume leadership of the global jihadist movement. However, as noted two weeks ago, we have yet to witness major defections of jihadists from al Qaeda to the Islamic state, outside of the Syria/Iraq theater of operations. The group's pointed criticism of al Qaeda for being too moderate and religiously flawed will likely serve to alienate those who venerated Osama bin Laden. The group's attacks on the Taliban, Mullah Omar and other Deobandi Muslims will also likely hurt the Islamic State's appeal to militants in South Asia.

It must be remembered that specific regional factors aided the Islamic State's growth — the brutal sectarianism in Iraq and Syria, for example — and the lack of those factors in other areas will continue to limit the group's ability to spread beyond its core locality.

The Islamic State has quite publicly tied its legitimacy to its success on the battlefield, essentially stating in Dabiq magazine and other outlets that its battlefield successes were a way to prove its claim to the caliphate and to show that it was being divinely favored. Yet, as the international campaign against the Islamic State progressed, the organization's offensive stalled and the Islamic State weathered dramatic losses on the battlefield in Kobani, Baji and Sinjar, to name a few. Indeed, it would seem that the reason the Islamic State continues to attack Kobani and suffer mounting casualties there is because of its propaganda claims. The city really has little strategic importance to it otherwise.

The U.S.-led coalition has also repeatedly struck at Islamic State-controlled oil infrastructure in an effort to limit the group's ability to finance itself through the black market sale of oil. Despite the Islamic State's recent public announcement of a $2 billion budget for 2015, its expected $250 million surplus for the year and John Cantlie's video assurances that the Islamic State's economy is fine, there are signs that the organization is struggling financially. Certainly, the group gained a great deal of money and goods when it seized banks, government buildings and military bases, but it is spending a lot of money to provide salaries for its fighters and services for the citizens of the cities and towns it controls. Anecdotal reports suggest that food, medicine and other essential goods are in scarce supply and that the residents of cities such as Raqaa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq are becoming unhappy with the many taxes the Islamic State has levied to support its economy. With very little other economic activity, shaking down the local population for "taxes" can work only for so long until people are bled dry.

The Islamic State also lost several key leaders, including its emir (governor) for Kirkuk, the head of military operations in Iraq, and al-Baghdadi's deputy, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, a former lieutenant colonel in Iraqi special operations. While the group had some success in recruiting foreign fighters, replacing al-Turkmani, a savvy and seasoned military man with on-the-ground fighting experience, will prove difficult.

While the Islamic State will attempt to celebrate such deaths as martyrdoms, these losses, when combined with the loss of territory on the battlefield and financial hardship, will nonetheless work to undermine the carefully crafted claim that the Islamic State is a divinely favored and inexorable force.

There will be no huge surge of U.S. combat troops into Iraq to combat the Islamic State as there was the last time it established a jihadist polity in Iraq. Instead, the fighting will be done by Iraqi troops, from the national army, the Shiite militias and the Kurdish peshmerga. Because of this, it will take longer to push the Islamic State out of cities such as Mosul, especially if Islamic State fighters choose to dig in and fight to the end rather than flee. However, once its lines of communication are cut and coalition airstrikes have hampered its ability to mass forces, the Islamic State will find it very difficult to retain the caliphate it has conquered.
COPYRIGHT: STRATFOR.COM

Geopolitical Weekly: Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges in the New Year, January 6, 2014

By Michael Nayebi-Oskoui

The Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world — it is no stranger to upheaval. The 2009 uprisings in Iran and the brinksmanship of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government were followed by the chaos of the Arab Spring, the spillover of the Syrian conflict into Iraq and a potential realignment of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Unlike recent years, however, 2015 is likely to see regional Sunni Arab interests realign toward a broader acceptance of moderate political Islam. The region is emerging from the uncertainty of the past half-decade, and the foundations of its future are taking shape. This process will not be neat or orderly, but changes are clearly taking place surrounding the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, as well as the region's anticipation of a strengthened Iran.

The Middle East enters 2015 facing several crises. Libyan instability remains a threat to North African security, and the Levant and Persian Gulf must figure out how to adjust course in the wake of the U.S.-Iranian negotiations, the Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Syria and Iraq, and the power vacuum created by a Turkish state bogged down by internal concerns that prevent it from assuming a larger role throughout the region. Further undermining the region is the sharp decline in global oil prices. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will be able to use considerable cash reserves to ride out the slump, the rest of the Middle East's oil-exporting economies face dire consequences.

For decades, long-ruling autocratic leaders in countries such as Algeria and Yemen helped keep militancy in check, loosely following the model of military-backed Arab nationalism championed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Arab monarchs were able to limit domestic dissent or calls for democracy through a combination of social spending and repression. The United States not only partnered with many of these nations to fight terrorism — especially after September 2001 — but also saw the Gulf states as a reliable bulwark against Iranian expansion and a dangerous Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. Levantine instability was largely contained to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, while Israel's other neighbors largely abided by a tacit agreement to limit threats emanating from their territories.

Today, Saddam's iron grip on Iraq has been broken, replaced by a fractious democracy that is as threatened by the Islamic State as it is by its own political processes. Gone are the long-time leaders of states like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Meanwhile, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Oman are facing uncertain transitions that could well take place by year's end. The United States' serious dialogue with Iran over the latter's nuclear program, once a nearly unthinkable scenario for many in the Gulf, has precipitated some of the biggest shifts in regional dynamics, especially as Saudi Arabia and its allies work to lessen their reliance on Washington's protection.

The Push for Sunni Hegemony

Riyadh begins this year under considerably more duress than it faced 12 months ago. Not only is King Abdullah gravely ill (a bout of pneumonia forced the 90-year-old ruler to ring in the new year in the hospital and on a ventilator), but the world's largest oil-producing country has also entered into a price war with American shale producers. Because Saudi Arabia and its principal regional allies, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, boast more than a trillion dollars in cash reserves between them, they will be able to keep production levels constant for the foreseeable future.

However, other OPEC producers have not been able to weather the storm as easily. The resulting 40 percent plunge in oil prices is placing greater financial pressure on Iran and the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq, Saudi Arabia's largest sectarian and energy rivals. Riyadh's careful planning and building of reserves means the Saudi kingdom's economic security is unlikely to come under threat in the next one to three years. The country will instead continue to focus on not only countering Iran but also rebuilding relationships with regional Sunni actors weakened in previous years.

Riyadh's regional strategy has traditionally been to support primarily Sunni Arab groups with a conservative, Salafist religious ideology. Salafist groups traditionally kept out of politics, and their conservative Sunni ideology was useful in Saudi Arabia's competition against Iran and its own Shiite proxies. Promoting Salafism also served as a tool to limit the reach of more ideologically moderate Sunni political Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, groups Riyadh sees as a threat because of their success in organizing grassroots support and fighting for democratic reforms.

With rise of external regional pressures, however, Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia are re-evaluating their relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood. Internal threats posed by Salafist jihadists and a desire to limit future gains by regional opponents are pushing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to try to forge a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood to limit the risks posed by rival groups in the region.

Restoring relations with the Muslim Brotherhood will also have effects on diplomatic relations. Qatar has long been a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that has strained its relations with other countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates even went so far as to close their embassies in Qatar. However, the continuation of the United States' rapprochement with Iran and Riyadh's own discomfort with the rise of Salafist jihadist groups has made it reconsider its stance on political Islamism. Riyadh, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi's agreement to resume diplomatic ties with Doha, and the latter's consideration of changing its relationships with Egypt and Libya, points to a shift in how the bloc's engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood has the potential to streamline the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) efforts in the region.

The Gulf monarchies' attempt at reconciling with political Islamists can potentially benefit the GCC. For its part, Qatar has engaged with the staunchly anti-Islamist Libyan government in Tobruk, and it appears tensions with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government in Egypt have calmed. Both scenarios point to the likelihood of the GCC moving closer to adopting a more unified regional stance beginning in 2015, one more in line with Riyadh's wishes to preserve the framework of the council.

This improvement in relations comes at a critical moment. With the United States and Iran undergoing a rapprochement of their own, the Gulf monarchies will try to secure their own interests by becoming directly involved in Libya, Syria and potentially Yemen. This military action will also aim to project strength to Iran while also filling the strategic void left by the absence of Turkish leadership in the region, especially in the Levant.

However, Qatar has been opposed to this course of action in the past. Despite its small size, the country has used its wealth and domestic stability to back a wide array of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia and rebel groups in Syria. Tensions between Qatar and regional allies came to a head in 2014 in the aftermath of Saudi and Emirati support for the July 2013 uprising that ousted the Doha-backed Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. The tension threatened the stability of the GCC and caused rebel infighting in Syria. This disconnect in Gulf policy has had wide regional repercussions, including the success of Islamic State militants against Gulf-backed rebel groups in Syria and the Islamic States' expansion into Iraq.

Without foreign military intervention on behalf of the rebels, no faction participating in the Syrian civil war will be able to declare a decisive military victory. As the prospects of a clear-cut outcome become less realistic, Bashar al Assad's Russian and Iranian backers are increasing diplomatic efforts to negotiate a settlement in Syria, especially as both are eager to refocus on domestic woes exacerbated by the current drop in global energy prices. Kuwait's recent decision to allow the Syrian regime to reopen its embassy to assist Syrian expats living within its borders points to a likelihood that the Gulf states are coming to terms with the reality that al Assad is unlikely to be ousted by force, and Sunni Arab stakeholders in the Syrian conflict are gradually giving in to the prospect of a negotiated settlement. A resolution to the Syrian crisis will not come in 2015, but regional actors will continue looking for a solution to the crisis outside of the battlefield.

Any negotiated settlement will see the Sunni principals in the region — led by the GCC and Turkey — work to implement a competent Sunni political organization that limits the authority of a remnant Alawite government in Damascus and future inroads by traditional backers in Tehran. Muslim Brotherhood-style political Islam represents one of the potential Sunni solutions within this framework, and with Saudi opposition to the group potentially fading, it remains a possible alternative to the variety of Salafist options that could exist — to include jihadists. Such a solution ultimately relies on a broader democratic framework to be implemented, a scenario that will likely remain elusive in Syria for years to come.

North Africa's Long Road to Stability

North African affairs have traditionally followed a trajectory distinct from that of the Levant and Persian Gulf, a reality shaped as much by geography as by political differences between the Nasser-inspired secular governments and the monarchies of the Gulf. Egypt, Saudi Arabia's traditional rival for leadership of the Sunni Arab world, has become cripplingly dependent on the financial backing of its former Gulf rivals. The GCC was able to use its relative stability and oil wealth to take advantage of opportunities to secure its members' interests in North Africa following the Arab Spring. As a result, Cairo has become a launching pad for Gulf intentions, particularly UAE airstrikes against Islamist militants in Libya and joint Egyptian-Gulf backing of renegade Gen. Khalifa Hifter's Operation Dignity campaign.

Like Syria, Libya represents a battleground for competing regional Sunni ambitions. Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, backed Libya's powerful Islamist political and militia groups led by the re-instated General National Congress in Tripoli after the international community recognized the arguably anti-Islamist House of Representatives in Tobruk. Islamist-aligned political and militia forces control Libya's three largest cities, and Egyptian- and Gulf-backed proxies are making little headway against opponents in battles to gain control of Tripoli and Benghazi, prompting more direct action by Cairo and Abu Dhabi.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are primarily concerned with the possibility of Libya, an oil-rich state bordering Egypt, becoming a wealthy backer of political Islam. Coastal-based infighting has left much of Libya's vast desert territories available for regional jihadists as well as a host of smuggling and trafficking activities, posing a significant security risk not just for regional states but Western interests as well. Egyptian and Gulf attempts to shape outcomes on the ground in Libya have proved largely ineffective, and Western plans for reconciliation talks favor regional powers such as Algeria — a traditional rival to Egyptian and Gulf interests in North Africa — that are more comfortable working with political actors across a wide spectrum of political ideologies to include Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamism.

Libya will likely find itself as the proving ground for the quid pro quo happening between the participants of the intra-Sunni rift over political Islam. In exchange for Saudi Arabia and its partners reducing their pressure on Muslim Brotherhood-style groups in Egypt and Syria, Qatar and Turkey are likely to work more visibly with Tobruk in 2015 in addition to pushing Islamist proxies into a Western-backed national dialogue. Libya's overall security situation will not be settled through mediation, but Libyan Islamists are more likely to re-enter a coalition with the political rivals now that both sides' Gulf backers are working toward settling differences themselves.

Regional Impact

Dysfunction and infighting have marred attempts by the region's Sunni actors to formulate a cohesive strategy in Syria. This has enabled Iran to remain entrenched in the Levant — albeit while facing pressure — and to continue expending resources competing in arenas such as Libya and Egypt. The next year will likely see an evolving framework where Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, will reach a delicate understanding on the role of political Islam in the region. 2014 saw a serious reversal in the fortunes of Muslim Brotherhood-style groups, which inadvertently favored even more far-right and extremist groups such as the Islamic State as the Gulf's various Sunni proxies were focused on competing with one another.

Iran's slow but steady push toward a successful negotiation with the United States, as well as the threats posed by militant Islam throughout the Levant, Iraq and North Africa, is necessitating a realignment of relationships within the Middle East's diverse Sunni interests. Less divisive Sunni leadership will be instrumental in coordinating efforts to resolve the conflicts in both Libya and Syria, although resolution in both conflicts will remain out of reach in 2015 and some time beyond.

A more robust Sunni Arab position, especially in Syria and the Levant, will likely put more pressure on Iran to reach a negotiated settlement with the United States by the end of the year. While a settlement may seem harmful to Gulf interests, the GCC is shifting toward a pragmatic acceptance of an agreement, similar to Riyadh's begrudging accommodation of a future role for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. The GCC's new goal is to limit Tehran's opportunities for success rather than outright denying it. Part of this will be achieved through an ongoing, aggressive energy strategy. The rest will come from internal negotiations between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey.

The next year will see the Sunni presence in Syria attempt to coalesce behind rebels acceptable to Western governments that are eager to see negotiations begin and greater local pushback against the Islamic State. More cohesive Gulf leadership will also present a more effective bulwark against Iranian and Alawite interests in the Levant. Most important, however, is the opportunity for regional Sunnis, led by Saudi Arabia, to present a more mature and capable response to mounting pressures. Whether through more assertive military moves in the region or by working with states such as Qatar to steer the Muslim Brotherhood rather than embolden the Islamist opposition, 2015 will likely see a shift in Sunni Arab strategies that have long shaped the region.

Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges in the New Year is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Security Weekly: Jihadism in 2014: Taking Stock of the al Qaeda Core, January 1, 2015

By Scott Stewart

Editor's Note: The following is the second installment of a series examining how the global jihadist movement evolved in 2014.

Last week, we published the first part of a series detailing the current status of the jihadist movement. That section noted how the split between al Qaeda and the Islamic State had divided and weakened the jihadist movement. As if on cue, the Islamic Sate released the sixth edition of its Dabiq Magazine on Dec. 29 and laid out a vivid chronicle of that schism. The magazine included articles containing stinging condemnation of al Qaeda's core leaders, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Afghan Taliban. It also attempted to dissuade wealthy donors from providing support to al Qaeda.

For some time, rumors of efforts to reconcile the two sides have persisted. After the pointed, public and personal attacks in Dabiq, this seems increasingly unlikely. If anything, the attacks can be expected to provoke a heated response from those they targeted in the al Qaeda core and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has been relatively measured in its public criticism of the Islamic State so far.

Having discussed the new morphology of the jihadist movement last week, it is now time to turn our attention to the current state of the al Qaeda core.

A Very Weak Core

The al Qaeda core has been weakened to the point of military irrelevance, and its ideological clout has dwindled substantially. The fact that the Islamic State's leaders felt confident enough to defy the orders of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly break away from the group and now mock him publicly is a clear reflection of the core's organizational irrelevance to the rest of the jihadist movement. If al-Zawahiri and the other core leaders were killed or arrested, the broader jihadist movement would hardly be affected.

The al Qaeda core's current irrelevance, however, is not necessarily permanent. In the past we have seen jihadist groups rebound and regain strength after experiencing substantial losses on the battlefield. The United States has employed the full force of its counterterrorism tools against the al Qaeda core for more than 13 years now, but if Washington were to reduce that pressure, and if the al Qaeda leadership were able to find some space in which to operate, it is possible that the group could begin to regain strength.

The al Qaeda core sent a group of representatives known as the Khorasan group to work with Jabhat al-Nusra around Aleppo in Syria; this could have been an effort to find such operational space. U.S. airstrikes, Syrian regime activity and attacks by the Islamic State and other Syrian rebel groups have severely constrained the Khorasan group's operational capabilities. Based on this outcome, it is unlikely that the remainder of the al Qaeda core leadership would depart from their sanctuaries along the Afghan-Pakistani border to relocate to such a precarious location.

The insular al-Zawahiri continues to constrain the core group's regeneration. He lacks the charisma and larger-than-life presence of Osama bin Laden — or even the Islamic State's Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Even when leading his own group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zawahiri was an ineffective leader. The group languished, then split before al-Zawahiri and his loyalists were absorbed into al Qaeda. Given space and opportunity, it is possible that a more effective al Qaeda leader could emerge in place of al-Zawahiri. This has not happened yet, however, and with the increasing momentum of the Islamic State it appears that the al Qaeda core will continue to decline.

For many years now, al Qaeda has issued threats of impending attacks that it claims will surpass 9/11, but these have not materialized. Instead, the main threat from the jihadist movement has shifted from attacks originating from the al Qaeda core to ones coming primarily from franchise groups and grassroots militants. As early as January 2006, we assessed that the al Qaeda core had lost its ability to pose a strategic threat to the United States homeland.

Measuring Accomplishments

When we look at the al Qaeda core's accomplishments in relation to its goals of establishing emirates and eventually re-establishing the caliphate, the group has clearly failed. In fact, the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks caused the United States to invade Afghanistan and overthrow the one jihadist emirate that existed at that time. While the Islamic State has declared a caliphate in Iraq and Syria, that polity remains at war with al Qaeda's franchise in the region and at odds with al Qaeda ideologically. This means that following 25 years of armed struggle, the al Qaeda core is no closer to achieving its objectives than when it began.

In terms of insurgent theory, the al Qaeda core's leaders held a "focoist" view, meaning they believed they could act as a global vanguard and employ violence to establish the conditions necessary for a global uprising in the Muslim world. While some groups and individuals have heeded al Qaeda's call to battle, their actions have been far from a global uprising. Indeed, most of the groups we refer to as al Qaeda franchises were pre-existing Islamist or jihadist organizations that have simply assumed al Qaeda's name. As discussed last week, the Islamic State and several factions of other al Qaeda franchise groups have defected from al Qaeda's orbit, leaving the al Qaeda portion of the global jihadist movement considerably weaker than it was at this time last year.

On the terrorism front, we have seen al Qaeda's efforts devolve into early al Qaeda or even pre-al Qaeda operational models. The group has not been able to send highly trained facilitators to mobilize and equip local cells as we saw in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. Indeed, it has not even been able to deploy professional teams of skilled operators like it did for the 9/11 attacks. Instead, the al Qaeda core has been reduced to little more than a propaganda organization operating on the ideological level while franchise groups and grassroots jihadists have taken the lead in the physical struggle.

The al Qaeda regional franchise groups have been able to adopt hierarchical structures in their areas of operation but have been largely unable to develop the ability to project power far outside their core areas. Furthermore, many of the franchise groups have not sought to conduct transnational attacks due to lack of capability or a simple lack of interest. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb initially adopted a targeting philosophy similar to that of the al Qaeda core, but its large suicide bombings inside Algeria provoked a backlash from the more nationalist elements of the organization, and it soon reverted back to focusing on targets more like the ones the group had previously attacked when it was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for its part, has sought to conduct regional attacks like the assassination attempt against Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and transnational attacks such as the Christmas Day 2009 underwear bomb attack. The group, however, has been forced to conduct such attacks by dispatching bombers from its own base of operations in Yemen rather than by sending operatives to Saudi Arabia and the West to plan and execute attacks from within the targeted countries. Even then, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not conducted a regional or transnational attack since the failed November 2010 cargo plane attempt. This long-term lack of success in attacking the West has resulted in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the al Qaeda core's calling for grassroots jihadists to adopt a leaderless resistance model.

Although badly damaged, al Qaeda has thus far managed to survive the focused and prolonged assault that was intended to destroy it. This is the primary goal of any organization pursuing a long war strategy, and, as previously mentioned, if pressure on the al Qaeda core were eased, it is possible the group could recover some of its pre-9/11 power. However, the group will have to deal with other challenges before it can resume its former position as the vanguard of the global jihadist movement.

Al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State have become more powerful and influential than al-Zawahiri and the al Qaeda leadership. The Islamic State's claim to leadership of the global jihadist movement is bolstered by its successes on the battlefield and the fact that it has established a large, physical Islamic polity in the heart of the Middle East.

When combined with its attacks on al Qaeda's ideology and operational philosophy, the Islamic State's more virulent and extreme form of jihadism also poses an existential threat to al Qaeda's ability to retain its current adherents, recruit new members and solicit funds from wealthy donors. These two factors, plus repeated attacks by Muslim religious leaders against the theology of jihadism, may ultimately prove more dangerous to the al Qaeda core than the U.S.-led campaign against the group.

Jihadism in 2014: Taking Stock of the al Qaeda Core is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Officer Down


Police Officer Craig Chandler
Baltimore Maryland City Police Department
End of Watch: Friday, January 9, 2015
Tour: 6 years
Incident Date: 11/23/2014

Police Officer Craig Chandler succumbed to injuries sustained two months earlier when he was involved in a crash during a pursuit of a moped.

He and other officers were attempting to detain a group of individuals who were riding dirt bikes, which are illegal to operate in the city. One of the people they were attempting to detain was picked up on a moped which then fled the scene. Both the moped and the patrol car Officer Chandler was riding in struck a utility pole on the 2200 block of Kirk Avenue.

Officer Chandler was transported to a local hospital with severe injuries. He remained in the hospital until succumbing to his injuries on January 9th, 2015.

The driver of the moped was charged with reckless driving, negligent driving, and fleeing and eluding.

Officer Chandler had served with the Baltimore City Police Department for six years and was assigned to the Northeast District.
Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Nemo me impune lacessit

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

Geopolitical Weekly: The Top Five Events in 2014, December 30, 2014

By George Friedman

'Tis the season to make lists, and a list shall be made. We tend to see each year as extraordinary, and in some senses, each year is. But in a broader sense, 2014 was merely another year in a long chain of human triumph and misery. Wars have been waged, marvelous things have been invented, disease has broken out, and people have fallen in love. Nonetheless, lists are called for, and this is my list of the five most important events of 2014.

1: Europe's Persistent Decline

The single most important event in 2014 was one that did not occur: Europe did not solve its longstanding economic, political and social problems. I place this as number one because regardless of its decline, Europe remains a central figure in the global system. The European Union's economy is the largest in the world, taken collectively, and the Continent remains a center of global commerce, science and culture. Europe's inability to solve its problems, or really to make any significant progress, may not involve armies and explosions, but it can disrupt the global system more than any other factor present in 2014.

The vast divergence of the European experience is as troubling as the general economic malaise. Experience is affected by many things, but certainly the inability to find gainful employment is a central feature of it. The huge unemployment rates in Spain, Greece and Southern Europe in general profoundly affect large numbers of people. The relative prosperity of Germany and Austria diverges vastly from that of southern Europe, so much so that it calls into question the European Union's viability.

Indeed, we have seen a rise of anti-EU parties not only in Southern Europe but in the rest of Europe as well. None have crossed the threshold to power, but many are strengthening along with the idea that the benefits of membership in a united Europe, constituted as it is, are outweighed by the costs. Greece will have an election in the coming months, and it is possible that a party favoring withdrawal from the eurozone will become a leading power. The United Kingdom's UKIP favors withdrawal from the European Union altogether.

There is significant and growing risk that either the European Union will have to be revised dramatically to survive or it will simply fragment. The fragmentation of the European Union would shift authority formally back to myriad nation-states. Europe's experience with nationalism has been troubling, to say the least — certainly in the first part of the 20th century. And when a region as important as Europe redefines itself, the entire world will be affected.

Therefore, Europe's failure to make meaningful progress in finding a definitive solution to a problem that began to emerge six years ago has overwhelming global significance. It also raises serious questions about whether the problem is soluble. It seems to me that if it were, it would have been solved, given the threat it poses. With each year that passes, we must be open to the possibility that this is no longer a crisis that will pass, but a new, permanent European reality. This is something we have been pointing to for years, and we see the situation as increasingly ominous because it shows no signs of improving.

2: Ukrainian and Russian Crises

Historically, tensions between Russia and the European Peninsula and the United States have generated both wars and near wars and the redrawing of the borders of both the peninsula and Russia. The Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II and the Cold War all ended in dramatic redefinitions of Europe's balance of power and its map. Following from our first major event of the year, the events in Ukraine and the Russian economic crisis must rank as the second most important event.

Stratfor forecast several years ago that there would be a defining crisis in Ukraine that would be the opening to a new and extended confrontation between the European Peninsula and the United States on one side and Russia on the other. We have also forecast that while Russia has regional power, its long-term sustainability is dubious. The same internal factors that brought the Soviet Union crashing down haunt the Russian Federation. We assumed that the "little Cold War" would begin in the mid-2010s but that Russian decline would not begin until about 2020.

We have seen the first act, and we continue to believe that the final act isn't imminent, but it is noteworthy that Russia is reeling internally at the same time that it is trying to cope with events in Ukraine. We do not expect Russia to collapse, nor do we expect the Ukrainian crisis to evolve into a broader war. Nevertheless, it seems to me that with this crisis we have entered into a new historical phase in which a confrontation with significant historical precedents is re-emerging. The possibility of conflict is not insignificant; the possibility that the pressures on Russia, internally and externally, might not speed up the country's own crisis cannot be discounted. Certainly the consequences of oil prices, internal economic dislocation, the volatility of the ruble and sanctions all must give us pause.

The Russians think of this as an event triggered by the United States. In the newspaper Kommersant, I was quoted as saying that the American coup in Ukraine was the most blatant in history. What I actually said was that if this was a coup, it was the most blatant in history, since the United States openly supported the demonstrators and provided aid for the various groups, and it was quite open in supporting a change in government. The fact that what I said was carefully edited is of no importance, as I am not important in this equation. It is important in that it reveals a Russian mindset that assumes that covert forces are operating against Russia. There are forces operating against it, but there is nothing particularly covert about them.

The failures of Russian intelligence services to manage the Ukrainian crisis and the weakening of the Russian economy raise serious questions about the future of Russia, since the Russian Federal Security Service is a foundation of the Russian state. And if Russia destabilizes, it is the destabilization of a nation with a massive nuclear capability. Thus, this is our second most important event.

3: The Desynchronization of the Global Economy

Europe is predicted to see little to no growth in 2015, with some areas in recession or even depression already. China has not been able to recover its growth rate since 2008 and is moving sideways at best. The United States announced a revision indicating that it grew at a rate of 5 percent in the third quarter of 2014. Japan is in deep recession. That the major economic centers of the world are completely out of synch with each other, not only statistically but also structurally, indicates that a major shift in how the world works may be underway.

The dire predictions for the U.S. economy that were floated in the wake of the 2008 crisis have not materialized. There has been neither hyperinflation nor deflation. The economy did not collapse. Rather, it has slowly but systematically climbed out of its hole in terms of both growth and unemployment. The forecast that China would shortly overtake the United States as the world's leading economy has been delayed at least. The forecast that Europe would demonstrate that the "Anglo-Saxon" economic model is inferior to Europe's more statist and socially sensitive approach has been disproven. And the assumption that Japan's dysfunction would lead to massive defaults also has not happened.

The desynchronization of the international system raises questions about what globalization means, and whether it has any meaning at all. But a major crisis is occurring in economic theory. The forecasts made by many leading economists in the wake of 2008 have not come to pass. Just as Milton Friedman replaced John Maynard Keynes as the defining theorist, we are awaiting a new comprehensive explanation for how the economic world is working today, since neither Keynes nor Friedman seem sufficient any longer. A crisis in economic theory is not merely an academic affair. Investment decisions, career choices and savings plans all pivot on how we understand the economic world. At the moment, the only thing that can be said is that the world is filled with things that need explaining.

4: The Disintegration of the Sykes-Picot World

Sir Mark Sykes and Francois Georges-Picot were British and French diplomats who redrew the map of the region between the Mediterranean Sea and Persia after World War I. They invented countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Some of these nation-states are in turmoil. The events in Syria and Iraq resemble the events in Lebanon a generation ago: The central government collapses, and warlords representing various groups take control of fragments of the countries, with conflicts flowing across international boundaries. Thus the Iraqi crisis and the Syrian crisis have become hard to distinguish, and all of this is affecting internal Lebanese factions.

This is important in itself. The question is how far the collapse of the post-World War I system will go. Will the national governments reassert themselves in a decisive way, or will the fragmentation continue? Will this process of disintegration spread to other heirs of Sykes and Picot? This question is more important than the emergence of the Islamic State. Radical Islamism is a factor in the region, and it will assert itself in various organizational forms. What is significant is that while a force, the Islamic State is in no position to overwhelm other factions, just as they cannot overwhelm it. Thus it is not the Islamic State, but the fragmentation and the crippling of national governments, that matters. Syrian President Bashar al Assad is just a warlord now, and the government in Baghdad is struggling to be more than just another faction.

Were the dynamics of the oil markets today the same as they were in 1973, this would rank higher. But the decline in consumption by China and the rise of massive new sources of oil reduce the importance of what happens in this region. It still matters, but not nearly as much as it did. What is perhaps the most important question is whether this presages the rise of Turkey, which is the only force historically capable of stabilizing the region. I expect that to happen in due course. But it is not clear that Turkey can take this role yet, even if it wished to.

5: The Births of Asher and Mira

I was given two new grandchildren this year. For me, this must be listed as one of the five major events of 2014. I am aware that it is less significant to others, but I not only want to announce them, I also want to point out an important truth. The tree of life continues to grow new branches inexorably, even in the face of history, adversity and suffering. The broad forces of history and geopolitics shape our lives, but we live our lives in the small things. As much as I care about the other four matters — and I do — I care much more for the birth and lives of Asher and Mira and my other grandchild, Ari.

Life is experience in the context of history. It is lived in intimate contact with things that history would not notice and that geopolitics would not see as significant. "There are more things ... than are dreamt of in your philosophy," Hamlet said to his friend Horatio. Indeed, and their names are Asher, Mira and Ari. This must not be forgotten.

Have a happy New Year's, and may God grant you peace and joy in your lives, in spite of the hand of history and geopolitics.

The Top Five Events in 2014 is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Officer Down


Sergeant Sean Renfro
Jefferson County Colorado Sheriff's Office
End of Watch: Saturday, January 3, 2015
Age: 40
Tour: 15 years

Sergeant Sean Renfro was struck and killed by a vehicle while directing traffic at an accident scene on Highway 285, at Doubleheader Ranch Road, near Aspen Park at approximately 2:40 pm.

Sergeant Renfro, who was off-duty, had stopped to assist at the scene of a previous crash when his vehicle was also struck as the result of icy and snowy conditions. He remained on scene and was assisting Colorado State Patrol troopers by directing traffic as they worked the accident.

As he directed traffic around the accident scene an SUV lost control, crossed over the center line, and struck Sergeant Renfro, a bystander, and one of the vehicles involved in the second crash. A trooper was also injured by flying debris.

Sergeant Renfro had served with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office for 15 years. He is survived by his wife and four children.
Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Nemo me impune lacessit

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

Sunday, January 4, 2015

New York has fallen so far...remember when America's city had a real mayor.

Rudy Giuliani was the greatest NY City mayor in my lifetime. Listen to this man and you see what a real leader is. He is knowledgeable and will not take the lies (I use that term specifically) of the host, Major Garrett. More on that in a second.

This was on CBS's Face the Nation, so almost no one saw it and a rebroadcast like my blog are the way to increase the viewership.Take a few minutes and listen to a real leader face his critics and explain why B Hussein Obama and De Blasio are complete hypocrites in the question of supporting cops. I've often said a man is well judged by the company he keeps. The President and Da Mayor have a mutual dog, the "Revered" Al Sharpton. You lay down with a dog, you get up with fleas.



Rudy Giuliani Thinks Mayor De Blasio And President Obama Need To Ditch Al Sharpton

"You make Al Sharpton a close advisor, you're going to turn the police in America against you..."

Many have spoken out about and criticized Sharpton, and Giuliani agrees with Sheriff David Clarke that he needs to be avoided in order to restore the unity between the citizens and police officers.

“When he loses Al Sharpton, maybe then he can have a better relationship with the New York City Police Department,” Giuliani said of Mayor de Blasio.

Giuliani echoed that remark when speaking about the president, claiming Obama is using Sharpton as the “poster boy for hating police.”

“He has had Al Sharpton to the White House 80, 85 times,” Giuliani said. “Often when he’s talking about police issues, he has Al Sharpton sitting next to him. If he would like to have a poster boy for hating the police, it’s Al Sharpton.”

The former mayor didn’t approve of the officers turning their backs on de Blasio because “it doesn’t matter if you like the mayor or you don’t like the mayor, you have to respect the mayor’s position.” He defended the current mayor by saying that it is also despicable to suggest that he is responsible for the deaths of the two officers.

Giuliani finished the interview, however, by saying that de Blasio should offer an apology to the police force for having created a false impression of them.

Back to my statement calling Garrett a liar. He says during the interview "When you were mayor, you had your beefs with the police, there were times they turned their backs on you....", around 2:30. Giuliani was having nothing of that, stopped Garrett and told him no, never did the cops turn their back on him. And we all know if there was a scene like that, CBS would have had the video ready to show. So yes Garrett, you lying.

Great work Mr. Mayor. God I wish you were still in charge up there.

Thanks to my cousin Tim for the link!

A mature look at the global warming, oh climate change, wait, climate disruption, no global climate disruption issue

And of all things, it's from the high state of Colorado!
Beaton: Fear, loathing and global warming

Here’s what a global warming “denier” said recently in the Wall Street Journal:

“The idea that ‘climate science is settled’ runs through today’s popular and policy discussions. Unfortunately, that claim is misguided. It has not only distorted our public and policy debates on issues related to energy, greenhouse-gas emissions and the environment. But it also has inhibited the scientific and policy discussions that we need to have about our climate future.”

Except he isn’t a “denier.” He’s President Obama’s former undersecretary for science, Steve Koonin. He’s also a former professor of theoretical physics and a provost at Cal Tech, and holds a Ph.D. from MIT. His piece is titled “Climate Science is Not Settled,” published Sept. 19 on the Wall Street Journal’s website.

Koonin explained that global warming exists, or doesn’t, depending entirely on the time period you’re referencing. Dinosaurs thrived on an Earth that was much hotter than it is now. (In fact, there were no polar ice caps at all for the great majority of Earth’s history.) Mammoths romped on a colder Earth. Romans ruled one a little warmer. Columbus sailed in one a little cooler. President Bill Clinton held office in one that was slightly warmer than it is now.

That is the greatest flaw in the "logic" of the global warming believers. On the Earth, which is in constant change (storms, earthquakes, changing heat amounts from the sun, droughts, changing patterns of temperatures) what is normal? And how to we arrive at that version of normal? I wish an "objective journalist" would ask the ALGORE that question before he gets off of his SUV to get onto his private jet to fly somewhere to make money saying "the planet has a fever..."
So next time people ask if you “believe in” global warming, answer yes — and no.

Notwithstanding all those natural climate variations, serious scientists such as Koonin do say this:

Part of the slight warming over the past few hundred years was probably human-caused. We don’t know how much.

It’s not factual that 97 percent of scientists believe that global warming is a crisis. What those 97 percent actually believe is the first point — that some part of that slight warming over the past few hundred years was human-caused.

And to add to that, the "97 percent of scientist", is there a list of these people we can refer to? All the scientist in the world, in the US, only UN countries, what is the population of academics. And are we referring to only academic scientist or also those who work in the private sector. Just asking. I've heard this quoted too many times but no one has an accurate list of these "scientist".

I Googled the question "How many scientist are in the world" and there is no firm number. This is what I found from ResearchGate.net, when another person asked "How many active academics/scientists are there worldwide?":
Andrzej Szymanski · Poznan University of Technology
@ Michael
Indeed, it is an important issue for long-term development planning ResearchGATE , but also in itself - for all of us - very interesting.
I do not think we were able to get to the precise data on the global number of scientists, inter alia, because of the large dispersion - not only in the various scientific institutions and universities, but also in industry. We must also take into account the independent scientists .
I was wondering on the "scale of the problem". On the basis of knowledge on the number of scientists working in about 20 major Polish universities and the Polish Academy of Sciences, I can say that the profile of the ResearchGATE has an average of about 20-25 % of scientists.
It seems to me, that in Polish universities and other scientific institutions ResearchGATE is not as popular as in other countries. So if we assume that the global number of people who have a profile on ResearchGATE medium reaches 35-40 %, it can be assumed, that the "global market" there are about 10-12 million people in the "scientific sector".

Ok, we got a number and I'll admit it's a swag. What the global warming believers will have us think is, using the low number of 10 million, 9.7 million scientists out there believe in global warming. OK, how did they come up with that number? Did they go to 9.7 million people across the planet and ask? Another question for an "objective journalist".
Scientists are roughly split on whether it’s a crisis. Some think it’s a good thing because it may save us from the next ice age.

The recent warming peaked about 18 years ago. The computer models didn’t predict that. We still don’t know why it happened. We don’t know if the warming will resume or reverse and, if it does resume or reverse, we don’t know at what rate or whether it will stop or start again.

Extreme weather events are no more frequent now than in the past. In fact, there are fewer hurricanes, tornadoes, droughts, floods and wildfires. We don’t know why.

If global warming resumes, it will produce winners and losers. It is hard to predict which will be which. The warm climate when dinosaurs ruled suited them well and suits a lot of other life well. Much of human evolution occurred during warm periods in warm places (and much did not). And longer growing seasons would alleviate hunger by increasing crop yields.

To the extent you think skiing will be supremely important to your great-grandchildren, be advised that in places with the latitude of Washington, D.C., such as Aspen, it might not be as good. So skiing might be a loser. On the other hand, an Environmental Protection Agency study suggests that skiing might be a winner because the warmer temperatures might be offset by more snowfall because more water would evaporate from the oceans into the atmosphere.

On balance, there would be greater biomass. That is to say, there would be more life on Earth as there was when dinosaurs thrived. Compare the quantity and diversity of life in the tropics with, say, Antarctica.

If we decide to prevent global warming from recurring, we’re not sure how. Reducing carbon emissions would help, but we aren’t able to say how much because we don’t know how much of it is caused by those emissions. Stated another way, we don’t know how much warming-reduction bang we get for our carbon-reduction buck. Nor do we know how much we need (if any).

So what should we do?

First, take the issue seriously. We should continue to test, probe, measure, analyze, model and debate.

Let’s use but not waste the resources of this unique planet and let’s look for ones that are renewable. Whether you’re from the political side that calls this “environmentalism” or the side that calls it “conservation,” we can agree that conserving our resources is a good thing.

Here’s what not to do:

Don’t fear-monger by contending that a particular heat spell or a snowstorm proves or disproves global warming. Scientists don’t rely on a single data point.

Don’t loath those who disagree with you. Children censor, shout and name-call; scientists consider, analyze and, only then, rebut. And friends and other persons in a civil society simply respectfully disagree. Persons with one set of views are not “deniers” and persons with another are not afflicted with “hysteria.”

In any event, censorship, shouting and name-calling are counter-persuasive. They say, “I’m not smart enough to rebut you, so I’ll instead silence you.”

Don’t take scientific advice from politicians and celebrities, and don’t take a position because it’s fashionable or because that’s the position dictated by your liberal or conservative tribe. Think for yourself.

Finally, unless you’ve stopped traveling by planes, trains and automobiles — and ski lifts — don’t get too sanctimonious. We’re all in this together.

Glenn is a former aerospace engineer for Boeing, and can be reached at theAspenbeat@gmail.com.

Thank you Mr. Glenn for an excellent review of the issue. However I'm drawn to your statement "Scientists are roughly split on whether it’s a crisis." and I recall the words of our current occupant of the White House, B Hussein Obama about using a crisis to get things done. I think the global warming/environmental crisis is an opportunity for the radical left to "accomplish things".

Another old liberal loves the draft....

I speak as a 23 year veteran of the Active Army and Reserves, retiring as a major in 2010. Question, why is it "liberals" love cohesive volunteerism?

After the draft ended after the Vietnam War, the Army (and the military in general) was a disaster. Racism, narcotics and other criminal efforts destroyed discipline in the ranks and it took years to come out of it. As my first boss when I was a lieutenant told me of the mid 70s, "Mike, a staff duty officer did not go into the barracks unless he was armed or had an armed escort." One of the greatest efforts was the Army's war on narcotics beginning in the late 70s, with a zero tolerance for drug use. We ridded the ranks of many of the criminal endeavors that led to dangerous discipline problems.

Another effort at reform was the infusion of volunteers as opposed to draftees. People who volunteered to serve as opposed to those who were taken at the beginning of their adult lives for two years. It let to a higher average of the education of the force, a more motivated and capable force. Without question, one of the greatest successes of America is the last 40 years has been the volunteer service.

Now the problems with liberals like Mr. Epstein is they don't comprehend what the purpose of the armed forces are. General MacArthur said it best in his address to the 1962 class at West Point:
...And through all this welter of change and development your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purpose, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishments; but you are the ones who are trained to fight.

Now we have another liberal finding another reason for the Army and how the make it mandatory.
How I Learned to Love the Draft

JOSEPH EPSTEIN

As the struggle with the Islamic State, or ISIS, grows more intense and the Obama administration’s air-attack strategy—if the experts turn out to be correct—proves unavailing, the calls for boots on the ground in Syria and Iraq are likely to become more insistent. Despite the coalition of nations aligned against ISIS and other terrorist groups, no one doubts that any such boots will be preponderantly American. Our current volunteer military will fill those boots.

Which prompts a question: Should the burden of defending America be exclusively theirs? When one watches those heartbreaking segments on the national news of men and women returning from Middle Eastern wars with missing limbs, and reads accounts of their suffering from mental-health problems as a result of their experiences in battle, one feels an essential unfairness about current military arrangements. True, these men and women volunteered for battle, yet in a democracy it somehow feels wrong for a small segment of the population to be charged with the responsibility of defending the country in foreign wars.

The remedy for this fundamental unfairness is of course at hand, and it goes by the name of the draft.

I have never felt more American than when I was in the Army...

...The great example of a successful conscription army is in Israel, where nearly all eligible young men and women serve. Israel exists, of course, in a state of perpetual peril; as has often been said, it cannot afford to lose even one war. But the glory of the Israeli army, and its support by all but the most pacifist Israelis, surely owes to the fact that everyone serves, or has served, in it...

I hate to bring reality into Mr Epstein's world view, but we are not Israel. The United States is a country of over 300 million, Israel 8 million, about the size of New York City. We are not surrounded by nations who have sword to wipe us off the face of the Earth or have regularly fired missiles into our soil. Israel been attacked multiple times since its founding in 1948. Israel's population is so small they must have a larger percentage of the people in the armed forces. Sorry, you are comparing apples and oranges.
...Under the draft, the American social fabric would change—and, judging from my experience, for the better. I write as a former draftee who served in the Army from 1958 to 1960. I was, in other words, a Cold War soldier, and never for a moment in danger. Much of my time in the military—I worked on the post newspaper at Fort Hood, in Texas, and later as a clerk, typing up physicals, in a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas—was excruciatingly boring.

Yet I am grateful for having served. Doing so took me out of my own social class and ethnic milieu—big-city, middle-class, Jewish—and gave me a vivid sense of the social breadth of my country. I slept in barracks and shared all my meals with American Indians, African Americans from Detroit, white Appalachians, Christian Scientists from Kansas, and discovered myself befriending and being befriended by young men I would not otherwise have met. I have never felt more American than when I was in the Army....

...At Fort Leonard Wood, in Missouri, where I did my basic training, I remember a guy from Tennessee named Flowers, whose ex-wife turned him over to the draft for failing to make alimony payments, and who joked about renegotiating the terms of his divorce when first issued his M1 rifle....

I'm glad you had a good experience in the Army of three generations ago. This is not the same Army or the same America. Also, I point out you spent two years in uniform. The modern army needs people for more than two years. If you want us to draft millions for two years, this is what would happen. After spending 10 weeks in basic training, followed by 5-50 weeks of Advanced Individaul Training a new private is sent to his first unit. Then in a manner of months the private, after hundreds of thousands of dollars being put into his training, is preparing to leave the service. A unit that is just getting him integrated into the team has lost a member and he will not be the only one. What a waste.
In contemporary America, if one is born into the middle or upper-middle class, one is unlikely ever to have to step outside that class. One stands to go to school with people from the same social class, marry into that class, raise one’s children within it, live out one’s days among its members. Members of the working classes are more cruelly class-bound and isolated. The ingredients in the once famous American melting pot thus remain frozen.

That is pure bull. I've got friends who work with me in law enforcement (solid middle class) who are married to highly paid lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc. America is a story of how people are born into poverty and rise to greater success (or fall from higher levels). Maybe you should spend more time away from liberal writers Mr. Epstein.
The hiatus the draft brings can have a decisive effect on one’s future. Certainly it did in my case. By drawing me at the age of 22 out of the workaday world for two years, the draft gave me space to think about my life and what I wanted to do with it. But for the draft, I might, God forfend, have gone to law school simply out of the need to appear serious, and today have been a perhaps wealthier but undoubtedly much less contented man.

During the years the draft was in effect, it was not uncommon for judges to let young criminal offenders choose among reform school, prison, and the Army. Most chose the Army, a decision I should like to see made by the gang members who now menace the streets of my city, Chicago, and other major American cities. As a totalitarian institution—that is, one that has total control over the people in it—the Army in my day had a remarkably high success rate in rehabilitating young offenders and even wayward jerks. In the Army, you shaped up or—well, there really wasn’t any alternative but to go to prison or have your life permanently stained by a dishonorable discharge.

I'm glad the Army helped you find out what you wanted to do with your life. But that is not why we have an army, see the quote above.
Arguments against reinstituting the draft, though not trivial, are mainly technical. Training volunteer soldiers is said to be hard enough, given the complexity of military hardware—training reluctant conscripts would be even more difficult. Yet far from all military tasks are technological; clerks, cooks, infantrymen are always needed. Having lots of soldiers who have gone through college and professional schools would also leaven the enlisted ranks in a useful way...

You really don't know how ignorant your statement is. An infantryman is "not technical"? Allow me to put you in the driver's seat of a Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle and see if you can start it? How about all the communications systems involved with infantry operations. Can you fire a mortar without getting yourself killed? Mr. Epstein, this is not the Army of 1959.

For some reason the people on the "liberal" side of the political spectrum seemed to think "volunteerism" should be mandated. I speak for the overwhelming majority of the men and women in uniform that it would be better for all concerned to have five people who volunteered to be there than ten who are forced to be there at the point of a gun. Inflicting the disruption of the a large number of draftees into the service while we are trying to handle multiple operations will only weaken the military and the nation.