A few years ago I post on my department's active shooter class and I called it the best in-service class I've ever had. I still stand by that. Well last night I caught 60 Minutes and they had a report on New York Police Department and Washington DC Police Department officers training for a nightmare. It's just over 15 minutes but well worth your time.
And 60 Minutes Overtime:
Wednesday, November 11, 2015
Security Weekly: Time Is Working Against the Islamic State, November 5, 2015
By Scott Stewart
At this time last year, a string of leaderless resistance-style attacks by grassroots jihadists in the West was making people very nervous. And their concern was understandable: In late October 2014, the tempo of attacks by grassroots jihadists in the West reached its highest point in history. The spike in activity largely stemmed from a statement made by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani a month earlier, urging individuals in Western countries to:
"... single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him."
The wave of violence continued through the end of 2014 and into 2015, as assailants struck Australia and France in December, followed closely by the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January and the Copenhagen attack in February. But since that time, it has become clear that the momentum of the attacks has slowed, and that grassroots jihadists have not been able to keep up a consistent tempo of striking multiple times each month. In other words, the violence taking place in October last year was an anomaly, not the start of an emerging trend. The question is: Why didn't the movement gain more traction?
The Limited Appeal of Jihadism
At least some of the reduction in violence can be traced to stepped up law enforcement efforts to identify potential attackers and disrupt plots. But it is also becoming increasingly clear that, as Stratfor noted in March, the Islamic State's appeal has its limits, and after an initial spurt of dramatic growth, the group seems to have reached its pinnacle. Now, the market for its ideology has hit a point of saturation, and its recruiting attempts are becoming less and less successful.
This is not to say that the jihadist ideology, or even the Islamic State's version of it, will disappear anytime soon. Jihadist insurgencies and terrorist attacks will persist for the foreseeable future, albeit at a slower tempo. However, the factors that led to the Islamic State's stunning rise in popularity last year — the group's territorial gains, its successes against authorities, and its propaganda — are starting to wear out. Much of the group's appeal lay in its portrayal of itself as an agent of apocalyptic Islamic prophecy. The Islamic State wasn't just talking about the end of times; it was actively working to make it happen.
There are other ways the group's diminishing appeal is making itself known. In addition to the slowing tempo of grassroots attacks, many reports have surfaced in recent months of the Islamic State arresting and executing its fighters as traitors when they try to leave the group's territory and return home. The days of the "five-star jihad" that promised lavish lifestyles to new recruits are clearly over, and many of the foreign fighters who traveled to Syria and Iraq have become disenchanted with the Islamic State — especially because many of the people they are fighting and killing are other Muslims.
A recent remark by FBI Director James Comey highlighted this trend when he said that fewer Americans are attempting to travel abroad to join the Islamic State. Of course, some of the decline could be explained by officials' efforts to make travel more difficult, but the key thing to note is Comey's phrasing: He said fewer people are attempting to travel to join the group, not that fewer people have successfully traveled there. There also has not been a corresponding spike in attacks by Islamic State supporters who may have been prevented from traveling, or a spike in arrests of people trying to travel to Islamic State-held territory. Clearly, the group's appeal has waned among American Muslims since last year, and many of its remaining supporters appear to be losing their zeal to be arrested or killed during an attack in the West.
Exposing the Islamic State's Vulnerability
Prior to the U.S.-led coalition's bombing operations over the past year, the Islamic State seemed to be invincible as it gobbled up large portions of Iraq and Syria. The media's coverage of these conquests only added to the hype as it portrayed the group as far more powerful than it actually was. The Islamic State's battlefield successes, coupled with the media limelight, played right into the group's apocalyptic propaganda that the end of times was near, and that it would triumph and conquer the world. To Muslims seeking a transcendent cause, the Islamic State's message held great appeal.
But since that time, the coalition's bombing efforts have significantly degraded the Islamic State's capabilities, even if they have not destroyed the group entirely. As a result, it has stymied the Islamic State's spread, as has the human geography of the region, and the group has not seen much success beyond Sunni areas. In fact, in many areas, such as northern Syria, coalition air power has played a decisive role in helping forces such as the Kurds push the Islamic State back from key border crossings. While smuggling in and out of Islamic State territory still occurs, the volume of goods and people crossing the border is undoubtedly far less than it was when the Islamic State controlled strategic areas around it.
By halting the group's advance and destroying its military units, the coalition has also helped curtail the Islamic State's biggest supply of resources: the homes, farms, business, goods and people that do not belong to the group, as well as the taxes levied on conquered citizens. This type of logistical model is severely undermined once conquerors can no longer acquire more territory to rape and pillage to support the areas already under their control.
And make no mistake, controlling territory requires resources, especially in large cities the size of Mosul. The rulers of such cities must provide services, utilities, food, water and security for the population, all while guarding against any threats from locals who are unhappy with their rule. So while many have noted that the Islamic State is "the richest terrorist group in history," they must also account for the vast economic drain that comes with holding and governing the amount of territory the Islamic State has, on top of the financial toll its war efforts are taking.
The Draw of Apocalyptic Ambitions
The Islamic State's brutal rape and pillage strategy has not alienated all of its potential recruits. For many in the region controlled by the Islamic State, they have no other choice but to support the group or die, and often few other career opportunities exist. But beyond these captive supporters, there are still many who have volunteered to support the caliphate experiment because of its transcendent purpose and because the idea of approaching the final days is so powerful that it can override any qualms about how the end is to be achieved. If you are fulfilling an apocalyptic prophecy, does it really matter that you murdered, raped and robbed?
The Islamic State's end goal is powerfully appealing to jihadists around the world, and even beyond to many non-jihadist Muslims. The opportunity to bring about an Islamic prophecy is exciting, and Islamic State leaders truly believe what they are preaching. The group's barbaric actions prove that its leaders genuinely subscribe to their apocalyptic vision and do not care about possible repercussions. Their doctrine has an especially powerful pull among marginalized individuals who tend to flock to cults, gangs and radical groups, as we can see not only in the young fighters and brides traveling to Syria but also in the grassroots jihadists conducting leaderless resistance-style attacks in the West.
The powerful appeal of apocalypticism can influence people to do unthinkable things. In the past, we have seen followers of the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo try to kill millions of people with biological and chemical weapons. Members of the Branch Davidians gave their daughters to David Koresh as brides and fought to the death to keep him from being arrested. Followers of the Heaven's Gate cult committed suicide in the hope of getting onboard the UFO hiding behind the Hale-Bopp Comet, and members of apocalyptic Christian cults have sold all their possessions in preparation for the foretold second coming of Jesus Christ that never came.
These historical examples point to the major limitation of groups that embrace apocalypticism: They lose their appeal when their predictions fail to materialize. When the second coming of Jesus did not take place in 1832, 1878, 1914 or 1975; when chemical attacks against the Tokyo subway system did not usher in the end of the world; and when David Koresh did not rise from the dead after three days, the organizations promoting such claims quickly became less attractive and began losing their ability to recruit new members.
This doesn't mean that the Islamic State's appeal will disappear overnight. But as the group's offensive operations are thwarted, as its economic engine stalls, and as the events it waits for do not come to pass, people will become increasingly disenchanted with its ideology. There are still Aum Shinrikyo and Branch Davidian supporters in the world, just as some of those who are invested in the Islamic State's ideology will continue to support the group until their final breaths. Once a person has sacrificed so much for a cause, it becomes hard to let it go. But as the clock continues to tick and the world continues to spin, time will ultimately undermine the apocalyptic ideology of the Islamic State.
COPYRIGHT: STRATFOR.COM
Geographical Weekly: The Case for Catalan and Scottish Secession Builds, November 10, 2015
The Case for Catalan and Scottish Secession Builds
By Mark Fleming-Williams
Separatist movements continue to rumble across Europe. The separatist urge extends in varying degrees to parts of Italy, Belgium, France, Romania and — most seriously at the moment — to Spain and the United Kingdom. In Spain, Catalonia this week proceeded with a "solemn proclamation" beginning the independence process, a move the Spanish Constitutional Court will probably block. Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, a year after 55 percent of Scots voted to remain a part of the union, polls are showing movement toward a "yes" vote on secession were a referendum held today, and Westminster is passing laws likely to exacerbate internal divisions.
Why Scotland and Catalonia currently display such strong secessionist tendencies has as much to do with past grievances as it does with a present confluence of factors.
The Consequences of Secession
Understanding the current movements in Catalonia and Scotland requires first understanding what it means for a region to become its own state. Geopolitics is the study of the strategies undertaken by groupings of people. These strategies are the sum of goals tempered by constraints; the strategy ultimately adopted is the most effective one available. By deciding to secede, a region or state is making the collective judgment that the needs of its populace will be better served outside its host nation rather than by remaining part of the larger whole. For this to be true, the many drawbacks of going it alone must be outweighed.
Frequently, the process of secession itself proves costly because the host country sees losing a region as weakening the whole, and so tries to prevent it (though examples of peaceful splits exist). The results can be quite bloody, as the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, showed in 1971. And Biafra's attempted secession from Nigeria in 1967 demonstrates that sometimes blood can be shed without the ultimate payoff of independence.
The drawbacks of a successful secession are also frequently the direct result of a diminution in size. As a rule of thumb, the larger the state, the more influence it has on the global stage. For example, it is hard to imagine a statesman from an independent Georgia rivaling the power wielded by another Georgian, Josef Stalin, when he was leader of the entire Soviet Union. A small country is also much more vulnerable to being buffeted by external forces, be it harmful flows of capital in and out of its currency or perhaps being bullied by a large trading partner to follow its preferred policies. Moreover, a small state may be more likely to experience aggression from powers other than the one from which it seceded — powers that might not have attacked it when it was part of the host state. Cyprus discovered this in 1974 when Turkey invaded it 14 years after Cyprus split from the United Kingdom.
Secession also means the creation of a new border with the former host country, which usually is the secessionist region's main trading partner. Studies have shown that borders greatly inhibit trade. There are also costs to creating the public sector institutions previously coordinated by the national capital.
On the plus side, a smaller unit can be more nimble in global affairs, making it possible to avoid major entanglements by being less visible. Moreover, larger states tend to have richer and poorer regions, with the former subsidizing the latter. A richer region that splits off may thus escape the burden of supporting poorer regions. Finally, a smaller region will tend to be more culturally homogenous than its larger parent, leading to a stronger sense of belonging among its population. Indeed, that may be a main driver for its desire to break away, and it often is the most powerful tool secessionist politicians looking for support have.
In this way, the case for secession becomes like a balance sheet, with forces favoring independence being weighed against forces for continued union. When the force for union outweighs that for separation, the status quo persists, but as the balance tips the other way there is a move toward secession.
The Scottish and Catalan Cases
The roots of Scottish separatism lie in geography. After the Romans invaded Britain in A.D. 43, they swiftly colonized the fertile plains of England and militarized the mountainous territories of Wales and northern England. But they ultimately decided that following suit in the highlands of Scotland was beyond their capabilities, and so they opted to erect a wall to keep the wild Scottish tribes out of their territory. Thus Scotland (along with Ireland) developed at some remove from the London-dominated heartland of the British Isles.
Compared to the United Kingdom, Spain is much more geographically decentralized. It is riven by mountains and valleys and has a dearth of navigable rivers, inhibiting intra-peninsular communication. This means the center has always struggled to impose itself on the periphery.
The two regions do a have a major historical commonality: Neither Scotland nor Aragon (at the time a sort of Greater Catalonia) was conquered by England or Castile; in fact, each freely chose to form part of a greater whole.
In 1707, Scotland, never a rich country, had recently bankrupted itself with a disastrous attempt at colonizing Panama. By uniting with England it saw an opportunity to gain access to that country's burgeoning international empire. (The union was made easier by the fact that an English monarch had died childless leaving a Scot king of both countries a century before.)
For its part, in 1492, Aragon — which had just suffered a ruinous civil war — had been watching its Castilian neighbor gradually absorb the rest of the peninsula. Castile's combined 5 million people now dwarfed Aragon's million. Joining its larger neighbor solved several problems for Aragon. For one, it helped deal with the French king, who was encroaching over the Pyrenees. (Catalonia owed its birth to a previous encroachment from the north, when the French sought to repel the encroaching Moors back down the Iberian Peninsula in the early 9th century; the distinctive Catalan tongue, which anchors the region's identity, emerged as a result of these Franco-Iberian roots.) It also brought the Mediterranean-facing Aragon closer to having a window on the Atlantic Ocean, which was where the locus of world trade was headed at that time. And it gave Aragon the opportunity of taking control of the whole: The Aragonese king wound up ruling the conjoined states as regent until 1515.
Over the centuries that followed, Scotland found itself gaining significantly from its union with England, with Glasgow and Dundee becoming important manufacturing hubs in the industrialized British Empire.
Catalonia, however, found itself in a tug of war with Madrid. The joining of Castile and Aragon to an extent was a union of equals, and Aragon was thus allowed to keep many of its special rights, privileges and autonomies. But as New World gold poured into Madrid and Seville, the Castilian center became more powerful compared to the Catalan periphery and began to encroach on these privileges in an attempt to centralize power — quieting Catalan objections with military force. The waning of the Spanish Empire, however, changed this balance: As one of the few Spanish regions to industrialize, Catalonia found itself in a position to assert itself once more. During the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, Madrid temporarily reversed this trend of growing Catalan assertiveness, but it re-emerged after Franco's death in 1975.
Today in both Scotland and Catalonia, the balance recording the costs and benefits of secession versus union is shifting in favor of secession. The United Kingdom is now a shadow of its imperial self, with the trade network upon which Scottish cities once thrived having shriveled to a trickle. Worse, the British economy more and more appears geared toward serving the financial services sector based out of London, allowing the heartland to draw most of the capital and ambitious university graduates. Finally, the discovery of oil off the Scottish coast in 1969 holds the promise of a basis for independent Scottish wealth.
Meanwhile, Spain has been struggling with unemployment rates of more than 20 percent for four years and has public debt levels of 98 percent of GDP. This has caused a wave of dissatisfaction across the country. Catalonia, which pays more into national coffers than it receives back, feels that it is subsidizing the poorer southern parts of the country, prompting many Catalans to feel they would be better off in an independent Catalonia. Such sentiments were exacerbated when the Spanish Constitutional Court rejected a 2006 Catalan proposal for more autonomy.
The Bigger Picture
Stepping back from the specifics of Scottish and Catalan separatism reveals that many of the forces that used to keep unruly regions at bay have been fading.
The early years of the 20th century saw a turning point in this regard, with global geopolitical implications. The world emerged from the horrors of World War I with an antipathy toward imperialism; World War II amplified this sentiment. Former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's 14-point program for world peace of 1918 was a clarion call for self-determination. This plus the global disapproval experienced by countries such as the United Kingdom and France on the occasions in the 20th century when they tried to hold their empires together by force gave rise to a global climate in which it is very hard for a Western country to impose its will on a group of determined secessionists. This has diminished some of the risks of a possible independence push, which often used to involve the separatists being put down forcefully by the center.
But another, more specific force also has been tipping the scales toward secession, one that surrounds both the United Kingdom and Spain, not to mention northern Italy, Flanders and the other separatist states in Europe: namely, the European Union itself. This is because by its very existence, the European Union solves many of the small-country problems potential secessionists face.
By becoming an EU member, a small nation can retain its global influence even after it has separated from its host country. Indeed, a small nation has every chance of placing one of its countrymen at the top of the entire structure, as Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg can attest. Trade fears are somewhat assuaged by automatic membership in the single market, and if the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment negotiations succeed, access to the U.S. market would be assured as well. Meanwhile, adoption of the euro solves potential currency problems (though it might also bring some new ones of its own). And from a military perspective, it is hard to imagine scenarios such as Turkey invading Cyprus had the latter been an EU member at the time. Thus, the development of the European Union has also been gradually improving the case for secession.
Unfortunately for potential secessionists, however, there are complications to this rather rosy looking picture. The first is that the current EU membership is very anti-separatist, largely because many members must cope with their own problem regions. Seceding states could thus find themselves blackballed from EU membership. A tiny independent state in the middle of Europe but not part of the union would find life very lonely indeed; Kosovo's current existence at the center of the Balkans offers a cautionary tale. It is hard to imagine such a state of affairs being allowed to persist in a country surrounded by the European Union, but the possibility still gives secessionists pause.
The second danger is that the European Union itself might not exist in perpetuity. Since 2008, the union has been in crisis. The European Council meeting in December, which will include discussions on the future of the union, looks set to be a fraught affair, with wide gaps between the French and German positions. Germany has spent much of the year protecting itself from a possible unraveling, first refusing to mutualize the risks in the European Central Bank's bond-buying policy and now resisting calls to pool deposit insurance for eurozone banks. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has been putting its human rights concerns to one side and has been aggressively courting China, no doubt with an eye on the possibility of leaving the European Union in the coming referendum. Thus, a newly independent state could find itself filling out application forms for a European Union that no longer exists.
As last year's referendum in Scotland (45 percent "yes") and September's Catalan election (48 percent for pro-separatist parties) showed, the ledger has not yet tipped in favor of secession, but the prevailing currents are moving that way. As long as these currents persist and barriers continue to be removed and as long as drawbacks to small statehood continue to be eroded and national centers continue to weaken their hold over their peripheries, separatism will surely continue to spread.
The Case for Catalan and Scottish Secession Builds is republished with permission of Stratfor.
Geopolitical Weekly: The New Latin America, November 3, 2015
By Reggie Thompson
Several years into a Chinese economic slowdown, the Latin American economies that relied on China to buy up their key exports are feeling the pain. With less hard currency coming in, governments across the region are rapidly readjusting their spending plans and preparing to govern in an environment in which they will have fewer resources to secure their key constituents' political loyalties.
The Role of Geography
Ever since commodity prices began dropping several years ago, much has been written about how slow economic growth and potential political instability will plague Latin America in coming years. But what will Latin America as a whole look like in a decade as a result of the Chinese economic downturn? What ideologies will dominate in a continent that over the past decade veered toward leftist populism? And what issues will define its relationship with the United States, the hemisphere's undisputed hegemon?
The region's geopolitics hold the beginning of an answer. The first step is to view Latin America's geographic regions and countries as a series of divided islands rather than a united entity. Unlike Western Europe, where the relative absence of natural obstacles eventually gave rise to interconnected political entities, South America is bisected by the dense Amazon rainforest and divided lengthwise by the nearly insurmountable Andean mountain range. Latin American colonies were divided even before the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas more than two centuries ago. After independence, this disconnected geographic landscape created dozens of economies of wildly varying sizes often more linked by trade with partners outside the region than with each other. With few unbroken expanses of arable land and high transport costs across the forests and mountains, Latin America was simply not in a position to create capital on the scale of the United States or Western Europe. Consequently, even major Latin American states such as Brazil or Mexico remain highly reliant on inflows of cash from abroad to keep their economies afloat and rely on exports to China or the United States for a significant part of their foreign trade.
Unsurprisingly, the goal of forming institutions that can provide lasting political and economic unity has eluded Latin American statesmen. Numerous attempts have been made to unite the fractious region: Simon Bolivar's ill-fated 19th-century bid to unite South America, a similar attempt at uniting the Central American states into a federation and the more recent creation of separate economic blocs in Latin America. Yet the isolation created by geographic barriers has foiled leaders' attempts to unite the region's countries into a real economic or political union on the scale of the European Union or even the North American Free Trade Agreement. In recent history, the closest that Latin American states came to some sort of unity — besides regional trading blocs such as the Common Market of the South and the Pacific Alliance — was the wave of leftist populist governments that swept the continent beginning in the early 2000s. But after a decade of budgets and politics buoyed by high commodity prices, the raw realities of geopolitics are back with a vengeance.
The Shape of Governments to Come
We cannot define the exact nature of the national governments that will emerge during the next decade; short-term actions are less predictable than long-term trends, and attempting to forecast which people or parties will lead countries such as Brazil after its 2018 elections or Venezuela after its presidential election in 2019 is very risky. However, we have a rough idea of the shape these governments will take. With less revenue available to pacify restive populations, the new governments will likely be more economically pragmatic than their predecessors. This is not to say that populism as a means of governance in Latin America will subside; rather, rulers are likely to take more care in how they relate to their voters and the outside world.
Because the region is so dependent on foreign capital for continued economic growth, and because states' export revenues are so depleted (in Bolivia, for example, export revenue is down by nearly a third compared with last year), leaders are more likely to refrain from mass nationalizations or hostility to foreign companies. During the past decade, leftist governments seized numerous private assets in disputes with private firms. Except for extreme cases such as Venezuela — which, because of its default risk, economic problems and past expropriations, is already de facto cut off from most foreign lending and many investments — most states will likely now try to encourage investments rather than scare them off. Consequently, Latin America is likely entering an era in which the grand populist gestures of the past decade will no longer yield the same results as before and can, in fact, be counterproductive for leaders trying to restart their faltering economies.
The weakening of the Latin American left is another factor that will shape the coming decade. In the next 10 years, the governments that came to power during the boom times will reach the end of their tenures. The list of states that will evolve from leftist administrations into some other type of government is lengthy. Venezuela will reach the painful point of reckoning in which its ruling United Socialist Party will split apart. And as the party splits, Venezuela will undergo a painful economic restructuring and a political shift away from extreme populism. In Ecuador, leftist President Rafael Correa may not secure even another four-year term. In Bolivia, low export prices for natural gas will put President Evo Morales' ability to secure another decade in office to the test.
Perhaps the only exception will be Colombia, where a possible peace deal with rebel groups could bring the left into the national fold, which could lead other parties to co-opt more leftist ideas. But even Cuba, long the bastion of Latin America's left and its ideological center, will eventually move into the United States' political orbit, likely in exchange for the lifting of the five-decade trade embargo.
The left's decline will give the United States an exceptionally benign climate for managing its relationships and priorities to the south. To be sure, longstanding concerns — such as trade, drug trafficking and illegal migration — guiding the United States' actions in much of Latin America will remain. But the bumper crop of leftist states that were often minor hindrances to U.S. political moves in the region will become less of a factor in the next decade. Washington's new priorities in the region, such as cushioning Venezuela's economic collapse and bringing Cuba into some sort of improved trade relationship, will occupy the United States' time.
Of the states currently undergoing deep economic downturns, several seem poised to make a resurgence. Mexico is an outlier, given than it is so linked to the United States through trade. But those links will ensure that despite problematic public finances, Mexico will remain a major force in Latin American economic growth. For Peru and Colombia, international trade will drop over the next several years, but their stable public finances will likely ensure some degree of social stability. And even Brazil, in the midst of a massive corruption scandal at Petrobras, will ride out the crisis due to its strong (albeit currently strained) domestic manufacturing base and sheer economic size.
Re-Emerging Differences
The rampant populism of the past 15 years — bolstered by rapidly increasing exports to hungry markets abroad — imposed a false appearance of unity among the Latin American leftist states. Superficially, Nestor Kirchner's Argentina appeared to have much in common with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, even though both countries' individual geographic and political characteristics ultimately dictated the governments' decisions. With the rise of another leftist bloc unlikely in the next decade, the divided nature of Latin America will again become evident.
And the continent's divided nature means that the shortcomings of international bodies there, such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), will become even more self-evident. For example, Brasilia will use Mercosur to do what is in its own immediate benefit: increase trade links with Latin American states outside its immediate neighborhood, such as Mexico. But truly lucrative deals, such as a Mercosur-European Union trade agreement, will remain just out of reach because they require full approval of all the group's members. Mercosur's other key member, Argentina, opposes any such deals lest they harm its domestic industry. Consequently, Brazil will continue looking for small bilateral deals, but it will continue to be hamstrung by Mercosur. Unasur, on the other hand, which was originally conceived of as a sort of South American United Nations, is highly unlikely to progress beyond a regional body that meets a couple of times a year. It is not that there is no political will in Latin America to push toward greater unity, but unlike the European Union, such bodies cannot be superimposed onto a region whose trade ties and key political relationships are focused toward other continents rather than each other.
The next decade will bring with it some political and economic continuity. The region will maintain its fundamental relationship with the rest of the globe, in which its foreign trade is overwhelmingly skewed toward the export of raw materials and its economies are heavily reliant on foreign capital markets. But deeper internal changes are already in motion, and the states of the region will change accordingly. The parties at the helm of these states will be different, and the way these parties relate with the outside world on a political and economic level will be undeniably different. Over the next 10 years, the shortcomings of extreme reliance on the Chinese economy will spur cost-cutting and domestic economic diversification. The trappings of the Cold War will fade in Latin America as leaders are replaced and political institutions evolve, but the new Latin America will continue to be more defined by its divisions than by any idea of unity.
The New Latin America is republished with permission of Stratfor.
Immunity for LEO deadly force
Not a fan of many things SCOTUS has ruled recently, but they did this right. The day I'm told I cannot use my weapon in defense of another or myself is the day I call it a night. If you want then, call your friendly neighborhood crackhead.
Supreme Court sides with police; officers using deadly force in chases granted more immunity
By LEO Affairs staff
In an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court sided with a Texas police officer in ruling that police are immune from lawsuits derived from using deadly force against fleeing suspects unless it is “beyond debate” that a shooting was unjustified.
The ruling came against an excessive force lawsuit filed by the estate of a man shot and killed while fleeing police on a Texas highway. The court ruled that Trooper Chadrin Mullinex cannot be held liable for the death of Israel Leija Jr. after firing a rifle at his car from a highway overpass.
According to the ruling, in 2010, Tulia PD officers approached Leija’s car at a drive-in restaurant with a warrant for his arrest, Leija sped off and headed for Interstate 27.
Leija entered the interstate and led the officers on an 18-minute chase at speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour. Twice during the chase, Leija called the Tulia Police dispatcher, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot at police officers if they did not abandon their pursuit. The dispatcher relayed Leija’s threats, together with a report that Leija might be intoxicated, to all concerned officers.
Arriving at the first location Leija was expected to reach, and learning that officers were already placing spike strips underneath an overpass, DPS Trooper Chadrin Mullenix communicated his idea to shoot the car to disable it. Officers on the ground gave him a 10-4, but as he was positioning himself on the overpass, his Sgt. radioed for him to “stand by” and “see if the spikes work first.” It is alleged that despite not being in his vehicle and while taking the shooting position, that he was still able to hear his Sgt.’s instructions.
Approximately three minutes after Mullenix took his position on the overpass, he spotted Leija’s vehicle and fired six shots into the vehicle as it approached. Following the shots, the vehicle hit the spike strips, and rolled two and a half times. However it was later determined that Leija was killed by the Mullenix’s shots, four of which struck his upper body.
In a previous decision on the matter, the Supreme Court had similarly ruled:
“In Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, the Court held that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ramming the car of a fugitive whose reckless driving “posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.” Id., at 384. And in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. ___ (2014), the Court reaffirmed Scott by holding that an officer acted reasonably when he fatally shot a fugitive who was “intent on resuming” a chase that “pose[d] a deadly threat for others on the road.” 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). The Court has thus never found the use of deadly force in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a basis for denying qualified immunity.”
To sum it all up, SCOTUS gets this one right, and protects officers who are doing their job keeping everyone safe from frivolous lawsuits.
Tuesday, November 10, 2015
Security Weekly: The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age, October 29, 2015
By Scott Stewart
On Sept. 29, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had pulled an undisclosed number of officers out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing following the hack on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) computer system, which exposed data on some 22.1 million government employees. The U.S. government blames China for the hack, and the withdrawal of agency personnel from Beijing based on fears their identities could be exposed would seem to indicate Washington is confident in its charge.
But beyond politics, the case is a good example of how digital advancements are making it increasingly difficult for intelligence officers to operate undercover.
Intelligence Cover
CIA officers with "official cover" work at U.S. embassies while posing as employees of another agency such as the State Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development. Sometimes this cover is quite superficial and is intended only for the public. In these cases, the CIA officer is formally declared to be an intelligence officer to the host intelligence service and serves a very important liaison role between the intelligence service of the host country and the CIA headquarters. He or she can also help provide training and resources to the local service or even work to coordinate joint projects against targets of mutual interest.
But other CIA officers under official cover are not declared to the host government, and their cover must therefore be more robust. Instead of openly liaising with the local intelligence service, their purpose is to conduct operations without the knowledge of the host government. Such missions could include recruiting or tending sources within the host country or attempting to recruit third-party nationals living in or visiting the country. These undeclared officers are the type of operative the CIA presumably moved out of Beijing, since the Chinese would have already known of the declared officers serving there.
Though the OPM files do not explicitly name CIA operatives, they could help a service such as the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) identify officers under official cover through all the administrative differences between the CIA and cover agencies such as the State Department. In a perfect world, the process for recruiting, hiring, training and then deploying CIA case officers would be identical to that of a State Department foreign service officer, but in reality the two agencies have different bureaucratic cultures and use different methods to clear, hire, train and assign employees. Because of this, the personnel record of a CIA case officer will appear discernably different from that of a State Department political or economics officer.
Non-Tech Giveaways
Of course there are other ways that a service such as the MSS could identify CIA officers under official cover. The first is by simply recruiting a source within the embassy or even the CIA itself. The KGB did this with spectacular success in the Aldrich Ames case. Because of his position at CIA headquarters, Ames knew the identity of every CIA officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and even many of the agents the CIA had recruited inside Russia. But it might be even easier than that. It is normally pretty widely known among embassy staff who the official cover CIA operatives are despite the best efforts to establish and maintain cover, so recruiting an officer who is not CIA could be helpful.
Even the foreign service nationals (FSNs) who work at an embassy often can tell the difference between the "normal" embassy officers and the undercover CIA officers. Sometimes this is because of the particular office an agent occupies in the embassy, the type of car they drive, the house they live in (have the last three official cover agents lived there?), their length of assignment and assignment history, and many other subtle signs. Official cover officers are supposed to live their cover, but some officers are better at it than others — even in high-threat counterintelligence environments.
In many cases, such indicators are picked up on by observant members of the local intelligence service without an inside source, and the official cover officer is placed under surveillance by the host country service. Because of this problem, the CIA and other intelligence agencies have had to develop a host of ingenious methods for official cover officers to avoid hostile surveillance.
Despite the obvious drawbacks of official cover, it does have some benefits. For one, the officers have a (hopefully) secure base to work from in the embassy with encrypted communications to headquarters. They are also usually provided with some level of diplomatic immunity, meaning that if they are caught red-handed in an operational act they will not be imprisoned or executed.
But the problems with official cover – and it is not just the CIA that has these problems — mean that for really sensitive tasks, intelligence agencies often use officers who are not under official cover. The CIA parlance for such an officer is a NOC (non-official cover); Russians refer to such an officer as an "illegal." A NOC will sometimes pose as a tourist or businessman, and in some cases will even pretend to be of another nationality.
The idea is that a NOC will not have all the "tells" of an official cover officer, and will therefore be able to conduct operational activities without receiving the same amount of host-country scrutiny that an official cover officer may receive. Of course, if a NOC is caught they can be arrested and imprisoned, usually to be traded at a later date for an opposition officer of equal value.
Technological Threats to Cover
While hacks pose a threat to the integrity of an intelligence officer's cover, there are many other threats to officers working undercover in the information age. Though intelligence agencies employ some of the best counterfeiters in the world, the changes countries have made to their travel documents are proving challenging. The best counterfeit artists can copy almost any document, including passports, but as I've discussed elsewhere, technology is making it increasingly difficult to use counterfeit documents because of security measures and the linking of documents to biometric data. This not only impacts criminals but also intelligence agencies. It is now impossible to completely counterfeit a passport or visa from whole cloth because such a document would not appear in the official database and would quickly be flagged as a counterfeit by a simple database query. Cloning passports (making an exact duplicate of an existing passport that bears a different photo) or altering an authentic passport by changing the photo has also become more difficult as documents have become tied to biometrics stored in national databases.
There are ways to obtain genuine documents to use as false identities for intelligence work, such as bribing or recruiting a passport agent or consular officer, but the practice is frowned upon and risks causing embarrassment if exposed.
But even with genuine documents, biometrics at border crossings is another problem now facing intelligence officers working under alias identities. Many countries now collect photographs and fingerprints from each traveler entering their country, and these photographs are often run through facial recognition software and the fingerprints compared to others on file. There are ways to fool these systems using high-end disguises and fake fingerprints, but such measures take time and resources. Thus, traveling under an alias is now more complicated, even for those with authentic travel documents in an alias identity.
Another digital age problem for intelligence officers is the increasing ubiquity of closed-circuit television cameras. In traditional intelligence tradecraft, an intelligence officer would leave an operational signal by using operational sleight of hand to leave a chalk mark on a wall or some similar surreptitious sign – even if they were under hostile surveillance. However, with the extensive CCTV coverage in some cities, suspected intelligence officers can be followed by cameras, even when a human surveillance team following them loses sight, meaning that intelligence officers have to make accounting for surveillance cameras a prime part of their operational planning.
On the positive side, technology does enable clandestine signals by allowing intelligence officers to place innocuous messages in innocent-looking chat rooms, websites or social media streams instead of having to leave old school signals like chalk marks or chewing gum.
Social media and the digital footprint it leaves also complicates life for intelligence officers working undercover, especially younger officers who are part of the social media generation and who have not been very careful with what they post. Additionally, in many cases counterintelligence officers can simply Google search an officer's alias name to see what is out there on the alias identity. Most normal people today have a digital footprint that goes back years and is consistent with who and what they are. Anyone who is a digital ghost without such an electronic trail is automatically suspect. Creating such a trail is possible, but again, it takes time and effort and adds additional complexity to creating and maintaining cover.
Public data can be another problem area. As a criminal investigator working passport and visa fraud cases, I frequently used public data and credit check database searches to help identify criminal imposters attempting to fraudulently obtain passports or visas. By typing in a person's name and a numerical identifier such as a date of birth or social security number, these public records database searches can compile an incredibly detailed profile of a person including addresses used, others who have used that same address, vehicle ownership and registration, marriages, divorces, corporate records, arrest records, etc. While the use of some of the more powerful databases is limited by legal restrictions, foreign governments can use many of the commercially available ones simply by paying for them and can access the more sensitive ones by paying a private investigator, lawyer or some other party with access.
Years ago, American intelligence officers frequently used mail drops when listing their cover addresses, but today, it is easy to identify such places from any computer. Simply by a running an address through Google Maps or Google Earth, one can quickly tell if an address is a commercial establishment, rather than a residence, and the business listed at that address. This means that addresses used for cover, whether business or residential, must be much more carefully considered than they were in the past.
Technology will not by any means bring an end to intelligence gathering. It will however, make some actions more difficult and force intelligence agencies to adapt to this new reality by making their covers more robust. If they don't adapt, they will get caught.
COPYRIGHT: STRATFOR.COM
Geographical Weekly: The Anatomy of Anti-Corruption, October 27, 2015
By Reva Bhalla
The tradition of abusing political power for personal gain goes back to antiquity, as does the debate over whether corruption is a necessary cultural vice in a country's development or a cancer that must be obliterated for a society to progress. A topic less covered, however, is what is behind the counter-corruption current.
In the past year or so, a striking number of scandals have been exposed, anti-corruption campaigns launched, probes deepened and leaders toppled over corruption charges. Brazil's state-run oil giant Petrobras, now the most indebted company in the world, is at the center of the biggest corruption scandal in the country's history; dozens of business executives and politicians, including the heads of the upper and lower houses of Brazil's legislature and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, are under investigation. In Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto has been heavily scrutinized for granting big contracts to companies that also sold him houses on favorable terms and for abruptly canceling a contract with a Chinese-led consortium for high-speed rails because of corruption allegations, as well as after the brazen escape of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman from federal prison. In Guatemala, a U.S.-backed anti-corruption investigative committee forced the resignation of President Otto Perez Molina, while in Honduras, another U.S.-led anti-corruption investigation has taken down one of the country's wealthiest and most politically connected families.
In Zurich, a U.S. and Swiss investigation has brought down on bribery charges the once untouchable Sepp Blatter, who headed FIFA, the global governing body for soccer. Elsewhere in Europe, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta is barely holding onto his seat while standing trial for tax evasion and money laundering. And an already fragile government in neighboring Moldova could fall any day now as mass protests persist over more than $1 billion that suspiciously vanished from the country's three largest banks.
Further east, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is working every institutional lever he can to neutralize corruption charges against himself, his son and a group of former ministers before he faces off against a vengeful opposition in a second round of elections. Chinese President Xi Jinping's sweeping anti-corruption probe is surging ahead after rounding up the biggest tiger yet, former security czar and former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang and his network of powerful allies. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak is facing a series of no-confidence votes following allegations that the state development fund had deposited $700 million in his personal bank account.
Meanwhile, foreign investors and Nigerians alike are waiting for action after Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari came to power with the promise of pursuing an aggressive anti-corruption campaign. In a desperate attempt to defuse mass street protests, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that does away with sectarian-allotted government posts.
The list could go on, but the trend is discernable: Around the globe, and under a variety of circumstances, the momentum to expose and crush corruption appears to be building. Even the most presumably immune members of the political elite in many countries have to watch their backs much more carefully than before.
The question then becomes why. We could assume that the world is collectively cleaning up its act and that international bodies promoting good governance and investigative reporters, aided by social media distribution channels, are having more success in mobilizing the public to demand more from their leaders. But nothing is that simple. Even in the list of cases cited above, there are great differences in each country's stage of economic growth, internal political climate and geopolitical circumstances.
The Roots of Corruption
A lot of scholarly thinking has been devoted to what drives corruption, what mitigates its corrosive effects and what role (for better or for worse) corruption plays in a country's economic development. A developmental economic approach would lament the "resource curse" afflicting countries that are overly dependent on extractive industries when large amounts of money taken in by state-owned firms is easily funneled into the pockets of a small political elite. A sociological approach would emphasize the differences between cultures and how they perceive corruption. For example, the West looks down on the tribal tradition of handing out positions to one's brother or cousin, but there are parts of the world where entrusting one's business to a stranger would be considered outright reckless.
Geopolitics will tell you that countries that are physically difficult to govern will be more prone to bribery. If a country is internally fragmented by its geographic features, allowing for the development of distinct cultures and sects that need to be brought under some form of central rule, then patronage-building will likely be an ingrained practice of the government and will be difficult, if not impossible, to root out.
Samuel Huntington, a revered political scientist who died in 2008, would stress that the taming of corruption and the rise of political order all comes down to institutions. If institutions are too beholden to the political ego of the day, then a wide gap between the political elite and the civil society will result, leaving ample room for a culture of impunity to develop at the top. From Huntington's point of view, the style of government (for example, a liberal democracy) is not a prerequisite for effective governance; rather, the degree of government — and thus the strength of its institutions — will chart a country's path toward growth or decay. Huntington even postulated that corruption could actually compensate for weak rule of law and provide an alternative path to growth when a country becomes bloated with bureaucracy. In other words, corruption will at least get things done in countries where the formal channels of government simply do not work.
A question that has received far less attention is what fuels the anti-corruption engine. What is giving new anti-corruption bodies around the world the space and courage to act now? There is of course no single answer, but a closer examination traces these actions back to declining growth rates, internal political competition and encouragement from larger outside powers seeking their own geopolitical gains.
Anti-Corruption in Action
This part of the discussion focuses on a selection of countries: Turkey, Brazil, China, Mexico, India and Indonesia. Each has experienced dramatic economic growth since the early 2000s, and each of those growth stories has been heavily tainted by corruption.
The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators include "Control of Corruption" as one of the core variables to measure governance in countries. Drawn from a compilation of sources that measure everything from perception of corruption through surveys to anti-corruption policy and prosecution, the index ranks countries annually from 0 to 100, with a higher number showing stronger control of corruption and a lower number showing weak control of corruption. Overlaying the Control of Corruption measure against gross domestic product and foreign direct investment rates from 1996 to 2014 has yielded some notable observations.
In boom times, when credit is abundant and foreign direct investment is shooting up in developing countries, corruption on the grandest scale becomes possible. After all, when a government is the chief party awarding major infrastructure projects with multimillion- and sometimes multibillion-dollar price tags attached, there is ample opportunity to pad the budget with political favors. Each step — from the environmental and technical feasibility studies to ongoing maintenance — is an opportunity for government bureaucrats and businessmen to cut ribbons in public and make furtive financial deals in private to move the process along.
When economic times are good and there is more money to go around, there is little variance in the Control of Corruption variable. However, when global economic conditions began stagnating following the 2008-2009 financial crisis and growth flattened out in 2011-2012, Turkey, Brazil and Mexico all showed a noticeable decline in Control of Corruption as major scandals were exposed and the perception of high-level corruption rose. Under more stressful economic conditions, political competition will naturally escalate, and civil society will be hyperaware of abuses of political power.
Unsurprisingly, spikes in the Control of Corruption variable correlate closely with political transitions in many of these cases. For example, when Erdogan came to power in 2003, many Turks — both secular and conservative — saw him as the fresh face that would clean up Turkey, root out the Mafioso networks and make the economy work again. For a while, that perception held, and Turkey's corruption ranking steadily rose. Meanwhile, Erdogan used Turkey's growth spurt to rapidly build out his patronage network and hand out contracts to political loyalists while sidelining his political adversaries. Once news started trickling out on the scale of corruption that had emerged during his tenure, Erdogan did not bother trying to redeem himself with a fresh anti-corruption drive. Instead, he dug his heels in further, promising more privileges to those who remained loyal to him.
Volatility in Indonesia's Control of Corruption variable seems to mirror significant political shifts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Suharto New Order dictatorship came to an end in 1998, and new efforts were made to undo his tightly knit and centralized patronage network extending from the armed forces to a sizable class of capitalist cronies. Indonesia has hit several major bumps along the way as successive governments have attempted to adopt anti-corruption platforms, only to see more entrenched interest groups derail these efforts from within. In fact, as post-Suharto Indonesia has become more politically decentralized, corruption has simply taken on a new form as additional layers of regulation at the local level create more space for bribery.
India's corruption ranking, on the other hand, appears to be largely insensitive to political shifts. The Indian National Congress party was hit by a slew of major corruption scandals involving the coal sector, telecom, railways, aerospace and defense, and construction. India's Control of Corruption rating declined steadily during that time. When it was in the opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party used these scandals to smear the Congress party, but now the Bharatiya Janata Party is caught up in "Lalitgate" — a scandal involving India's professional cricket association — and the Vyapam scandal, which exposed payoffs to place students in the best schools and government jobs. The fledgling anti-corruption Aam Aadmi Party, which unseated the Bharatiya Janata Party in state elections in Delhi, is already faltering in popularity. Perhaps India's politics are too deeply mired in corruption to build a credible anti-corruption platform at this stage of development.
China is a much more complex story. China's current leaders seemed aware early on that the country's rapid growth could endanger the Party's credibility and viability should corruption go unchecked. Xi is well aware of his country's long history of dynastic cycles, beginning with centralized power and consolidation, the erosion of the imperial court by bureaucratic corruption, the gradual empowerment of local landlords at the expense of the center, a call too late to reform and inevitable dynastic decline. Now stuck in the throes of an economic slowdown and still far behind in a number of crucial reforms to rebalance the economy, Xi is focused on the need to consolidate control under himself while he works to redeem the Party's credibility through the most aggressive anti-corruption drive since Maoist China. The spike in China's Control of Corruption ranking seems to correspond closely with the launch of Xi's anti-corruption drive, but it also appears to be leveling out. Although Xi's anti-corruption drive is earnest, his ability to enforce reforms is still questionable. When officials are too intimidated to make decisions, they avoid them altogether, and reforms are left in limbo. It remains to be seen whether Xi can avoid the historical paradox of anti-corruption reform precipitating political decline in China.
The Role of Outside Players
In other cases, the agendas of larger outside powers influencing smaller states in their periphery could drive anti-corruption efforts more than economic cycles. In Ukraine, the protesters who withstood the cold in Maidan Square for weeks in hopes of toppling former President Viktor Yanukovich were incensed by his flagrant spending habits, but would they have succeeded in overthrowing their president without support from certain Western intelligence agencies interested in pushing back against Russia in one of the most sensitive points in its periphery? In Moldova, a highly fragile coalition of pro-European parties is facing the ire of protesters (many of whom are Russian-backed) over a major corruption scandal that could topple the government once again and give Moscow an opening in another proxy battleground with the West.
Backing foreign anti-corruption bodies is developing into a handy foreign policy tool for Washington. The United States did not have to build institutions from scratch; it inherited them from the British and then figured out a more equitable system in the end to check and balance political power. This makes it all the easier for Washington to export the argument that institution building is the path to effective governance and economic growth. And if the United States is a leading provider of capital in a time of great economic stress, then U.S. officials towing large delegations of investors have a bit more leverage in trying to shape institutional development in countries of interest.
In Romania, a critical Western ally in the former Soviet periphery known for entrenched corruption, the United States has worked very closely with the country's intelligence service strengthening the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. Against all odds, this investigative body has succeeded in removing a number of high-level officials and stripping politicians of immunity and is currently trying to unseat a sitting prime minister. From the Western perspective, if Romania is more politically stable and more conducive to foreign investment, it will be more immune to Russian influence and sit more comfortably in the Western camp.
In Central America, the United States has the ability to withhold crucial aid to pressure drug-ridden and corrupt countries to enable anti-corruption investigative bodies. One such entity, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, actually brought down President Otto Perez Molina. The bitter former president is now blaming U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and the "geostrategic" agenda of the U.S. government for pressuring him to extend the mandate of the committee that ultimately brought about his downfall. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has played a particularly significant role in building cases and pursuing corrupt politicians in Latin America, from Honduras to Venezuela. In the name of building more credible institutions and stable governments to limit drug-trafficking and illegal immigration, Washington can increasingly be expected to use anti-corruption measures to shape political evolutions in many of these states.
No simple or single explanations will come from examining the drivers of corruption and the forces that counter the abuse of political power for personal gain. In some cases, anti-corruption initiatives will amount to little more than a political campaign, only to fizzle out within a couple of years. In other cases, corruption is so endemic that political and economic changes will have little impact on a country's ranking. For several countries, the recent explosion of bribery scandals is the natural product of more than a decade of unprecedented economic growth. And for a country like China, an anti-corruption campaign is both the saving grace of the Party and the potential harbinger of decline. A less familiar but growing trend reveals how countries sitting in the shadow of bigger powers can be pushed and pulled through anti-corruption protests and investigations toward broader geopolitical ends.
The Anatomy of Anti-Corruption is republished with permission of Stratfor.
Monday, November 9, 2015
Dr. Carson and the Republican establishment.
Long time friend, mentor, fellow Army officer, cigar smoker and Bourbon drinker, and founding member of the Vast Right Wing Conspiracy (VRWC), Mike Ford, has a great article in American Thinker on how the Republican establishment (aka RINOs and authors of Democratic victory) are hostile to Dr. Carson.
Mr. Kristol is a classic example of what is wrong with the party leadership. They want a "go along to get along" candidate who can "reach across the aisle and make a deal..." Like McConnell, Boehner (and new Speaker of the House Ryan), they haven't gotten the point. We don't want you to manage the American nation's decline, we need you to through a monkey wrench into the machinery of the Democratic machine, stop it and reverse it! Giving us another North Eastern moderate Republican will just lead to President Mrs. Bill Clinton in January 2017. Mark Steyn put it well during the 2012 Republican nomination process when the RINOs gave us a compromise. Steyn said, "America doesn't need a 'compromise', she needs a choice." Unfortunately the RINOs didn't get that and the "compromise" nominee kept 4 million conservative voters home and B Hussein Obama sent up for a second term.
America can't take this again and it deserves much better!
Why would Bill Kristol want to make a Hillary victory inevitable?
Last week in an article titled, Ben Carson Reconsidered, destined for the November 16th print edition of The Weekly Standard, "conservative" pundit William Kristol shows just how willing he is to risk a Hillary Clinton presidency and all its concomitant damage. He's willing to risk such simply to prevent an outsider from ascending to that office. In a two (internet) page article, Dr. Kristol excoriates Donald Trump while damning Dr. Ben Carson with faint praise. Here is his final statement:
So while Carson probably won’t and likely shouldn’t be the nominee, the Republican party is better for his candidacy. And if the unthinkable happens and Donald Trump wins the Republican nomination, we may take off a few days next year to gather ballot access signatures for the 2016 independent ticket of Carson-Webb, or Webb-Carson.
On the one hand, he does give some lackluster support for Dr. Carson as a party strengthener but who couldn't get elected while on the other he posits an independent ticket with Carson on the bottom and a failed Democrat presidential candidate, former Secretary of the Navy, Jim Webb, on the top. Can anyone out there come up with a better method to ensure a Clinton presidency? Does Dr. Kristol truly believe a Webb-Carson or Carson-Webb ticket will pull votes from Hillary Clinton?
I don't know about other conservatives, but I would personally low crawl through a mile of broken glass to help ensure Hillary Clinton doesn't get a chance to appoint two, maybe three Supreme Court Justices, thus continuing the erosion of liberty accelerated in the past 7 years.
Mr. Kristol is a classic example of what is wrong with the party leadership. They want a "go along to get along" candidate who can "reach across the aisle and make a deal..." Like McConnell, Boehner (and new Speaker of the House Ryan), they haven't gotten the point. We don't want you to manage the American nation's decline, we need you to through a monkey wrench into the machinery of the Democratic machine, stop it and reverse it! Giving us another North Eastern moderate Republican will just lead to President Mrs. Bill Clinton in January 2017. Mark Steyn put it well during the 2012 Republican nomination process when the RINOs gave us a compromise. Steyn said, "America doesn't need a 'compromise', she needs a choice." Unfortunately the RINOs didn't get that and the "compromise" nominee kept 4 million conservative voters home and B Hussein Obama sent up for a second term.
America can't take this again and it deserves much better!
Sunday, November 8, 2015
Why we get the hell off of highways....
A point I made in Field Training my rookies was if you have an accident or other incident on a highway, you get the hell out of there. Unless there is a reason to stay (e.g. waiting on an ambulance) you simply grab IDs from the drivers and move it off the road. Why? As I've said more than once, "It's an excellent place to get killed!"
I once had to explain to an idiot, err citizen, why I wasn't going to wait for his own tow truck. I told this....gentlemen, "I have four reasons, in order of priority:
With that as some background, here is an excellent video from Utah Highway Patrol on the hazards of being on the side of a highway.
I once had to explain to an idiot, err citizen, why I wasn't going to wait for his own tow truck. I told this....gentlemen, "I have four reasons, in order of priority:
1. I really don't want to get killed today and this is an excellent place for that to happen.
2. While we're out here people are looking at us and not paying attention to driving. This may cause another accident. BTY, this happened once when I was waiting on the side of I-10 in New Orleans back in 1996. Two people looking at the us and one rear ended the other.
3. While people are gawking at us this is slowing down traffic for miles.
4. Finally, you may also get injured out here."
With that as some background, here is an excellent video from Utah Highway Patrol on the hazards of being on the side of a highway.
Saturday, November 7, 2015
What to do to get through an Active Shooter, when you're shot and should be "Down"
An image presented by movies is if you hit someone once, he's down. And there are times this is true, you may be down. In an example we discussed in the academy was of an officer chasing a suspect, the turd put his pistol over his shoulder and fired. The one in a million shot hit the officer in the head and instantly killed him.
But often it takes more than one shot to take you down and you will have to make it through a very difficult situation. And this is the story of a man who had to do that. He was shot 15, yes, 15 times, 12 of which were not stopped by the vest, and he made it though. Take a read.
But often it takes more than one shot to take you down and you will have to make it through a very difficult situation. And this is the story of a man who had to do that. He was shot 15, yes, 15 times, 12 of which were not stopped by the vest, and he made it though. Take a read.
Shot 15 times, a cop offers 5 keys to increasing officer resilience
Resilience is all about positive mindset, mindfulness, a winning spirit, and keeping things in perspective
Resiliency means bouncing back from adversity. The circumstance does not define the resilient officer. Rather, the resilient officer embraces the situation and understands the importance of rebounding. The resilient officer doesn’t always have all the answers, they won’t be correct, and they won’t always come out on top. But what separates the resilient officer is the inability to quit. They take the ups and downs and chalk each experience up to another learning experience.
One name that tops the list in terms of law enforcement resiliency is retired Lt. Brian Murphy. Lt. Murphy’s ability to keep his composure during his life-threatening incident occurred because he relied on three things: training, resiliency, and colleagues (to end the incident).
Lt. Murphy’s story began the morning of August 5th, 2012, when a gunman entered a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek (Wis.). The active shooter event began when two people were killed in the temple parking lot. The gunman eventually moved from the parking lot into the temple, where four more people were killed and three were wounded.
Lt. Murphy was first on scene of the active shooter incident. A gun battle ensued, and Murphy was shot 15 times: three bullets entered his vest and 12 entered his body (including two head shots).
Despite grievous injuries, what defined Murphy that day was his will to live. Murphy never gave up. He survived the incident, went home, and thrives today due to his resiliency. Here are Lt. Murphy’s keys to enhancing officer resilience:
1. Never give up, work around obstacles, and adapt in order to be the best you can be. Lt. Murphy credits his time as a Marine in helping sustain his physical and emotional resilience into adulthood.
2. Resiliency is the ability to carry on no matter what is going on around you. Physical resilience starts with mental resilience.
3. Understand that everyone has something to teach you. Be willing to listen and learn.
4. To improve your resiliency from a physical standpoint, get out of your comfort zone every single day.
5. Being a cop is what you do; it is your job. Being a father, mother, husband, wife, son, or daughter is who you are. Remember the importance of family and nurture these relationships each and every day, because nothing is promised.
Remember resilience is not innate and all perishable skills must be nurtured. No one knows when they may encounter that life changing or life-threatening event, but remember the words of Lt. Brian Murphy: “We are stronger than we think; we are able to persevere longer than we ever thought we could. It’s inside each of us – the spirit to endure. The question really is: how badly do we want to work for it?”
Lt. Murphy explains: “We don’t pick when bad shit happens, it picks us. It’s what we do that separates each of us. If you were going to be in a fight for your life tomorrow; how hard would you train today?”
You must answer that question right here, right now, and begin building and nurturing your resilience today, because it could just save your life tomorrow...
Thursday, November 5, 2015
Officer Down
Senior Trooper Steven VincentRest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch
Louisiana State Police, Louisiana
End of Watch: Monday, August 24, 2015
Age: 43
Tour: 24 years
Badge # D-57
Incident Date: 8/23/2015
Senior Trooper Steven Vincent was shot and killed while checking on a vehicle that was being operated by a suspected intoxicated driver near the intersection of Highway 14 and Fruge Road, near Bell City.
Trooper Vincent was on patrol when he spotted a vehicle from a previous reckless driving report. The vehicle in question had driven off the road and was stuck in a ditch. Trooper Vincent approached the vehicle and began speaking with the occupant and then ordered him to exit the vehicle. The male exited the vehicle with a sawed off shotgun in his hand and opened fire, striking Trooper Vincent in the head. The man then taunted Trooper Vincent as he lay on the ground mortally wounded.
A passing motorist witnessed the incident, stopped his vehicle and tackled the subject. He then wrestled the shotgun away from the man while additional civilians who stopped to assist, utilized Trooper Vincent's handcuffs to cuff and take the subject into custody. They then called for assistance and rendered aid to Trooper Vincent.
Trooper Vincent was taken to Lake Charles Hospital where he died the next day from his wounds.
Trooper Vincent was a U.S. Army veteran. He had served with the Louisiana State Police for 13 years and had previously served with the Lake Charles Police Department for 11 years. He is survived by his wife and 9-year-old son.
Nemo me impune lacessit
Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh.
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