Security Weekly: Why the Boston Bombers Succeeded, April 25, 2013

By Scott Stewart
Vice President of Analysis

When seeking to place an attack like the April 15 Boston Marathon bombing into context, it is helpful to classify the actors responsible, if possible. Such a classification can help us understand how an attack fits into the analytical narrative of what is happening and what is likely to come. These classifications will consider factors such as ideology, state sponsorship and perhaps most important, the kind of operative involved.

In a case where we are dealing with an apparent jihadist operative, before we can classify him or her we must first have a clear taxonomy of the jihadist movement. At Stratfor, we generally consider the jihadist movement to be divided into three basic elements: the al Qaeda core organization, the regional jihadist franchises, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and grassroots operatives who are radicalized, inspired and perhaps equipped by the other two tiers but who are not members of either.

Within the three-tier jihadist movement there exist two distinct types of operatives. One of these is the professional terrorist operative, a person who is a member of the al Qaeda core or of one of the regional franchises. These individuals swear loyalty to the leader and then follow orders from the organization's hierarchy. Second, there are amateur operatives who never join a group and whose actions are not guided by the specific orders of a hierarchical group. They follow a bottom-up or grassroots organizational model rather than a hierarchical or top-down approach.

There is a great deal of variety among professional terrorists, especially if we break them down according to the functions they perform within an organization, roles including that of planners, finance and logistics specialists, couriers, surveillance operatives, bombmakers, et cetera. There is also a great deal of variety within the ranks of grassroots operatives, although it is broken down more by their interaction with formal groups rather than their function. At one end of the grassroots spectrum are the lone wolf operatives, or phantom cells. These are individuals or small groups that become radicalized by jihadist ideology but that do not have any contact with the organization. In theory, the lone wolf/phantom cell model is very secure from an operational security standpoint, but as we've discussed, it takes a very disciplined and driven individual to be a true lone wolf or phantom cell leader, and consequently, we see very few of them.

At the other end of the grassroots spectrum are individuals who have had close interaction with a jihadist group but who never actually joined the organization. Many of them have even attended militant training camps, but they didn't become part of the hierarchical group to the point of swearing an oath of allegiance to the group's leaders and taking orders from the organization. They are not funded and directed by the group.

Indeed, al Qaeda trained tens of thousands of men in its training camps in Afghanistan, Sudan and Pakistan but very few of the men they trained actually ended up joining al Qaeda. Most of the men the group instructed received basic military training in things like using small arms, hand-to-hand combat and basic fire and maneuver. Only the very best from those basic combat training courses were selected to receive advanced training in terrorist tradecraft techniques, such as bombmaking, surveillance, clandestine communications and document forgery. But even of the students who received advanced training in terrorist tradecraft, only a few were ever invited to join the al Qaeda core, which remained a relatively small vanguard organization.

Many of the men who received basic training traveled to fight jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya or returned home to join insurgent or militant groups. Others would eventually end up joining al Qaeda franchise groups in places like Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Algeria. Still others received some basic training but then returned home and never really put their new skills into practice.

Most grassroots jihadists fall along a continuum that stretches between the lone wolf and someone who received advanced terrorist training but never joined al Qaeda or another formal militant group.

Whether the two men suspected of carrying out the April 15 Boston Marathon attack knowingly followed al Qaeda's blueprint for simple attacks by grassroots actors, their actions were fairly consistent with what we have come to expect from such operatives. Certainly based upon what we have seen of this case so far, the Tsarnaev brothers did not appear to possess sophisticated terrorist tradecraft.

For example, regarding the bombs employed in the attack and during the police chase, everything we have seen still points to very simple devices, such as pipe bombs and pressure cooker devices. From a bombmaking tradecraft standpoint, we have yet to see anything that could not be fabricated by reading Inspire magazine, spending a little bit of time on YouTube and conducting some experimentation. As a comparison, consider the far larger and more complex improvised explosive device Anders Behring Breivik, the Oslo bomber, constructed. We know from Breivik's detailed journal that he was a self-taught bombmaker using directions he obtained on the Internet. He was also a lone wolf. And yet he was able to construct a very large improvised explosive device.
 Also, although the Tsarnaev brothers did not hold up a convenience store as initially reported, they did conduct an express kidnapping that caused them to have extended contact with their victim while they visited automatic teller machines. They told the victim that they were the bombers and then allowed the victim to live. Such behavior is hardly typical of professional terrorist operatives.

Grassroots Theory

As it has become more difficult for professional terrorists to travel to the United States and the West in general, it has become more difficult for jihadist organizations to conduct attacks in these places. Indeed, this difficulty prompted groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to attempt to attack the United States by dispatching an operative with an underwear bomb and to use printer cartridge bombs to attack cargo aircraft. In response to this difficulty, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula began to adopt the grassroots into their operational doctrine. They first began promoting this approach in 2009 in their Arabic-language magazine Sada al-Malahim. The al Qaeda core organization embraced this approach in May 2010 in an English-language video featuring Adam Gadahn.

In July 2010, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched an English-language magazine called Inspire dedicated to radicalizing and equipping grassroots jihadists. Despite the losses that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has experienced on the battlefield, it has continued to devote a great deal of its limited resources toward propagating this concept. It has continued to publish Inspire even after the magazine's founder and editor, Samir Khan, was killed in an American missile strike in Yemen.

The grassroots strategy was perhaps most clearly articulated in the third edition of Inspire magazine, which was published in November 2010 following the failed October 29, 2010, printer bomb operation. In a letter from the editor in which Khan explained what he referred to as "Operation Hemorrhage," he wrote:

"However, to bring down America we do not need to strike big. In such an environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve fewer players and less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America has worked so hard to erect. This strategy of attacking the enemy with smaller, but more frequent operations is what some may refer to the strategy of a thousand cuts. The aim is to bleed the enemy to death."

In Adam Gadahn's May 2010 message entitled "A Call to Arms," Gadahn counsels lone wolf jihadists to follow a three-pronged target selection process. They should choose a target with which they are well acquainted, a target that is feasible to hit and a target that, when struck, will have a major impact. The Tsarnaev brothers did all three in Boston.

Implications

Yet despite this clearly articulated theory, it has proved very difficult for jihadist ideologues to convince grassroots operatives to conduct simple attacks using readily available items like in the "build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom" approach, which they have advocated for so long.

This is because most grassroots jihadists have sought to conduct huge, spectacular attacks -- attacks that are outside of their capabilities. This has meant that they have had to search for help to conduct their plans. And that search for help has resulted in their arrest, just as Adam Gadahn warned they would be in his May 2010 message.

There were many plots disrupted in 2012 in which grassroots operatives tried to act beyond their capabilities. These include:

- On Nov. 29, 2012, two brothers from Florida, Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, were arrested and charged with plotting attacks in New York.

- On Oct. 17, 2012, Bangladeshi national Quazi Nafis was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation after he attempted to detonate a vehicle bomb outside New York's Federal Reserve Bank.

- On Sept. 15, 2012, Adel Daoud was arrested after he parked a Jeep Cherokee outside a Chicago bar and attempted to detonate the bomb he thought it contained. This was also an FBI sting operation.

But the carnage and terrorist theater caused by the Boston attack have shown how following the simple attack model can be highly effective. This will certainly be pointed out in future editions of Inspire magazine, and grassroots operatives will be urged to follow the model established by the Tsarnaev brothers. Unlike operatives like Faisal Shahzad who attempted to go big themselves and failed, the brothers followed the blueprint for a simple attack and the model worked.

It is quite possible that the success of the Boston bombing will help jihadist ideologues finally convince grassroots operatives to get past their grandiose plans and begin to follow the simple attack model in earnest. If this happens, it will obviously have a big impact on law enforcement and intelligence officials, who have developed very effective programs of identifying grassroots operatives and drawing them into sting operations. They will now have to adjust their operations.

While these grassroots actors do not have the capability of professional terrorist operatives and do not pose as severe a threat, they pose a much broader, amorphous threat. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies generally do not deal well with ambiguity.

There are simply too many soft targets to protect and some of these simple attacks will inevitably succeed. This means that this low-level broad threat will persist and perhaps even intensify in the immediate future.

As we've previously discussed, the best defense against the grassroots threat are grassroots defenders. These include the police and alert citizens who report suspicious activity -- like people testing bomb designs -- a frequent occurrence before actual bomb attacks. The slogan "If you see something, say something," has been mocked as overly simplistic, but it is nonetheless a necessity in an environment where the broad, ambiguous threat of grassroots terrorism far outstrips the ability of the authorities to see everything. Taking a proactive approach to personal and collective security also beats the alternative of living in terror and apprehensively waiting for the next simple attack.

It is also very important for people to maintain the proper perspective on terrorism. Like car crashes, cancer and natural disasters, terrorism is part of the human condition. People should take prudent, measured actions to prepare for such contingencies and avoid becoming victims (vicarious or otherwise). It is the resilience of the population and its perseverance that will ultimately determine how much a terrorist attack is allowed to terrorize. By separating terror from terrorism, citizens can deny the practitioners of terrorism the ability to magnify their reach and power.

Why the Boston Bombers Succeeded is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Officer Down

Deputy Sheriff Douglas Leon Hanna
Washita County Oklahoma Sheriff's Office
End of Watch: Sunday, April 21, 2013
Age: 44
Cause: Automobile accident

Deputy Sheriff Douglas Hanna was responding to a call at approximately 12:10 a.m. when a pickup truck ran a stop sign and collided with the passenger side of his patrol vehicle.

He was traveling eastbound on State Highway 54A, west of Corn, when the pickup driver entered the highway from County Road 2350. Deputy Hanna's patrol vehicle rolled multiple times, partially ejecting him even though he was wearing his seatbelt. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

Geopolitical Weekly: Demystifying U.S. Policy on Syria, April 23, 2013

By Reva Bhalla
Vice President of Global Affairs

The United States is not known for subtlety. This is perhaps unsurprising for a nation buffered by oceans and in possession of the world's largest military and economy. That kind of power carries weight, and that kind of weight does not always allow the United States to be light on its feet. At the same time, Washington does not want to continue slogging around the Middle East, reacting to every crisis that comes its way. While the mixed signals that Washington has been broadcasting toward Syria of late have confounded many, they are not in the least surprising coming from a superpower trying to lighten its load.

Speculation grew in the past week over the possibility of U.S. military action in Syria when U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that around 200 army troops from the headquarters unit of the 1st Armored Division based out of Fort Bliss, Texas, would be deployed to Jordan. Hagel strongly reiterated that this move should not be interpreted as a stepping-stone to a U.S. military intervention in Syria, saying the unit would instead be involved in training Jordanian counterparts to handle growing refugee flows into Jordan from Syria and would improve U.S. preparedness for any security developments involving Syria's chemical weapons.

What Hagel chose not to say in his testimony is also revealing. Theoretically, the headquarters unit would allow the United States to significantly scale up military operations if, for example, the need arose for sizable combat operations to seize Syria's chemical weapons. By itself, however, the U.S. decision to set up a small army headquarters unit in Jordan apart from U.S. special operations forces activity already taking place along the border does not necessarily imply that the Pentagon is moving toward a large-scale military involvement in Syria.

Jordan would present an array of logistical and political challenges as a launchpad for a U.S. invasion into Syria. Despite its tight relationship with Washington, Jordan for good reason has shied away from hosting U.S. military bases. It only very quietly permitted the movement of U.S. special operations forces into Iraq from Jordan in 2003. It faces domestic political dissent and a homegrown Salafist-jihadist presence, meaning Jordan has limits in just how far it can go in publicly aligning itself with a U.S. mission against the Syrian regime. Even as unconfirmed rumors continue to circulate regarding the U.S. deployment of Patriot missile defense batteries to Jordan (in addition to the ones Amman already operates) as a defensive measure to shield the kingdom from any blowback from Syrian President Bashar al Assad's forces, it is far more likely that Jordan will face a spate of suicide bombings before it has to worry about ballistic missile strikes from Syria. The same day Hagel announced the army deployment to Jordan, al Assad issued the following warning in an interview: "We would wish that our Jordanian neighbors realize that ... the fire will not stop at our borders -- all the world knows Jordan is just as exposed [to the crisis] as Syria."

The moves in Jordan, while notable, are more symbolic than militarily significant. They signal to the al Assad regime that the meaningful use or loss of control of the regime's chemical weapons arsenal would compel U.S. military action that could uproot what remains of the Alawite regime in Damascus. Washington hopes its cautious efforts to prepare a chemical weapons contingency plan will convince the al Assad regime that a political settlement would be preferable to a pell-mell regime collapse that could draw U.S. soldiers onto Syrian soil. At the same time, the Obama administration is trying to respond to pressure from Congress and elsewhere by showing that it is at least taking some concrete action to aid the rebellion and prepare for contingencies while avoiding drawing the United States into another Middle Eastern maelstrom.

The subtlety of this middle-ground policy may well be lost on its intended audience, however. The U.S. administration has, perhaps deliberately, publicized an internal debate over its Syria policy. Hagel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have advocated extreme caution when contemplating a military intervention, while Secretary of State John Kerry is pushing for increasing aid to the rebels. This is a debate where we would expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who understand the military implications quite well, to carry more weight. Indeed, the United States so far has withheld lethal aid from the rebels.

But U.S. restraint in Syria, many will argue, has led to the hijacking of the Syrian rebellion by radical, battle-hardened Salafist-jihadist fighters. So long as the more moderate elements of the Sunni rebellion struggle to get the foreign support they have sought, groups like the Syrian Islamic Front and the even more extreme Jabhat al-Nusra will continue to dominate the battlefield and reap the spoils -- and impose their adherence to their austere interpretation of Islam wherever power vacuums develop, to the endangerment of the wider region.

This argument assumes that the United States could overcome its own history in Iraq and successfully pluck out the most moderate and like-minded rebels to train and equip so that they eventually eclipse the radicals. It also assumes that battlefield successes of more moderate Sunni rebels will create the conditions for an equally moderate, and at the same time representative, government to replace the al Assad regime and mend the rifts left by civil war.

The dangers inherent in these assumptions are embedded in the region's history. The northern Levant experiences generational cycles of civil wars. In 1860, a civil war between Maronites and Druze spread from Mount Lebanon to Damascus in a matter of months. In 1958, Maronite Christians went to war again with Druze and Sunni Muslims in a civil war that drew in the U.S. Marines. In 1975, an influx of Palestinian militants into Lebanon and unsettled scores between Maronites and Muslims drew Syria and Israel into a bloody civil war that lasted through 1990 and left Syrian troops in Lebanon for nearly three decades.

Conflict, no matter how it begins, will always penetrate a deeper power imbalance in the region, whether between French-backed Maronites and Druze in the post-Mandate period or between Alawites and Sunnis today. This is a region where mere family disputes can trigger wars, and where conflicts typically end out of exhaustion. Powers that intervene do so at their own peril and with the unsettling knowledge that any political settlement will fail -- and frequently exacerbate the sectarian power struggles that define this fractious borderland.

This is a history that al Assad has long known and that Washington is learning quickly. In appreciating the unintended consequences of the downfall of the al Assad regime, no matter how much it is despised, the United States is understandably preparing for contingencies and hedging its military bets through a number of subtle and seemingly contradictory moves. It is just that justified pessimism toward the outcome of conflict in the region that in the end will likely continue to drive U.S. restraint.

Demystifying U.S. Policy on Syria copyright STRATFOR.COM

6 Facts of Life for Police

From this evening's PoliceOne.Com email, a good summary of the facts of life on the street.

Passion for the Job

Chief Joel F. Shults, Ed.D.

Boston bombings: 6 things cops know that most Americans don't

I do not want to be counted among the journalists who — in the necessary chatter of avoiding dead air — weave a thousand speculative stories. But in the wake of the events in Boston last week, here are some observations I offer after nearly four decades in the business.

1.) There is evil in the world.

We can scramble for meaning and theories and existential answers but you don’t have to be a believer in the supernatural to see that some people just want to kill and destroy. Many commentators and reporters centered on the theme of why a person everyone describes as a nice, normal guy could do this.

Study it all you want my friends. No one is immune from the influence of wickedness.

2.) This is why we have seen the militarization of the police.

This week’s events will not silence those who say that SWAT tactics and “military grade weapons” are not appropriate for civilian policing, but it will mute them for a while.

Guess what: you want us to deal with bombers and mass murder? Then give us those tools.

3.) Facts and theories are golden. Conjecture is foolishness.

We don’t try to keep the public in the dark. We just can’t play “expert commentator” and throw out a bunch of possible scenarios.

We deal in evidence. Facts. Rational probabilities.

Trust us and don’t blame us for silence or misinformation. We’ll tell you what is appropriate to be shared at an appropriate time.

4.) Cops are not omniscient or omnipresent. We work within the laws of physics.

The cheers after Tsarnaev’s arrest were preceded by impatient questions of how he had gotten away from “all those cops.”

If we could recruit officers with psychic powers we would.

5.) The applause will fade.

We’ll bask in appreciation while we can, but the next police officer who is murdered will not make CNN headlines.

Jesus was welcomed with shouts of adoration not many days before the crowds turned and called for his crucifixion.

Maybe you won’t forget, but you probably will.

6.) This is what we face every day. Every. Day.

Shootouts with murderers? Well, not many of us have, but all of us are standing in line and ready for it.

You can say, “I’m out of harm’s way because I’m not in a war zone” but if shooters and bombers have taught us anything it is that they can strike anywhere, anytime.

I can’t think of any warrior cop that I know that would have hesitated one minute to go to Boston if called or who thinks that kind of thing couldn’t happen in their patrol area.

K9s Warriors

Anyone who's held a perimeter on a patrol knows what a God send a K9 is. But seeing these dogs in action is even more incredible.


Take a look at SFC Corbin's dog Ax at 12:00. The way Ax looks up at his handler. Talk about love from a being to another.

I've got another book on my "To Read" list...damned, Beth will kick my ass if I order it now.

I don't say this often but thank you 60 Minutes for an excellent article.

UPDATE:

From 60 Minutes Overtime, is Ax a hero?

And there is a fine line between bravery and stupidly. Here is a 60 Minutes producers trying his luck with the dog. Spoiler alert, the dog won. In all seriousness, notice how quickly the dog releases when ordered by his handler. Well trained.

A New Hope to kill Obamacare

This is Hail Mary and it would require John Roberts, to a degree, to come out and admit he was wrong last summer with the original Obamacare ruling, but it's right now our only hope.

The Supreme Court may yet rule Obamacare unconstitutional

Many may not be familiar with Article I, Section 7 of the U. S. Constitution that requires that “all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” This means that any law, which extracts money from the American people, can only come from the House. The problem is The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, known as Obamacare, originated in the U.S. Senate not in the House as constitutionally required. The Pacific Legal Foundation, a Sacramento, California based foundation, is pursuing the matter before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia...

...In the Supreme Court’s decision of June 2012, it took great pains to establish that Obamacare is not a law passed under the Commerce Clause; this is a tax they ruled. Whether a fine, as the Administration argued throughout the case, or a tax as Roberts insisted, it is an extraction of money from the masses and therefore a tax and therefore must originate from the House, not the Senate. The philosophical switch created by Roberts made the constitutional error far more glaring. By letting origin slide the House looses its clear distinction on the origin of taxes and the people their right of first approval of taxation for generations yet unborn and probably forever...

Let us pray this gets expedited to SCOTUS and ruled correctly before more damage is done.

Is Chris Matthews really feeling something warm and fuzzy?

Great cartoon from this morning's Legal Insurrection:

Officer Down

Patrol Officer Sean Collier
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Police Department
End of Watch: Thursday, April 18, 2013
Age: 26
Tour: 1 year, 3 months
Suspect: One deceased, in custody

Patrol Officer Sean Collier was shot and killed during a large scale manhunt for suspects in the Boston Marathon bombing.

Shortly after reports of shots fired on the MIT campus, Officer Collier was found in his vehicle at about 10:30 p.m. with multiple gunshot wounds. He was transported to Massachusetts General Hospital where he was pronounced dead.

The suspects carjacked a vehicle and led police on a pursuit. During the pursuit, the suspect threw explosive devices from the vehicle at police. The pursuit ended in Watertown, where one suspect was killed and a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police Officer was shot and seriously injured in a gun battle. The second suspect was captured in Watertown the following evening.

Officer Collier had served with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Police Department since January 2012 and had previously worked as a civilian employee of the Somerville Police Department.

Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

China flexing it's expanding muscle

China has been expanding its ability to project power over the last 20 years. It has recently deployed a diesel powered carrier and is pushing to control more of the world's oil supply.

One of the primary ways the US has projected force since the 30s has been our fleet of carriers. China as of yet cannot project a fleet of ships to challenge US naval dominance. But they are deploying a newly fielded missile to specifically target our capital ships.

China deploys anti-ship missile off Taiwan

China has deployed near Taiwan a powerful missile designed to take out US aircraft carriers as Beijing strengthens its ability to prevent US forces from aiding Taiwan during potential conflict.

The deployment of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile comes as China’s army develops greater long-range and offensive capabilities. Those advances pose a challenge to US forces as Washington looks to build up its military presence in east Asia to balance out China’s rising might.

The DF-21D missile is a particular worry for Taiwan as it relies on US forces to back it up against threats from the mainland, which has not renounced the use of force to take the island it regards as part of its territory.

The missile limits the US’s ability to send aircraft carriers into the strait unchallenged to support Taipei, as it did in 1996 when China conducted missile tests in the strait during the run-up to the island’s first democratic election. Taiwan itself has no aircraft carriers.

News of the missile’s deployment came in written testimony to the head of intelligence for the Pentagon, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, delivered to a Senate committee on Thursday.

Chinese and US military sources have been saying since late 2010 that China has been planning to deploy the missile, but the testimony marks the first time a concrete deployment has been revealed in connection with a particular location. US military officials have said previously that the US lacks a tested way to defend its aircraft carriers against the missile.

That increases the pressure on Taiwan to strengthen its own ability to deter threats from the mainland and illustrates how, despite a reduction in tensions engineered by Taiwan’s president, China’s military continues to prepare for the possibility of conflict.

Taiwan’s military declined to comment specifically on the new missile, but its spokesman Luo Shou-he said the military “has continually strengthened the ability of self-defence to ensure the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.”...

...While the US and Taiwan lack a formal defence treaty that would require intervention, it is widely assumed that such help would be forthcoming. The US is required by its domestic law to help Taiwan defend itself, and it maintains a network of military advisers on the island.

...“This is [China’s] so-called double-handed strategy,” said one officer in Taiwan’s navy. “China maintains an improvement in the relationship across the strait . . . on the other hand it is still sending a very strong message to pro-independence personnel: ‘Don’t do anything stupid, I still have very strong capabilities’.”...

Now the test was conducted by China and we cannot know how well it really went off, but we know the People's Republic will improve their technology as time goes on. As the Nimitz class of carriers are retired and the deployment of the Gerald Ford series is in question, our ability to influence the world is more problematic.

Great to know with our leadership in Washington running multi-trillion dollar deficits as far as the eye can see and the Chinese helping to finance them, we're actually paying for this.

Nero fiddles along.

Officer Down

Assistant Warden Peggy Sylvester
Opelousas Louisiana Police Department
End of Watch: Sunday, April 14, 2013
Age: 50
Tour: 14 years

Assistant Warden Peggy Sylvester was killed in an automobile accident on Louisiana 31, south of Louisiana 742, at approximately 4:45 am.

She was attempting to pass another vehicle during a period of rain when her department vehicle left the roadway and struck a tree. Assistant Warden Sylvester, who was not wearing a seatbelt at the time, suffered fatal injuries.

Assistant Warden Sylvester had served as a jailer with the Opelousas Police Department for three years. She had previously served with the Eunice Police Department for one year and St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office for 10 years. She is survived by her son, two daughters, and parents.

Rest in Peace Sis…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

Security Weekly: Mexico's Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges, April 18, 2013

By Tristan Reed
Tactical Analyst

Balkanization of Cartels

Since the late 1980s demise of the Guadalajara cartel, which controlled drug trade routes into the United States through most of Mexico, Mexican cartels have followed a trend of fracturing into more geographically compact, regional crime networks. This trend, which we are referring to as "Balkanization," has continued for more than two decades and has impacted all of the major cartel groups in Mexico. Indeed the Sinaloa Federation lost significant assets when the organizations run by Beltran Leyva and Ignacio Coronel split away from it. Los Zetas, currently the other most powerful cartel in Mexico, was formed when it split off from the Gulf cartel in 2010. Still these two organizations have fought hard to resist the trend of fracturing and have been able to grow despite being affected by it. This led to the polarized dynamic observed in 2011 when these two dominant Mexican cartels effectively split Mexican organized crime in two, with one group composed of Los Zetas and its allies and the other composed of the Sinaloa Federation and its allies.


This trend toward polarization has since been reversed, however, as Balkanization has led to rising regional challenges to both organizations since 2012. Most notable among these is the split between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation. The Sinaloa Federation continues to struggle with regional crime groups for control in western Chihuahua state, northern Sinaloa state, Jalisco state and northern Sonora state. Similarly, Los Zetas saw several regional challengers in 2012. Two regional groups saw sharp increases in their operational capabilities during 2012 and through the first quarter of 2013. These were the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Knights Templar.

The Beltran Leyva Organization provides another example of the regionalization of Mexican organized crime. It has become an umbrella of autonomous, and in some cases conflicting, groups. Many of the groups that emerged from it control specific geographic areas and fight among each other largely in isolation from the conflict between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation. Many of these successor crime groups, such as the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos are currently fighting for their own geographic niches. As its name implies, the Independent Cartel of Acapulco mostly acts in Acapulco, while Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos mostly act in Morelos state.

The ongoing fragmentation of Mexican cartels is not likely to reverse, at least not in the next few years. Despite this, while Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation continue to face new rivals and suffer from internal splintering, their resources are not necessarily declining. Neither criminal organization faces implosion or a substantial decline as a transnational criminal organization as a result of rising regional challengers. Both Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation continue to extend their drug trafficking operations on a transnational level, increasing both their influence and profits. Still, they will continue to face the new reality, in which they are forced to work with -- or fight -- regional groups.

Los Zetas

In Hidalgo state, a former Zetas stronghold, the Knights Templar have made significant inroads, although violence has not risen to the level of that in the previously mentioned states. Also, the turf war within Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas states between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas that began when Los Zetas split from the Gulf cartel in 2010 continues.

In light of Ivan "El Taliban" Velazquez Caballero's dissent from Los Zetas and the death of former leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano, Zetas leader Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales could face organizational integrity issues during 2013. Signs of such issues appeared in Cancun during the first quarter when some members of Los Zetas reportedly broke from the group and adopted the Gulf cartel name. Besides possible minor dissent, a seemingly new rival has emerged in Tabasco state to counter Los Zetas. A group called Pueblo Unido Contra la Delincuencia, Spanish for "People United Against Crime," carried out a series of executions in Tabasco state throughout the first quarter, but the group's origins and significance remain unclear. No indicators of substantial splintering among Los Zetas have emerged since the Velazquez split.

Sinaloa Federation

Regional organizations continued to challenge the Sinaloa Federation on its turf in western Chihuahua state, northern Sinaloa state and Jalisco state through the first quarter. Intercartel violence in mountainous western Chihuahua continues as the Sinaloa Federation fights La Linea for control of the region's smuggling routes and drug cultivation areas. Los Mazatlecos so far has maintained its control over northern Sinaloa cities, such as Los Mochis and Guasave. It also has continued violent incursions into southern areas of Sinaloa state, such as Mazatlan, Concordia and El Rosario with its ally Los Zetas.

Gulf Cartel

At the beginning of 2012, Gulf cartel territory appeared likely to be absorbed by larger cartels -- essentially signaling the end of the Gulf cartel. Support from the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar combined with fractures within Los Zetas allowed a Gulf cartel resurgence, leading to a renewed Gulf assault on Los Zetas in the northeastern states of Mexico. The resurgence ended with a series of notable arrests during the last quarter of 2012, such as that of former top leader Jorge Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla Sanchez. The arrests triggered additional Gulf cartel infighting, which peaked in March 2013.

The escalated infighting in the Gulf cartel, particularly in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, highlighted the new state of the Gulf cartel: Instead of operating as a cohesive criminal network, the Gulf cartel now consists of factions linked by history and the Gulf label. The infighting began in 2010 after the death of former top Gulf cartel leader Antonio Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen. The death of Cardenas Guillen split the Gulf cartel into two main factions, Los Rojos and Los Metros. By the first quarter of 2013, infighting had broken out between Los Metros leaders, such as Mario "Pelon" Ramirez Trevino, David "Metro 4" Salgado and Miguel "El Gringo" Villarreal. This suggests the Gulf cartel is further fractured and no longer consists of just two opposing sides. The Gulf cartel may begin acting as a cohesive network during the second quarter after the escalated infighting in March, though this cannot be definitely predicted.

From March 10 to March 19, Reynosa became the focal point for Gulf cartel infighting as Ramirez Trevino escalated his conflict against Villarreal. Ramirez Trevino reportedly expelled Villarreal's faction and its allies from the Reynosa plaza and killed Salgado. This could mean Ramirez Trevino has consolidated control over other Gulf cartel factions. If true, this would represent a substantial shift in organized criminal operations in northeastern Tamaulipas state, where the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar smuggle drugs, people and other illicit commodities through the border towns of Reynosa and Matamoros while Los Zetas maintain a constant interest in fighting for control of the stated cities.

As mentioned during the last annual update, Gulf cartel factions are increasingly reliant on Sinaloa Federation and Knights Templar support to defend the remaining Gulf cartel territory in Tamaulipas state from Los Zetas. This certainly remains true after the first quarter, although the recent shift from Gulf cartel infighting may signal a shift in intercartel dynamics. Since the Gulf cartel in reality consists of separate factions, there is likely a separate relationship between each Gulf cartel faction and the larger criminal organizations reportedly in alignment with them. With Ramirez Trevino now in charge of Reynosa, a city valued by both the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar, his existing relationship with the two organizations will likely influence their strategies for maintaining their interests in Gulf cartel-controlled areas. Additionally, it is not yet clear whether Ramirez Trevino suffered any substantial losses during the March fighting in Reynosa. If he did lose some capabilities fighting Los Zetas in Tamaulipas state, or if he has challenged a faction loyal to either the Sinaloa Federation or the Knights Templar, either organization would likely have to use its own gunmen for defending Gulf cartel-controlled areas or mounting their own incursions into Zetas territory, particularly Nuevo Laredo.

Intercartel violence in the Gulf cartel-controlled city of Reynosa will likely diminish compared to the first quarter of 2013 if Ramirez Trevino has indeed won. This reduction in violence will continue only as long as Ramirez Trevino is able to hold his control over Reynosa. Influence from external organizations, such as Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar, could once again spark violence if Ramirez Trevino's efforts have harmed their trafficking operations through Reynosa or presented a new opportunity to seize control. What, if any, Gulf cartel infighting is ongoing is difficult to gauge.

Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion

The severing of the relationship between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation came to the forefront of conflicts in the Pacific states of Michoacan and Jalisco during the first quarter of 2013. The Sinaloa Federation relied on its alliance with the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion in defending the critical location of Guadalajara from Los Zetas and used the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion as an assault force into Los Zetas strongholds, such as Veracruz state.

Although evidence of the rift between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation began to appear in open-source reporting during the last half of 2012, the conflict between the two organizations only became clear when the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion went on the offensive in Jalisco state by attacking Sinaloa Federation allies Los Coroneles, the Knights Templar and the Gulf cartel.

With a now-fully independent Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the polarization of warring cartels in Mexico has effectively ended. In addition to the existing conflicts between the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation must now focus on reclaiming an operational hold over Jalisco state from the now-rival Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. The second quarter will continue to see a conflict between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and Sinaloa Federation-aligned groups in Jalisco state as well as neighboring states like Michoacan.

Knights Templar

The Knights Templar experienced intensified conflict during the first quarter from their principal rival, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. In an effort to combat the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the Knights Templar have allied with other Sinaloa Federation-aligned groups, the Gulf cartel and Los Coroneles, referring to themselves as "Los Aliados" to fight the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion within Jalisco. Violence as a result of this alliance against the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion has been most notable in the Guadalajara metropolitan area as well as towns lying on highways 15 and 90, which connect to Guadalajara.

In addition to the Knights Templar offensive into Jalisco state, the group is currently defending its stronghold of Michoacan state. The Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion also has conducted violent assaults against the Knights Templar in Michoacan, particularly on routes leading from Jalisco state toward Apatzingan, Michoacan state. This assault has increased intercartel violence along the border of the two states as part of a tit-for-tat dynamic.

Citizens of Buenavista Tomatlan, Michoacan state, a municipality lying amid territory contested by the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Knights Templar, have recently set up a community police force to counter Knights Templar operations in the municipality. As in some other areas of Mexico, this community police force is a volunteer force that assumed law enforcement responsibilities independent of the Mexican government. The community police, while established to thwart the Knights Templar, have created tension between the communities of Buenavista Tomatlan and the government. On March 8, the Mexican military detained approximately 34 members of the community police force that had been created in February in Buenavista Tomatlan.

The Buenavista Tomatlan arrests occurred after the community police took over the municipal police station March 4 and detained the municipal police chief, who the Mexican military later freed. Notably, the Mexican government claimed at least 30 of the detained community police belonged to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. If true, this suggests it has made territorial gains to the point of infiltrating the community police. However, there has been no confirmation on whether the accusations are true. Regardless, the community police force of Buenavista Tomatlan has placed its focus on stopping Knights Templar operations in the area, a focus that could only benefit the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion's war with its rivals.

Mexico's Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Officer Down

Police Officer Donald Bishop
Town of Brookfield Wisconsin Police Department
End of Watch: Friday, April 12, 2013
Age: 32
Tour: 2 years

Police Officer Don Bishop suffered a fatal heart attack while responding to a burglary call at approximately 11:00 pm.

He suffered the heart attack while driving near the intersection of Jaclyn and Sierra Drives. His patrol car left the roadway and struck a tree. Other responding officers immediately pulled him from the vehicle and began CPR. He was transported to a local hospital where he was later pronounced dead.

Officer Bishop had served with the Town of Brookfield Police Department for two years and also served as a part-time officer with the Village of Eagle Police Department. He had previously served as a reserve officer with the Mukwonago Police Department.

Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

We're having a Baconator for our health!

105-Year-Old Woman Claims Bacon Is the Secret to Long Life

First an 101-year-old lady proved to us that four drinks a day is totally OK, and now an 105-year-old is saying bacon is her secret to long life. Say what?

According to HLN, 105-year-old Pearl Cantrell credits her lengthy life to her love for bacon, as she eats the cured pork meat every day, which got her through "decades of hard work."

Naturally, this goes against every other study out there that says that processed meats actually decrease life span. The most recent study found that 4 pounds of uncooked bacon a day would actually kill a human, which is, admittedly, a lot of bacon....

This stat is so screwed up the study must have been federally funded. For a 200 pound man this is daily two percent of his body weight. Hell, you drink too much water you will drown yourself.

...Cantrell has, however, outlived three of her seven chidlren, endured years of physical labor working in a field, and is still up and running (and eating bacon every day). We'll just add it to our list of supposedly life-lengthening foods (including Roquefort cheese, boiled Greek coffee, and wine). The science doesn't back this up, but we can hope.

Thank you Ms Cantrell, in your honor Beth and I will have eggs and bacon this morning...for our health and long life!

But it wasn't his lack of faith that did him in....

Star Wars actor Richard LeParmentier dies aged 66... 35 years after he was choked by Darth Vader

Star Wars actor Richard LeParmentier has died, aged 66.

He famously played a choking victim of Star Wars villain Darth Vader in 1977 film A New Hope.

TMZ reports that the circumstances surrounding LeParmentier's death are currently unclear.

The actor had appeared in more than 50 movies and TV shows but was best remembered for his role as the arrogant Admiral Motti, commander of Vader's planet destroying Death Star in 1977 film Star Wars: A New Hope.

In the infamous scene, Motti mocks Vader's 'sorcerer's ways' and 'sad devotion to that ancient Jedi religion.'

This leads to a near-fatal confrontation with the helmeted Vader who crushes his windpipe using 'the force.'

LeParmentier also played a police officer in 1988 film Who Framed Roger Rabbit, and is reported to have recently been working as a screenwriter for British television.

Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1946 to British and Irish parents, he moved to the UK in 1974. He was married from 1981 to 1984 to British actress Sarah Douglas, who played the supervillain Ursa in Superman II. LeParmentier also made an appearance in the Christopher Reeve film as a reporter.

He also had roles in James Bond film Octopussy and the TV shows Capital City and We'll Meet Again.

The actor, who appeared at several sci-fi conventions, once said of his famous Star Wars scene: 'I did the choking effect by flexing muscles in my neck. It set off a chain of events, that choking.

'I can't do it anymore because, oddly enough, I have had an operation on my neck and had some 21st century titanium joints put into it.'

Originally, LeParmentier was asked by creator George Lucas to play an unnamed part with only a few lines, but he turned it down, before being offered the role that would launch his career.

He died at his home in Austin, Texas.

I remember as a kid seeing Darth kick your ass with just The Force and thinking "Woo, that's cool!" Thanks for another memorable small piece of the mine and millions of kid's lives. RIP Richard LeParmentier One last time we'll look at that great scene!

Geopolitical Weekly: China and North Korea: A Tangled Partnership, April 16, 2013

By Rodger Baker
Vice President of East Asia Analysis

China appears to be growing frustrated with North Korea's behavior, perhaps to the point of changing its long-standing support for Pyongyang. As North Korea's largest economic sponsor, Beijing has provided the North Korean regime with crucial aid for years and offered it diplomatic protection against the United States and other powers. To outsiders, China's alliance with North Korea seems like a Cold War relic with little reason for persisting into the 21st century. However, Beijing's continued support for Pyongyang is not rooted in shared ideology or past cooperation nearly as much as in China's own security calculations.

Perhaps nothing sums up the modern relationship more effectively than the oft repeated comment that the two countries are "as close as lips and teeth." Far from a statement of intense friendship, the completion of that Chinese aphorism -- "When the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold" -- highlights China's interest in propping up the North Korean regime. North Korea serves as a buffer state for China's northeast, and though Pyongyang can exploit that need, the North Korean leadership harbors no illusion that China is truly interested in the survival of any particular North Korean regime so long as Beijing can keep its buffer.

Whether China is seriously considering a change in relations with North Korea, ties between the two countries are shaped as much by geography and history as they are by choice. The Korean Peninsula abuts China's northeast, along Manchuria. The Yalu River separates North Korea from China, and the area on the western edge of the border functions as a gateway between the two countries along an otherwise largely mountainous border. The geography of the Korean Peninsula, as seen several times in the past, offers little resistance to rapid military maneuvers from north to south or vice versa.

At times, this border area was a troublesome spot for Chinese empires, which had to contend with various invaders and growing Korean military strength. At other times, the peninsula served as a conduit for Chinese culture to Japan -- and intermittently as the main highway for military confrontation between China and Japan. During the 19th century and the expansion of European and American activity in Asia, if foreign countries had dominated Korea, it would have further undermined China's already faltering national security. And during the Cold War, North Korea provided a strategic buffer against U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea, a role it still plays today.

A History of Antagonism

China and North Korea draw heavily from history in assessing each other's strategic positions, as well as their own. China sees North Korea as a useful buffer but one that can draw China into wars and potentially weaken or at least delay China's attempts at achieving its own strategic imperatives. North Korea sees China as a necessary partner, one that through careful manipulation will continue to fund and protect North Korea, but always with the risk of North Korea losing control of its own fate to the Chinese. These are not new ideas -- they draw from centuries of interactions, and both countries take different lessons from that history.

The North Koreans trace their lineage and in part their national philosophy to the Koguryo Kingdom, which lasted from 37 B.C. to 668 A.D., was centered in what is now North Korea and stretched well into modern-day China's northeast. During the seventh century, one Chinese dynasty wore itself out trying to expand into Koguryo, and that dynasty's successor was successful only after briefly allying with the dominant kingdom in what is now South Korea. The Chinese dynasties' moves against the Koguryo Kingdom reflected their concerns about having a strong power on China's frontier, a concern that continues to this day. China and both Koreas still have brief academic spats over the historical affinity of Koguryo, with China claiming it was a Chinese dynasty, in part to justify Beijing's continued oversight of North Korea but also to challenge any potential reunified Korea's claims to the ethnic Korean population that still resides on the Chinese side of the Yalu River.

The Korean Peninsula was also used as an invasion route between China and Japan. During the 13th century, after more than two decades of conflict, the Yuan Dynasty finally beat the ruling Korean kingdom into submission and used Korean shipbuilders, soldiers and supplies to launch two assaults against Japan, both of which ultimately failed. The Japanese, following unification under Toyotomi Hideyoshi some three centuries later, launched a large-scale invasion of Korea on their way to Ming China. The six-year war highlighted one of the weaknesses of Korea's defense -- the Japanese moved rapidly up the peninsula, quickly taking Seoul, Kaesong and Pyongyang. Ming forces rushed troops into Korea to block the rapidly advancing Japanese, who had all but brushed aside the unprepared Korean forces.

The combination of Chinese cannon and mobile troops from southern China, plus the ability of the Korean navy to cut Japanese supply lines, turned the tide, but throughout the intervention, the Chinese and Koreans found little to agree upon. Korea's ruling Chosun Kingdom saw itself as defending Ming China from the Japanese aggressors and demanded the utter defeat of the Japanese and if possible their subjugation. The Koreans further feared China would use the opportunity to leave its forces on the peninsula permanently. The Chinese were willing to settle for the retention of a buffer Korean state and considered accepting Japanese occupation of southern Korea, calling frequent cease-fires during the war that the Koreans saw as too beneficial to Japanese and Chinese interests but not to their own. The intervention during the Japanese invasion, like the later intervention during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, was not based on the interests of the Koreans but very much on the interests of the Chinese.

Despite Korea's concerns about possible Chinese domination, since the seventh century the various Korean kingdoms managed to largely retain their independence by nominally acceding to China's imperial vision and accepting a special relationship with the Chinese dynasties. This allowed China to remain confident in Korea's loyalty on the border and gave Korea a relative assurance that China would not invade it. For both, it was a combination of convenience and necessity that drove relations.

The pattern continued with only a few interruptions into the 19th century, even as China was being worn down by European colonial powers. China vigorously defended Korea's right to remain isolated from the rest of the world. Beijing was not strong enough to use military power to ensure Korea's continued role as a strategic buffer but rather exploited its special relationship with Korea diplomatically. Beijing would alternate between claiming a suzerainty relationship with Korea, making it the only path to dialogue with the Hermit Kingdom, and claiming that despite the special relationship the Koreans set their own foreign policy and China was not responsible for their actions. China's main objective here was to keep Korea out of the hands of foreigners.

Ultimately, China failed. Amid the complex maneuvering between the Chinese, Japanese, Russians, Koreans and others in the early 20th century, Japan took control of the Korean Peninsula. Holding Korea effectively ensured that there was little chance that China or another power could use the territory to stage an invasion of Japan. Possession of Korea also helped the Japanese to seize more of Manchuria, reinforcing to China just how important Korea is to China's national security interests.

Korea as a Strategic Asset

At the end of World War II, China was focused on its internal civil war and was not yet prepared to re-establish a special relationship with Korea. But by 1949, the Chinese Communists had largely emerged victorious at home and the Soviet occupying forces in North Korea had left. North Korea's new Communist government, formed after the Japanese withdrawal and the peninsula's division in 1945, consulted with or perhaps manipulated Moscow and Beijing into offering their political and military backing for an invasion of the South.

At the same time that Pyongyang was preparing its invasion into South Korea, China was preparing a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. But China's plans had to be shelved. Only days after hostilities broke out between North and South Korea in June 1950, the United States deployed ships to the Taiwan Strait to protect the Nationalist government in Taipei. When the North's forces were halted and pushed back to the Yalu months later, China had no choice but to shift its attention away from Taiwan and enter the Korean War to deal with the much more pressing threat along its border.

The Soviets, concerned that a successful move by Beijing to defeat the Nationalists in Taiwan would then free Beijing to make political overtures to the United States, gained in the Korean War continued animosity between the United States and China. North Korea's actions, while they could have been beneficial for China had they succeeded, instead undermined Beijing's reconquest of Taiwan, locked Communist China into two more decades of contentious relations with the United States and ultimately left China responsible for supporting a faltering state on a critical border. The North Koreans were grateful for Chinese intervention but recognized that, as in past interventions, the Chinese were once again willing to settle for a divided Korea, so long as they could retain their buffer.

Although the North Koreans were able to draw on the emerging Sino-Soviet split after the Korean War to gain economic concessions from the competing Communist powers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left the North Korean regime with a stark choice: risk losing control over the country amid attempts at reform and opening (the example of the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe did little to encourage this path) or accept the risk of a single sponsor state in China. Pyongyang sought another path; it would build a strong domestic deterrent to any military action while also threatening to use that deterrent to try to extract economic concessions out of the Americans, Japanese, South Koreans and anyone else concerned about peace and stability. Pyongyang would also draw on China's continued fear of losing its strategic buffer.

Although largely effective in the past, this policy is beginning to see diminishing returns. North Korea is now even more dependent upon China than before, but China is as much a hostage to the relationship as North Korea is. Beijing has used the various North Korean crises to its own advantage, offering to mediate talks in return for political concessions from the United States or South Korea, playing a very similar game as it did during the colonial era by simultaneously asserting a special relationship with North Korea and denying responsibility for North Korean actions. For China's leaders, this once served as a very useful way of managing regional relations and countering U.S. challenges to Chinese policies, such as currency manipulation. But for China, too, the policy is beginning to lose efficacy, and Washington is increasingly calling on China to either assert itself in dealing with Pyongyang or be sidelined. Washington may even be seeking to circumvent China, turning to India and Mongolia as potential interlocutors.

For China, North Korea remains a necessary strategic buffer, and in a unification scenario, the most China can tolerate is a neutral Korea that leans toward Beijing. For North Korea, Beijing's need for a buffer may ensure that China will defend the North against an attack, but it doesn't guarantee that Beijing would preserve the North Korean regime. Beijing may be just as well served by a more pliant North Korea as by the current government. The Chinese have already intimated that in a collapse or a war scenario, they may seize Pyongyang and hold the northern portion of Korea, effectively taking on responsibility for the management of the buffer zone, even if this is not the optimal solution.

North Korea's continued use of a threatening posture, if it fails to gain concessions and shows China's inability to influence its smaller neighbor, may ultimately be seen by China as detrimental to its own interests. This is the message China is now spreading via its academics and others, both in the domestic media and abroad. In return, North Korea, in commentaries in its state media, has suggested that small powers cannot trust the promises of big powers to defend them, and thus must build their own strong deterrent.

At the rhetorical level, a rift is emerging between Beijing and Pyongyang. Since both countries have new leadership, it is not surprising that they are uncomfortable with one another at this time. Both use North Korea's continued crises for their own advantage, and both see that that approach is not working as well as it used to. During his recent visit to China, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry sought Beijing's help in understanding the behavior of North Korea and in reining in Pyongyang's threatening statements and actions. Beijing countered that Washington needs to engage Pyongyang in dialogue but that China itself has not established a close relationship with the new North Korean leadership. The subtext, even before the Kerry visit, was that Beijing itself is growing exasperated with Pyongyang's actions, which are outside the realm of what China considers acceptable, and that Chinese academics, if not the leadership, are now openly discussing a possible break with North Korea and China's near unlimited support of its belligerent neighbor.

This may be another feint. The Chinese once again may be seeking to trade their assistance with North Korea for political concessions elsewhere. And with North Korea less predictable given its new leader, these concessions may have to be higher than in the past. Washington appears to have already anticipated the Chinese counter and has suggested it could reverse some of its recent deployments of missile defense systems to the region if China intervenes with the North. There is some irony in the United States using the North Korean playbook in dealing with China -- Washington essentially escalated the military situation with the missile defense deployment and is now offering to return to only slightly above the pre-crisis status quo in return for political concessions, namely calming North Korea.

North Korea's actions are beginning to invite responses that threaten China's strategic interests, from expanded U.S. missile defense to accelerating Japanese remilitarization to the increased potential for closer Japanese-South Korean military cooperation. If anything makes China begin to question which country has the upper hand in its relationship with North Korea, this may be it.

China and North Korea: A Tangled Partnership is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Officer Down

Chief of Police Anthony Q. Barfield, Sr.
Barwick Georgia Police Department
End of Watch: Tuesday, April 9, 2013
Age: 47
Tour: 20 years

Chief of Police Anthony Barfield suffered a fatal heart attack while at the scene of a domestic disturbance.

He began experiencing trouble breathing and was subsequently transported to a local hospital where he passed away.

Chief Barfield had served in law enforcement for 20 years and was the agency's only law enforcement officer.

Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

Reverse this and see how it's covered in the Forth Estate....

OK, let's assume B Hussein Obama has a stroke next week and passes. Or Jimmy Carter finally rides the Earth of his presence. Or Bubba Clinton is finally found in the bed of a really jealous husband. I know, Mrs Clinton will be relieved, but on the point of this post there will be a state funeral soon afterwards. And Republicans of all stripe will show their respect. More accurately the they will be respectful of the former occupant of the White House.

Now we come to the other side of the aisle. Lady Thatcher will be buried Wednesday in a state funeral in everything but name. How are the leftist being respectful to a fallen human, mush less a great leader and woman.

Well, let's just say no one should be surprised.

TIGHT SECURITY GUARDS AGAINST THREATS TO THATCHER FUNERAL

Margaret Thatcher survived an assassination attempt when she was prime minister and police are taking no chances that her critics might seek a final attack by targeting her funeral.

A major security operation has been planned for Wednesday's ceremonial event, amid fears it could be disrupted by far-left groups, Irish republicans or individuals obsessed by the Iron Lady.

The high-profile guest list, headed by Queen Elizabeth II and set to include a host of global political figures and celebrities, has also increased the pressure on Scotland Yard.

Peaceful protests, anti-Thatcher chants and banners are also expected following a week of impromptu street celebrations to mark the death of a political leader who remains hugely divisive.

Hundreds of people joined a "party" in Trafalgar Square on Saturday night, and several said they would return to demonstrate at Thatcher's funeral.

The former premier's coffin will be carried through the streets of London with full military honours.

"I plan to go there and turn my back when she comes," Sigrid Holmwood, a 34-year-old artist, told AFP, saying she objected to the expensive send-off given to such a divisive leader.

Hate to tell you Sigrid, but no one cares. But if this gives your life some meaning, well, help yourself.

Police are scanning social networking sites for information about possible protests on Wednesday, after the events last week were spread on Twitter and Facebook.

They have also urged people planning to disrupt the funeral to contact them, a pro-active tactic used with success during last year's London Olympic Games...

...Dai Davies, a former head of royal protection at the London police force, told The Times newspaper that police chiefs were most likely to be concerned "about a fixated person with a psychological hatred of Margaret Thatcher".

Another potential threat could come from Irish republican dissidents who still hate Thatcher for her hardline approach on hunger strikers during the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the main paramilitary group fighting British rule in the province, tried to kill her with a bomb in 1984. She survived but five people died.

The IRA gave up its armed struggle a decade ago, but dissident groups are still active in Northern Ireland...

Again, when a Democratic president is laid to rest, do you think there will be Tea Party groups along the streets in DC showing what they really thing of these men. Probably not. And if their are a few idiots along the routs, you can rest assured they will be put shown by MSNBC, et all as an example of right wing hatred or some such rubbish.

But the left is never extreme, hateful or distasteful, right Chris Matthews.

Officer Down

Deputy Sheriff Hans Fifer
Faulkner County Arkansas Sheriff's Office
End of Watch: Monday, April 8, 2013
Age: 32
Tour: 5 years

Deputy Sheriff Hans Fifer suffered a fatal heart attack following a training session and tryout with the agency's SWAT team at a facility in North Little Rock.

He began experiencing shortness of breath during the training and was administered oxygen. Shortly thereafter he began suffering chest pains and collapsed. He was transported to Springhill Baptist Medical Center where he was pronounced dead.

Deputy Fifer had served with the Faulkner County Sheriff's Office as a full-time deputy for only four months. He had previously served as a reserve deputy with the agency and with the Cabot Police Department for five years. He is survived by his wife and two young daughters.

Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

The latest example of the government nanny state. E-Cigarettes.

One of the greatest open lies government, at all levels, perpetrates is they want people to stop smoking tobacco products. If they were serious about that they would ban the substance. However, they tax it for the children, specifically for children's health care programs. But it's a steady steam of cash to the public coffers for politicians to spend. People are addicted to nicotine so they will pay.

A few years ago the Electronic Cigarette, also known as the E-Cig came on the market and has gained great acceptance. Personally I know a good friend who used them to stop a 1-3 pack a day cigarette habit, plus someone at work who is using them to ween himself off of the nicotine.

Now some usual suspects would seem to like this. But we all know that they don't because of the usual reason, money. Now we have this news, thanks to Hot Air.

The next ban… e-cigarettes

As we all know, the government is very interested and actively engaged in stopping people from smoking cigarettes. (Insert pause here.)

Okay… now that I’ve given you all time to stop laughing, we can give a brief nod to the fact that government at all levels in the United States has virtually zero interest in stopping people from smoking. They have a vast, vested interest in looking like they disapprove of smoking, while keeping it legal and taxing the living heck out of it at every level. This leads to all manner of economic and law enforcement problems, but still manages to stack a few extra coins in their coffers and avoids the embarrassing problem of having tens of thousands of additional people suddenly out of work.

But a deal was cut at one point – more on that below – which might allow manufacturers to transition to other tobacco based products which were not smoked, This led to the e-cigarette. (Disclosure: I’ve never tried this product.) But it looks like the government wants to shut this menace down as well.

As the Food and Drug Administration [FDA] is poised to issue new rules governing e-cigarettes, a new study has found some 22 potentially dangerous chemical elements in the vapor given off or inhaled.

These include many metallic particles – including 3 on the FDA’s “harmful and potentially harmful chemicals” list [lead, nickel, and chromium] – with the concentrations of 9 “higher than or equal to the corresponding concentrations in conventional cigarette smoke,” notes public interest law professor John Banzhaf, who has been called “the law professor who masterminded litigation against the tobacco industry.”

That’s bad news for people in the industry who thought that the government would give them a bit of running room to make such a shift, as reported by Forbes.

Several years ago, the federal government entered into a Faustian bargain with the tobacco industry — and the cigarette makers with the government. It was legislation borne of mutual antipathy.

Under the scheme, Washington brought the tobacco industry under the thumb of federal regulation. FDA now oversees everything from the way cigarettes are marketed, to the manner in which they are made. In exchange, the tobacco industry was promised a regulatory track out of their current (declining) business model…

It always seemed a naïve aspiration — that FDA would ever sanction such products – and even more uncertain that the anti-tobacco crowd would let this paradigm advance. Now, each side’s ambitions (and the law’s spirit) are being tested.

In short, the government is looking to ban – or at least heavily restrict – the use of these new e-cigarettes which deliver the drug (nicotine) without all the other harmful trash generally associated with the burning plant fiber bi-products. Social engineers the world over are already on board with this plan, including schemes at the World Health Organization to try to ban – or more likely tax heavily – it at an international level.

I’m sure there is a point to be made about any smokeless tobacco product being sold to children, but what about adults? I suppose the assumption here is that e-cigarettes might just be an unholy plan to addict non-smokers to nicotine and lure them into smoked products, but in the end that just winds up generating more tax revenue. So where is the profit motive for the government in this one?

Have any of you actually tried one of these electronic cigarettes? The practice doesn’t involve spitting like chew or wads in the cheek like other packaged products. Should the government be wading into this?

With all respect the profit motive is obvious. The feds, through the FDA are moving into this because cigarettes are taxed at a relatively huge rate, including specific federal taxes. E-cigs, however, are only taxed at the rate for any other consumer product and the taxes do not go to Washington but to state and local coffers. So the feds will not ban them, only regulate and tax them, for the children.

Personally I've evolved in my view of smoking over my life. As a younger man I was a militant anti-smoker, thinking it was one of the more stupid vices. However, over the years I have started to use it myself. I've only tried a cigarette once around ten years of age (probably the reason I didn't pick up the habit like the rest of the family) but in my late 20s I tried cigars. I now smoke a weekly (end of the work week, something to unwind with) cigar and an occasional pipe. As time has gone on I've become more libertarian on the use of tobacco, among other issues.

A few years ago the Houston City Council passed an ordinance forbidding smoking in restaurants and bars. Again, government overreach. If a restaurant owner wants to allow smoking in all, part or none of his business that is no one's decision but his. If a consumer want to dine at a restaurant that does (or does not) allow smoking, that is their business.

I finish this post as I also finish an excellent Rocky Patel Cameroon with some great conversation over coffee with my lovely wife Beth, our great neighbor Bill and our loving son Elmer the wonder dog. Hope you had a great weekend and here's to a great week!

Officer Down

Detective Eric Smith
Jackson Mississippi Police Department
End of Watch: Thursday, April 4, 2013

Detective Eric Smith was shot and killed inside the Jackson Police Department's headquarters building while interviewing a murder suspect at approximately 6:00 pm.

The subject attacked Detective Smith inside of the interview room. The man disarmed Detective Smith and fatally shot him before turning the gun on himself.

Detective Smith is survived by his wife, who also serves with the Jackson Police Department.

Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

Geopolitical Weekly: Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy, April 9, 2013

By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman

Editor's Note: George Friedman originally wrote this Geopolitical Weekly on North Korea's nuclear strategy on Jan. 29. More than two months later, the geopolitical contours of the still-evolving crisis have become more clear, so we believe it important to once again share with readers the fundamentals outlined in this earlier forecast.

North Korea's state-run media reported Sunday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the country's top security officials to take "substantial and high-profile important state measures," which has been widely interpreted to mean that North Korea is planning its third nuclear test. Kim said the orders were retaliation for the U.S.-led push to tighten U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang following North Korea's missile test in October. A few days before Kim's statement emerged, the North Koreans said future tests would target the United States, which North Korea regards as its key adversary along with Washington's tool, South Korea.

North Korea has been using the threat of tests and the tests themselves as weapons against its neighbors and the United States for years. On the surface, threatening to test weapons does not appear particularly sensible. If the test fails, you look weak. If it succeeds, you look dangerous without actually having a deliverable weapon. And the closer you come to having a weapon, the more likely someone is to attack you so you don't succeed in actually getting one. Developing a weapon in absolute secret would seem to make more sense. When the weapon is ready, you display it, and you have something solid to threaten enemies with.

North Korea, of course, has been doing this for years and doing it successfully, so what appears absurd on the surface quite obviously isn't. On the contrary, it has proved to be a very effective maneuver. North Korea is estimated to have a gross domestic product of about $28 billion, about the same as Latvia or Turkmenistan. Yet it has maneuvered itself into a situation where the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea have sat down with it at the negotiating table in a bid to persuade it not to build weapons. Sometimes, the great powers give North Korea money and food to persuade it not to develop weapons. It sometimes agrees to a halt, but then resumes its nuclear activities. It never completes a weapon, but it frequently threatens to test one. And when it carries out such tests, it claims its tests are directed at the United States and South Korea, as if the test itself were a threat.

There is brilliance in North Korea's strategy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea was left in dire economic straits. There were reasonable expectations that its government would soon collapse, leading to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, the goal of the North Korean government was regime survival, so it was terrified that outside powers would invade or support an uprising against it. It needed a strategy that would dissuade anyone from trying that. Being weak in every sense, this wasn't going to be easy, but the North Koreans developed a strategy that we described more than 10 years ago as ferocious, weak and crazy. North Korea has pursued this course since the 1990s, and the latest manifestation of this strategy was on display last week. The strategy has worked marvelously and is still working.

A Three-Part Strategy

First, the North Koreans positioned themselves as ferocious by appearing to have, or to be on the verge of having, devastating power. Second, they positioned themselves as being weak such that no matter how ferocious they are, there would be no point in pushing them because they are going to collapse anyway. And third, they positioned themselves as crazy, meaning pushing them would be dangerous since they were liable to engage in the greatest risks imaginable at the slightest provocation.

In the beginning, Pyongyang's ability to appear ferocious was limited to the North Korean army's power to shell Seoul. It had massed artillery along the border and could theoretically devastate the southern capital, assuming the North had enough ammunition, its artillery worked and air power didn't lay waste to its massed artillery. The point was not that it was going to level Seoul but that it had the ability to do so. There were benefits to outsiders in destabilizing the northern regime, but Pyongyang's ferocity -- uncertain though its capabilities were -- was enough to dissuade South Korea and its allies from trying to undermine the regime. Its later move to develop missiles and nuclear weapons followed from the strategy of ferocity -- since nothing was worth a nuclear war, enraging the regime by trying to undermine it wasn't worth the risk.

Many nations have tried to play the ferocity game, but the North Koreans added a brilliant and subtle twist to it: being weak. The North Koreans advertised the weakness of their economy, particularly its food insecurity, by various means. This was not done overtly, but by allowing glimpses of its weakness. Given the weakness of its economy and the difficulty of life in North Korea, there was no need to risk trying to undermine the North. It would collapse from its own defects.

This was a double inoculation. The North Koreans' ferocity with weapons whose effectiveness might be questionable, but still pose an unquantifiable threat, caused its enemies to tread carefully. Why risk unleashing its ferocity when its weakness would bring it down? Indeed, a constant debate among Western analysts over the North's power versus its weakness combines to paralyze policymakers.

The North Koreans added a third layer to perfect all of this. They portrayed themselves as crazy, working to appear unpredictable, given to extravagant threats and seeming to welcome a war. Sometimes, they reaffirmed they were crazy via steps like sinking South Korean ships for no apparent reason. As in poker, so with the North: You can play against many sorts of players, from those who truly understand the odds to those who are just playing for fun, but never, ever play poker against a nut. He is totally unpredictable, can't be gamed, and if you play with his head you don't know what will happen.

So long as the North Koreans remained ferocious, weak and crazy, the best thing to do was not irritate them too much and not to worry what kind of government they had. But being weak and crazy was the easy part for the North; maintaining its appearance of ferocity was more challenging. Not only did the North Koreans have to keep increasing their ferocity, they had to avoid increasing it so much that it overpowered the deterrent effect of their weakness and craziness.

A Cautious Nuclear Program

Hence, we have North Korea's eternal nuclear program. It never quite produces a weapon, but no one can be sure whether a weapon might be produced. Due to widespread perceptions that the North Koreans are crazy, it is widely believed they might rush to complete their weapon and go to war at the slightest provocation. The result is the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea holding meetings with North Korea to try to persuade it not to do something crazy.

Interestingly, North Korea never does anything significant and dangerous, or at least not dangerous enough to break the pattern. Since the Korean War, North Korea has carefully calculated its actions, timing them to avoid any move that could force a major reaction. We see this caution built into its nuclear program. After more than a decade of very public ferocity, the North Koreans have not come close to a deliverable weapon. But since if you upset them, they just might, the best bet has been to tread lightly and see if you can gently persuade them not to do something insane.

The North's positioning is superb: Minimal risky action sufficient to lend credibility to its ferocity and craziness plus endless rhetorical threats maneuvers North Korea into being a major global threat in the eyes of the great powers. Having won themselves this position, the North Koreans are not about to risk it, even if a 20-something leader is hurling threats.

The China Angle and the Iranian Pupil

There is, however, a somewhat more interesting dimension emerging. Over the years, the United States, Japan and South Korea have looked to the Chinese to intercede and persuade the North Koreans not to do anything rash. This diplomatic pattern has established itself so firmly that we wonder what the actual Chinese role is in all this. China is currently engaged in territorial disputes with U.S. allies in the South and East China seas. Whether anyone would or could go to war over islands in these waters is dubious, but the situation is still worth noting.

The Chinese and the Japanese have been particularly hostile toward one another in recent weeks in terms of rhetoric and moving their ships around. A crisis in North Korea, particularly one in which the North tested a nuclear weapon, would inevitably initiate the diplomatic dance whereby the Americans and Japanese ask the Chinese to intercede with the North Koreans. The Chinese would oblige. This is not a great effort for them, since having detonated a nuclear device, the North isn't interested in doing much more. In fact, Pyongyang will be drawing on the test's proverbial fallout for some time. The Chinese are calling in no chits with the North Koreans, and the Americans and Japanese -- terribly afraid of what the ferocious, weak, crazy North Koreans will do next -- will be grateful to China for defusing the "crisis." And who could be so churlish as to raise issues on trade or minor islands when China has used its power to force North Korea to step down?

It is impossible for us to know what the Chinese are thinking, and we have no overt basis for assuming the Chinese and North Koreans are collaborating, but we do note that China has taken an increasing interest in stabilizing North Korea. For its part, North Korea has tended to stage these crises -- and their subsequent Chinese interventions -- at quite useful times for Beijing.

It should also be noted that other countries have learned the ferocious, weak, crazy maneuver from North Korea. Iran is the best pupil. It has convincingly portrayed itself as ferocious via its nuclear program, endlessly and quite publicly pursuing its program without ever quite succeeding. It is also persistently seen as weak, perpetually facing economic crises and wrathful mobs of iPod-wielding youths. Whether Iran can play the weakness card as skillfully as North Korea remains unclear -- Iran just doesn't have the famines North Korea has.

Additionally, Iran's rhetoric at times can certainly be considered crazy: Tehran has carefully cultivated perceptions that it would wage nuclear war even if this meant the death of all Iranians. Like North Korea, Iran also has managed to retain its form of government and its national sovereignty. Endless predictions of the fall of the Islamic republic to a rising generation have proved false.

I do not mean to appear to be criticizing the "ferocious, weak and crazy" strategy. When you are playing a weak hand, such a strategy can yield demonstrable benefits. It preserves regimes, centers one as a major international player and can wring concessions out of major powers. It can be pushed too far, however, when the fear of ferocity and craziness undermines the solace your opponents find in your weakness.

Diplomacy is the art of nations achieving their ends without resorting to war. It is particularly important for small, isolated nations to survive without going to war. As in many things, the paradox of appearing willing to go to war in spite of all rational calculations can be the foundation for avoiding war. It is a sound strategy, and for North Korea and Iran, for the time being at least, it has worked.

Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy is republished with permission of Stratfor.